Abstract

The article describes the system of Burundian political parties as it has formed after 1990. The ruling CNDD-FDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces de défense de la démocratie) and the state security apparatus under its control systematically repress opposition activities. However, certain political parties maintain their organizational cohesion in spite of this pressure and continue to challenge the electoral authoritarian regime. The paper argues that explanations at the level of party organization and society's identity divisions must be combined for the logic of the party system to unravel.

While the CNDD-FDD builds its strength on a clientelistic state-party merger, organizational cohesion of the opposition parties stands and falls with their thin networks of highly committed members. The paper claims that these core structures emerge and maintain long-term cohesion only if the constituencies that the parties represent are sufficiently large, geographically spread and their collective identities sufficiently strong. There are five distinct constituencies with these characteristics that give rise to the five parties in the system. The account is based on an analysis of general elections in 1993, 2005 and 2010 and fieldwork conducted in 2012.

Introduction

As far as Burundi's post-1990 political trajectory is concerned, apart from several election analyses (Palmans 2011; Reyntjens 1993, 2006; Vandeginste 2011) and the voluminous literature about the Burundi's peace process, there has been no attempt to describe the general pattern of competition and cooperation between Burundian political parties as such. More than 20 years after the reintroduction of multipartyism in 1992 and nearly ten years after the first post-conflict elections, it is time to fill this gap. Our interpretation of the Burundian party system is driven by the following question: what is it that enables some opposition parties, and not others, to survive as organizations in the extremely hostile political environment of Burundi? This research question is significant because it sheds light on “variation in the strength and the organizational character of opposition parties [in sub-Saharan Africa]” (LeBas 2011: 21). In a broader perspective, it probes the dynamics of organized political action under repressive circumstances where there is no guarantee of an eventual success of the struggle (Osa and Schock 2007; Osa 2003). In contrast to other scholarship in the field of electoral politics, the article does not look at electoral competition in procedural sense and remains agnostic about the relationship between electoral competition, political parties and party system on one hand, and governance on the other hand.

The text is divided into three sections. The first one outlines the context of Burundian politics and summarizes the history of multiparty competition. The second section describes the political parties' internal organization and the relationship between the parties in terms society-wide identities that underlie the party system. The third section examines the puzzle of opposition parties' cohesion. Namely, it focuses on the parties' main asset: their core members, the character of core members' engagement and their motivational dynamics. Also, a related question of differential strategies of the ruling and opposition parties is discussed. In its conclusion, the paper summarizes the logic of the party system, the theoretical lessons of the case and briefly sketches future political scenarios.

I.

Country Context

Burundi is tiny,1 overpopulated2 and 88.5% of the population is classified as rural (World Bank n.d.). The country was a decentralized kingdom for centuries and, unlike other former colonies in Africa, its current borders overlap with this ancient

1 25,680 km² of land area.
2 398 inhabitants per km² of land area.
political unit. Only two ethnic groups in the primordial sense inhabit the country - Barundi majority (99%) and Twa minority (1%) - and one common language – Kirundi – is used for communication. Historically, the Barundi majority was divided into several caste-like social groups reflecting a complex history of migration, co-habitation and assimilation of two or more ethnically diverse populations. However, a degree of mobility between these groups always existed. As the ritual royal order and the complicated web of inter-group relationships gradually broke down during the colonial and post-colonial periods, two of these categories - Hutu and Tutsi - became dominant, highly antagonistic and acquired racial connotations. In statistical terms, the Tutsis make up 10 to 20% of the population and the Hutus 80 to 90%. Although socio-cultural stereotypes of Hutus and Tutsis exist, two persons meeting for the first time cannot reliably say whether the other is Hutu or Tutsi based on his or her physiognomy, name, language, religion, dress code, etc. The only possibility is to know one’s patrilineage (father’s identity passes on all his children).

Burundi gained independence in 1962 and became a republic in 1966. From 1965 to 1993, a hegemonic Tutsi regime ruled the country and Hutus were excluded from the armed forces, civil service, public sector companies and higher education. Only a single political party, Tutsi-dominated UPRONA, was permitted to function. In addition, since the early 1960s, Burundi has been plagued by episodes of mass violence and political assassinations. Dozens of high-profile politicians were killed, among them three acting prime ministers: prince Louis Rwagasore in 1961, Pierre Ngendandumwe and Léopold Bihumugani alias Biha in 1965; ex-King Charles Ndizeye alias Ntare was killed in 1972, the first democratically elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye was murdered during a bungled coup d'état in 1993, and President Cyprien Ntaryamira perished together with Rwandan President Habyarimana when their plane was shot down in Kigali in 1994. Four waves of mass violence claimed thousands (attempted coup and army break-up in 1965), tens of thousands (communal massacres and army reprisals in 1988) and hundreds of thousands of lives (the selective genocide of Hutus in 1972 and the civil war from 1993 to 2004) (Lemarchand 1970, 1996; Malkki 1995; Samii 2014).

History of Multiparty Competition

Three general elections took place before 1990: municipal elections in 1960 where only men were allowed to vote, and parliamentary elections in 1961 and 1965 with universal suffrage. The key pre-independence elections in 1961 were won by nationalist UPRONA. By 1965, however, UPRONA had become an instrument to legitimize the Tutsi minority rule while “the army was its physical base” (Reyntjens 1993: 573).

Multiparty competition was re-introduced after a period of cautious political liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A new Constitution was approved by a referendum in March 1992 and a law-decreet on political parties promulgated in April 1992 (Reyntjens 1993: 565–566). These documents laid ground for the presidential and National Assembly elections in June and July 1993, respectively. The main challenger of Tutsi-dominated UPRONA was a newly registered, Hutu-dominated FRODEBU. Although the election campaign ostensibly reached across the Hutu/Tutsi categorization, in reality the vote was polarized (Reyntjens 1993: 573–576). In the first poll, FRODEBU’s candidate Ndadaye gained 65% of votes and became the country's first democratically elected President (Reyntjens 1993: 569). In the subsequent parliamentary elections, held according to the system of proportional representation, six political parties fielded their candidates and FRODEBU emerged victorious with even a larger margin of 73% (Table 1). The coup in October 1993, during which Ndadaye was murdered, and the maelstrom of civil war put electoral competition to a halt for 12 years.

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3 Kirundi and French are the two official languages of Burundí. French is used in higher education and to communicate with foreigners.
4 XXX Hamitic myth.
5 Full names of all political parties mentioned in the text are listed in Table 1.
Table 1
General election results in 1993 and 2005 (National Assembly), and 2010 (local government)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of registered voters</td>
<td>2,360,090</td>
<td>3,167,124</td>
<td>3,555,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter turnout</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>1993 Result (%)</th>
<th>2005 Result (%)</th>
<th>2010 Result (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU (Front pour la démocratie au Burundi)</td>
<td>72.54</td>
<td>21.70</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPRONA (Unité pour le progrès national)</td>
<td>21.89</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPB (Rassemblement du peuple burundais)</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP (Parti pour la réconciliation du peuple)</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADDDES (Ralliement pour la démocratie et le développement économique et social)</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP (Parti du peuple)</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD-FDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces de défense de la démocratie)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.55</td>
<td>64.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC (Mouvement de rassemblement pour la réhabilitation du citoyen-Rurenzangemero)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARENA (Parti pour le redressement national)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALIPE-Agakiza (Parti libérateur du peuple burundais-Agakiza)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL (Forces nationales pour la libération)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD (Mouvement pour la solidarité et la démocratie)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPD (Union pour la paix et la démocratie)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU Nyakuri (Salwanya FRODEBU Nyakuri-Iragi rya Ndadaye)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* included in “Others”

Note: For 2010, local government election results are used because the elections to the National Assembly were boycotted.

Sources:

The framework for the elections in 2005 and 2010 was provided by the post-conflict Constitution of 18 April 2005 which is based on peace agreements from 2000 and 2003 (Vandeginste 2009: 71–74). The Constitution is “markedly consociational, attempting … to combine majority rule with minority protection” (Reyntjens 2006: 119). Among provisions in this vein, it stipulates proportions of Hutus and Tutsis in the government, in the parliament and on the electoral party lists; out of two vice-presidents, one has to be from a predominantly Hutu and the other one from a predominantly Tutsi party; and every political party that obtains at least 5% of votes is entitled to participate in the government while the number of its ministerial posts should be proportionate to the number of its MPs (Reyntjens 2006: 119–120; Vandeginste 2009: 74–78). The electoral system remains the same, i.e. proportional representation with closed party lists and the country’s 17 provinces being equal to 17 electoral districts. Importantly, the most intransigent Hutu armed movement, PALIPEHUTU-FNL (Parti de libération du peuple hutu-Forces nationales pour la libération), signed a peace agreement only in 2008 and did not take part in the first post-conflict elections.

Both the local government and the National Assembly elections in 2005 were won by the strongest Hutu armed rebellion CNDD-FDD, now transformed into a political party of the same name (Table 1). Compared to 1993, the vote did not pitch Hutus against the Tutsis but several Hutu-dominated parties competed for the same Hutu and Tutsi electorate and several Tutsi-dominated parties were vying for their Tutsi compatriots (cf. Reyntjens 2006: 122–128). FRODEBU, profiting from the PALIPEHUTU-FNL absence, ended up the second and UPRONA the third. The President was elected indirectly, during...
a joint session of the National Assembly and the Senate. There was only one candidate, CNDD-FDD chairman Pierre Nkurunziza, who obtained 151 votes out of 166 possible (Reyntjens 2006: 129).

Similarly to 2005, the voting marathon in 2010 opened with local government elections. It was the first post-conflict poll with full opposition participation: PALIPEHUTU-FNL transformed into a political party FNL a year earlier. According to the official results, CNDD-FDD increased its lead from 59 to 64%, FNL gained 14% and FRODEBU fell from 22 to 5% because it lost the extra FNL votes from 2005 (Table 1). Shortly after the polling day, all main opposition parties, including UPRONA, alleged massive fraud and withdrew their candidates from the presidential election a month later. Thus, CNDD-FDD’s Nkurunziza was elected for his second term in office unopposed. UPRONA later decided to participate in the National Assembly elections but all other important opposition parties boycotted them which meant that between one quarter to one third of voters are not represented in the parliament. As shown in Table 1 above, a total of 15 parties scored 0.5% of votes or more in at least one of the three election rounds. In the rest of the article, we will argue that only five of them form the country's party system: CNDD-FDD, FNL, FRODEBU, MSD, and UPRONA.

II.

Organization of Political Parties

To prepare the terrain for the analytical part of the paper, we are going to contrast organization of the ruling CNDD-FDD and the opposition parties. In spite of the nominal power-sharing, we call all parties, except CNDD-FDD and FRODEBU Nyakuri, opposition because it corresponds better to the nature of their relationship with the regime. We rely primarily on our fieldwork material and supplement it with other sources where we deem it necessary. There are two general tendencies that cross-cut the ruling versus opposition dichotomy. Firstly, UPRONA, FRODEBU and CNDD-FDD, by virtue of being former or current ruling parties, have their structures more stable and their internal procedures more developed. Secondly, the decision-making procedures within the former armed movements are less transparent than in other parties.

CNDD-FDD

Since coming to power in 2005, CNDD-FDD has successfully created a party-state merger. Difference between government representatives and public servants on one hand, and party cadres on the other hand, is intentionally blurred; a phenomenon that is best visible at the municipal level. State resources are routinely used to finance and provide logistics for party activities.

In addition, CNDD-FDD has stable sources of funding that combine its control over appointments to public sector jobs

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6 The senators, two from each province, are elected by a college of all local government councillors of the respective province.

7 Validity of the local government election results in 2010 should be taken with a degree of caution. A Burundian non-governmental organization that fielded the biggest number of election observers reported intimidation of voters in front of polling stations (COSOME 2010a, 2010b: 6). Although the reports do not name any specific party it is reasonable to assume that CNDD-FDD cadres were responsible. The head of another Burundian non-governmental organization observing the 2010 polls reported additional examples of electoral manipulation by the CNDD-FDD outside urban centres (vote buying and secrecy of the ballot compromised) in a private conversation with the author in 2010 (cf. Nzobonimpa 2013b; cf. Vandeginste 2011:318).

8 The more radical opposition parties also withdrew their members from the newly elected local government councils.

9 FRODEBU Naykuri (Real FRODEBU in English), a satellite of CNDD-FDD, is a FRODEBU splinter led by veteran politician and political entrepreneur Jean Minani. The party functions on clientelist principles and is regionally based.

10 Besides several months of desk research of both primary and secondary sources in French and English, the text draws on a fieldwork that the author conducted in Burundi over 30 days in autumn 2012. The fieldwork included 24 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with members of Burundian political parties and four other persons. Altogether, 23 members from seven different political parties (CNDD, CNDD-FDD, FNL, FRODEBU, MSD, Sangwe-PADER, and UPRONA) participated in the interviews. In terms of hierarchy, four respondents were national level party officials, 14 were middle rank officials (regional, provincial and communal), two were lower-level officials (hillside), and three were regular party members. The interviews took place in seven different provinces: Bujumbura, Cibitoke, Gitega, Kirundo, Muramvya, Muyinga, and Ngozi. Informed consent procedure was performed with all respondents. The conversations were not recorded; only hand-written notes were taken. The shortest interview lasted 30 minutes, the longest one 150 minutes, the average length was 87 minutes, total interview time was 34.5 hours.

11 XXX A fuller account of the parties’ organization can be found in (XXX).
with clientelism: it offers job security in exchange of a portion of one's salary regularly deposited on a bank account belonging to the party. Supposedly, the more one pays, the higher the probability one will be promoted or otherwise rewarded, and vice versa.12

The party's territorial penetration is very deep in most provinces. According to a CNDD-FDD cadre, “for each household we know who is with us and who is not, whether a member of the household is in the party”.13 While this is certainly an exaggeration, where CNDD-FDD structures do exist, they are not imaginary: regular meetings are held, attendance sheets signed, minutes taken, reports written and archived, small- or large-scale activities organized. As witnessed during the fieldwork, the party is highly active throughout the election cycle, especially in terms of recruitment of new members and assessment of individual voting behaviour at the level of even the smallest party segments. Heads of segments compile names of new members and voters into lists and forward them to higher-level structures; from the provincial level upward, these lists can be computerized. CNDD-FDD possesses new large headquarters in Bujumbura, inaugurated in 2011. A provincial office may have ten, twenty, thirty full-time and part-time employees; membership in provincial committees is a paid post. The party has a youth wing, so called Imbonerakure (translated from Kirundi as “those who see far into the distance”), that intimidate and harass opposition member and sympathizers; in some places, they have more authority than regular police forces (Amnesty International 2014: 24–31; Human Rights Watch 2012: 18–19).

CNDD-FDD regularly holds national congresses; at least two ordinary and five extraordinary congresses have been held since “congrès constitutif” in 2004 (XXX). The party does not seem to have any consultative procedures for resolving internal conflicts and formulating policies; its decision-making is highly centralized. An extreme example is so called “Conseil des Sages”14: a supreme body composed of 11 persons, six “confirmed” by the national congress and five named by the party’s president, which has the right to expel disloyal party members (cf. Nzobonimpa 2013a). In case they happen to be elected members of the parliament or a communal council, they would lose their seat which would then pass onto the next party member on the closed election list (Uwamahoro 2011; Vandeginste 2011: 328).15

Opposition parties

Systematic repression is the single most important constraint on opposition party activities and organization. It has significantly increased since the 2010 election boycott.16 In ranges from assassinations to intimidation and threats, either by police, secret service, local administration, CNDD-FDD cadres, or Imbonerakure. Membership in an opposition party may cause one problems in terms of getting a job, being promoted, doing business, and when dealing with state authorities. Detentions of members of provincial and communal committees are common and may last weeks. The detained officials are told that they are suspected of crimes such as financial fraud, terrorism, attempting to organize an armed uprising, possession of arms, or insulting the government. In general, the repression is less severe in towns and harsher in the hills where it comes mainly from local government officials. Intensity of the repression is also province-specific and depends on who is the provincial governor and police chief.17

Apart from the country-wide repression aimed at individual party representatives, members and sympathizers, the opposition parties are also targeted as organizations in legal-bureaucratic sense. CNDD-FDD, helped by the ministry of interior and the judiciary, attempts to weaken, split or ban the parties under various formalistic and procedural pretexts. For example, opposition party members may be enticed to convene a congress to depose an exiled leader, fractions are created to split parties in two, disagreements about the application of party statutes are used by the authorities to interfere with internal party affairs, etc. All important parties have been affected: FRODEBU in 2008, FNL in 2010, UPD in 2011, UPRONA and MSD in 2014 (Amnesty International 2014: 18–20). As of July 2014, the main bodies of FNL (Agathon Rwasa), UPD (Chauvineau

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12 Interestingly, a member of MSD claimed that the whole thing was exaggerated and the presumed clientelist exchange was based, to a large extent, on people's fear and paranoia.
13 Interview with a CNDD-FDD member in autumn 2012.
14 Translated from French as “Council of The Wise”.
15 Electoral Code as amended on 18 September 2009, Article 112.
16 The paragraph is based on fieldwork interviews; further details on political repression and violence in Burundi can be found in reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group.
17 A recent example shows the repression can be truly draconian. In March 2014, MSD members clashed with the police at the party headquarters in Bujumbura; eight members of MSD and five policemen were injured. Ten days after the confrontation, in a trial lasting one day, “21 individuals were sentenced to life in prison. Ten were sentenced to ten years in prison while another 14 were sentenced to five years in prison” (Amnesty International 2014: 10–11).
Mugwengezo) and UPRONA (Charles Nditije) were all technically illegal (RFI 2014). MSD was suspended for four months after their militants clashed with the police in March 2014.

The repression causes an overall paralysis of party functioning, especially at communal and lower levels. Apart from the capital Bujumbura, by far the largest urban centre, the parties have some presence in provincial towns only. The strongest opposition party FNL has operated underground since summer 2010. The measures taken by individuals vis-à-vis the repression range from hiding for weeks in Kigali, moving to relatives elsewhere in Burundi, sleeping outside one's home for extended periods of time because one is supposedly on the “list of the condemned”, etc. A chair of a party segment may hide their archive in an underground cache in the bush, party structures stop communicating in writing, committee members at all levels stop holding regular meetings and switch to informal channels to exchange information. They meet casually in public places, in small groups or just one to one; in some provinces they may be able to hold discrete meetings in private houses or restaurants.

The second biggest constraint on opposition activities is a lack of funding. The state does not contribute and the parties are funded by their members and sympathizers. Contributions in cash, in kind or in labour are sought especially during election campaigns, and one’s recognition of membership is dependent on them. A member or sympathiser can help by buying a hat or T-shirt with party logo, one can give or lend a bike or motorcycle to the party, to pay for fuel, party representatives on the campaign trail can ask for favours such as transport, food or drink. During the 2010 elections, this system came under pressure because CNDD-FDD started to give out material in large quantities to their followers rather than asking them to finance the campaign. MPs or other high-ranking state official would deposit a portion of their salary on the party account if the job was obtained thanks to the party. However, since 2010, even these relatively stable sources of funding have dried up because of the election boycott, governmental clampdown and volatile political climate.

Party membership is largely informal, only UPRONA routinely keeps record of its members. There was a wave of defections to CNDD-FDD, especially of provincial and communal presidents, after the 2010 local government elections; since then, hardly anybody has applied for membership. Members’ loyalty is verified informally, via contacts in the person’s social network or by asking the person to perform a small task for the party. Territorial penetration of the opposition is meagre at best. The weaker the party, the thinner the network of its committed cadres and activists. As of autumn 2012, even relatively strong parties such as FNL, FRODEBU and MSD, had only a handful of reliable and capable members of local committees (provincial and communal) in each of the 17 provinces, if any at all. Smaller parties, such as CNDD, UPD and MRC, were largely limited to the capital. UPRONA as an unofficial representative of the Tutsi minority, is the only opposition party that has some functioning segments in the hills – those with a high concentration of Tutsis. As for administrative support and office space, only the former governing parties – UPRONA, and, to a much smaller extent, FRODEBU – have something that could be called an “apparatus”. UPRONA’s spacious headquarters in Bujumbura harbour a few paid officials and support staff and the party can afford to have a small office with a secretary at the provincial level. FRODEBU employs two persons plus a guard in Bujumbura and nobody at lower levels. FNL, MSD, UPD, CNDD and others may have no regularly paid staff whatsoever and their headquarters are shuttered for most of the time or non-existent. The opposition formations, again with a partial exception of UPRONA and FRODEBU, produce hardly any written documents because their structures ceased functioning or they do not want to take the risk; archives of many of their segments have been hidden; some are in possession of ex-members who defected to the CNDD-FDD.

The opposition parties’ supreme organs have been in disarray for several years due to the combination of repression, legal-bureaucratic pressure and exiled leadership. FNL’s Rwasa went to hiding already in June 2010; he resurfaced in Bujumbura in 2013 but is formally without a party. MSD’s Sinduhije left Burundi in August 2010, returned in 2013 and went to exile again after the events in March 2014; an arrest warrant issued for him. UPD’s presidential candidate from 2010, Pascaline Kampayano, also returned in 2013 but her party is split. CNDD's Léonard Nyangoma remains in exile. UPRONA has been in turmoil at least since 2011 because of the conflict between pro-governmental and oppositional wings and the subsequent meddling by the minister of interior from CNDD-FDD. Only FRODEBU appears to have withstood all trappings and the party’s 5th ordinary congress took place in 2011.18

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18 It does not mean that leaders of FRODEBU are not spared of police harassment. The party’s vice president, Frédéric Bamvuvginaryumira, one of the most influential opposition figures and a possible common opposition candidate for the presidency in 2015, spent 3.5 months in detention between December 2013 and March 2014 (Amnesty International 2014: 21–23).
Parties and collective identities

In this section, we describe the relationships between the Burundian political parties in terms of the society-wide political identities that they embody. These identities hinge on three historical processes/events: (1) the 1972 selective genocide of Hutus, (2) the civil war from 1993 to 2004 and (3) the post-conflict spread of liberal democratic faith. Two things should be noted. Firstly, all these identities are inherently political; i.e. they did not come into being via activities of political entrepreneurs. Secondly, both the historical processes and the political identities that they engendered, are rooted in the profoundly hierarchical character of the Burundian society, i.e. the caste-like social differentiation and its modern permutations.

The selective genocide of Hutus in 1972

The fortunes of UPRONA and FRODEBU are shaped by the 1972 killings. UPRONA was originally set up as a project of the royal Bezi clan without Hutu/Tutsi connotations. After the murder of Rwagasore in 1961, the society started to split along Hutu/Tutsi lines and the party was gradually taken over by Tutsis. The selective genocide of 150,000 to 200,000 educated and influential Hutus was mainly perpetrated by the army, controlled by a Tutsi clan from Bururi province (Samii 2014: 213–214). The army was helped by UPRONA's militant youth wing, Jeunesses révolutionnaires Rwagasore (Lemarchand 2008). There are no indications that the party itself was directly implicated. On the other hand, ideologues of the UPRONA regime always justified the exclusion of the Hutus from political and economic life by their supposed genocidal tendencies vis-à-vis the Tutsis (Lemarchand 1996: 23–27). Given the fact that a small-scale Hutu uprising preceded the 1972 killings, some interpret the selective genocide “as a Tutsi response to the perceived threats posed to their security by … Hutu attacks” (Lemarchand 1996: 27). More than 40 years later, many Tutsis vote and join Hutu-dominated parties, including former armed movements such as CNDD-FDD; others continue to see UPRONA as the guarantor of safety of the Tutsi minority.

FRODEBU emerged from the refugee wave caused by the 1972 events. In contrast to other refugee organizations such as PALIPEHU, the goal of FRODEBU was to change power balance in Burundi via political means rather than armed struggle. Even after many FRODEBU politicians were murdered during and after the 1993 coup, the majority of FRODEBU leaders refused to rescind their politics of non-violence (cf. Bundervoet 2009). The party has never had an armed wing subordinated to it. The party's representatives elected in 1993 held positions in the government and other state institutions throughout the civil war despite the tens of thousands of Hutu civilians killed by the Tutsi-dominated "monoethnic" army. The refusal of the party leadership to join the armed struggle cost FRODEBU a substantial portion of its credibility: it failed to protect the population that brought it to power. In any case, the decade of war did not change the party's ethos and the pursuit of non-violent politics defines FRODEBU until the present. Three important fractions left the party over the years to found their own formations: Léonard Nyangoma, opting for armed resistance, founded CNDD in 1994, Augustin Nzoijibwami created Sangwe-Pader party in 2002 and Jean Minani launched FRODEBU Nyakuri in 2008. None of these splinter parties has ever beaten the popularity of the core group that keeps carrying the original label. At the same time, FRODEBU cannot free itself of the tragic historical heritage, a burden which limits its appeal to more forward-looking and younger opposition sympathizers.

The 1993-2004 civil war

The civil war defines the relationship between CNDD-FDD and FNL. Since their inception, the Hutu armed movements had undergone repeated splits. A World Bank (2004: 17) report listed seven such groups with at least one thousand fighters each. For extended periods of time, members of these armed movements were exposed to the dangers and discomfort of bush fighting; they share experience of misery and violence, as both victims and perpetrators. In the end, many regular fighters were integrated into the army and other security forces, others received financial support to help them to return to civilian life. Their leaders became army colonels, police chiefs, heads of government departments, or even MPs.

19 It is interesting the to compare the World Bank (2004: 17) estimates with the much lower numbers of actually demobilized combatants two years later (Daley 2008: 226).
The solidarity derived from the shared experience of violent struggle makes the ex-rebellion parties distinct. Long-term loyalty to the group is expected. For example, an MSD member mentioned that ex-combatants from CNDD-FDD and FNL did not take part in his party’s primaries because their former fellow combatants would consider it a betrayal. According to other respondents, party politics are permeated by culture of violence imported from the times of the civil war because the former fighters “do not know anything else”. This was corroborated in an interview with one ex-combatants turned CNDD-FDD member who viewed himself and his colleagues as the party’s military wing in reserve. A lukewarm CNDD-FDD member characterized the situation in the following way: “the core people of CNDD-FDD come from the "maquis" (jungle); they are not educated and for this reason they have an inferiority complex; while they were fighting, others were going to school; they will not relinquish power, they are like Kagame”.

During the peace process, the armed movements pursued different strategies that seem to rely, other motivations aside, on a cultural stereotype that a respondent from MSD called Hutu “obédience” (obedience to a superior and, by extension, allegiance to the group): the idea, that, in the end, Hutu population will flock around one decisive winner and strong leader. The more radical stance of PALIPEHUTU-FNL vis-à-vis Tutsi representation in the post-conflict institutions eventually backfired and CNDD-FDD took the lead (cf. Falch 2008: 3–4). However, as the 2010 elections confirmed, FNL remains the most serious challenger of CNDD-FDD, with the same hard-core loyalties forged in battle. Relationship between the two parties is extremely hostile. Being asked why he chose to join FNL over other opposition parties, a university-educated FNL representative replied: “An army is defeated only by another army”.

**Liberal democratic faith**

The faith in “true democracy” defines MSD. This source of identity is best conceptualized as a modern-day religion (Swidler 2010: 165–167). In Burundi, it originates in the contemporary co-existence of two extreme life-worlds with little space in between: the young, westernised urban elite and the poor peasants practising subsistence economy. Many of those who broaden their horizon by dint of higher education or contact with Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are irresistibly pulled toward the liberal democratic project as if it was offering salvation to the problems of the country. Simultaneously, a gap of world-views and imagination opens between them and the peasants. The discourse on democracy and good governance leaves the parochial peasantry unimpressed. It is no coincidence that MSD relies on spreading its message via party members who are teachers in regular contact with students and pupils who are then supposed to influence their parents and relatives. Of course, not all "intellectuels" become apostles of democracy and join MSD. As we have mentioned in the previous paragraph, repression and heavy-handedness of the regime pushes some of them towards more confrontational politics.

More reasons for why we do not include other parties in the system will become apparent in the rest of the paper. Here, we have focused on the underlying identities. It appears that each of them supports only one or two (competing) parties. There is no “space” for other parties whose existence is grounded, in one way or another, in the former Hutu armed movements as well: CNDD, UPD and PALIPE-Agakiza. Similarly, MRC and PARENA, are both instruments of Tutsi military-commercial elite; there does not seem to be a long-term popular demand for more than one Tutsi-oriented formation. Having defined the basic relationships between the parties, we are ready to analyse in greater detail their organizational cohesion and competition strategies.

**III. Cohesion**

CNDD-FDD’s cohesion is relatively easy to explain. Its representatives and members have access to otherwise scarce resources, material or otherwise. The fact that clientelism or outright corruption are often involved, hardly bothers them. In addition, the party can draw on ties forged during the civil war. From the point of view of ordinary rural dwellers, CNDD-FDD governance is not a failure either. The state delivers a range of public goods, hence, the middle and lower level cadres, who are in close contact with the population, have nothing to be ashamed of. There have been only two occasions when internal friction boiled over. In 2007, a party strongmen Hussein Radjabu was demoted and later imprisoned; in 2011, a
member of Conseil des Sages, Manassé Nzobonimpa, publicly denounced corruption of some high-ranking CNDD-FDD officials and was subsequently expelled from the party. Neither case had any serious consequences besides the loyalists of Radjabu splitting off and creating a minor UPD opposition party.

The problem arises when we try to explain the cohesion of the Burundian opposition parties. The topic was taken up by LeBas (2011) in her comparative study of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Kenya. She carefully analyses the hostile operating environment and remains sceptical about the capability of parties in hybrid regimes to maintain strength and stability over longer periods of time: “they may be able to mobilize mass constituencies and even win elections, but they are likely to, eventually, fall prey to the collapse of mobilization or the fragmentation of the party at the elite level” (LeBas 2011: 25).

Drawing on contentious politics scholarship, LeBas (2011: 36–47) argues that strong parties emerge via polarization of the party landscape and creation of identity barriers that “hollow out” the middle ground. However, the Burundian opposition parties do not resemble LeBas’ (2011) prime example of the working of this mechanism, the Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe. In Burundi, the opposition parties do not make use of any pre-existing, large-scale mobilizing structures such as trade unions in Zimbabwe or Zambia; rather, they rely on informal, personal networks. In LeBas’ (2011: 37) opinion, such parties “[are] characterized by fragmentation and more tenuous ties to popular constituencies”. In contrast to LeBas’ (2011) expectations, we consider the Burundian opposition parties remarkably resilient. Simultaneously, they are not particularly strong from an organizational point of view, especially as far as mass mobilization and decision-making procedures are concerned (cf. LeBas 2011:24–26). Strikingly, they are also unlikely to succeed electorally. Their chances to seize power via “free and fair” elections are improbable at best. The regime not only relies on a safe base of rural voters. It can also manipulate the electoral process in an infinite number of ways, if necessary. Yet, the opposition parties keep on going.

At this point, we should ask whether the opposition parties in Burundi are relevant at all. Do they pose a challenge to the CNDD-FDD regime or not? And if yes, what kind of challenge precisely? We think that they do pose a challenge. Firstly, during the fieldwork in autumn 2012, opposition party members held strong convictions about the role of their parties in Burundian politics and were already deliberating how to organize the 2015 election campaign. Out of nine opposition cadres interviewed, only one, from CNDD, admitted that he was losing hope in opposition politics. The cadres claimed that their provincial committees had remained functional despite the defections and that lower-level committees could be rekindled. Although there was certainly some wishful thinking on the part of the respondents, a sense of purpose and determination was palpable. Secondly, other signs of determination and readiness could be observed: (a) after their return from exile in 2013, FNL’s Rwasa and MSD’s Sinduhije repeatedly declared that their parties would compete in 2015, (b) the opposition parties, including UPRONA, held several public meetings or attempted to do so, defying state repression, (c) the opposition alliance ADC-Ikibiri announced a plan to put forward a common presidential candidate in 2015, (d) the parties participated in United Nations-sponsored negotiations with the government, pre-electoral workshops, etc. Thirdly, judging by the 2010 official results, the opposition parties are not electorally weak either. The ADC-Ikibiri members FNL, FRODEBU, MSD, UPD, and CNDD obtained 26,8%; together with UPRONA their score was 33% (Table 1). Taking into account some degree of electoral manipulation, these parties enjoy genuine popular support of at least 35 to 40%.

What lesson should we draw from this picture that combines weakness with strength? Most importantly, our analysis suggests that the opposition parties as organizations are kept afloat by a limited number of core members who do not profit from their political engagement in any tangible way, rather the opposite. Also, it seems that the challenge to the regime does not consist as much in an immediate threat of electoral defeat but in the fact that the opposition formations take political competition seriously. They are a constant reminder that the struggle for power is on, that there are aspirants to the highest posts in waiting and they are ready to weather the repression. As party organization is integral to our explanation of the party system, we cannot leave the question of cohesion without further inquiry. Who are the core members and where does the loyalty to their parties come from? Since the mainstream literature on political parties does not tackle this problem, we have to expand our disciplinary scope. We will do so in three steps, examining the following topics: (1) the character of the core members’ engagement, (2) the core members’ motivational dynamics and (3) the concept of identity as a link between the individual and social orders.

21 XXX Comment on the exceptionalism of UPRONA
22 In comparison to CNDD-FDD, there are much fewer ex-combatants in FNL structures.
23 XXX Comment on ADC-Ikibiri.
Let us start with the character of engagement. We will approach it via psychologically-oriented scholarship on long-term retention of social movement activists by using Bunnage's (2014) literature review. Our goal is to find out if the character of the core members' engagement, in the light of this closely related research, is conducive to their retention or not.

**Table 2**  
Character of Burundian core party members' engagement in terms of Bunnage’s (2014) review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Character of engagement</th>
<th>Conductive to retention?</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Well educated; salaried employment which is not of entrepreneurial nature</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Biographical availability</td>
<td>Men from 20 to 40 years of age</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Some of them married with children, others not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Highly committed to broad, rather than concrete, social goals</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>Believed they could &quot;make a difference&quot; as they competed for representative positions at various levels of government: national, provincial, communal, etc.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>They saw the 2010 election boycott as counter-productive but understood it as a past mistake that will not be repeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social relations</td>
<td>Sense of camaraderie and loyalty</td>
<td>Expressed solidarity with fellow activists and the parties' leadership and they strongly identified with their parties' cause</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Campaign activities and holding regular, more or less conspiratorial meeting, in between elections, undoubtedly strengthen social ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social networks</td>
<td>Diverse; depended on how the particular party was formed and the individual in question; if a network played a role, it was of informal character</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>They reported that they joined their parties through their own volition, some were members of a network that the founders of the party targeted**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structure of organization</td>
<td>Emphasis on intra-party democracy at provincial and lower levels appeared to make participation more enjoyable†</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Tendency to centralized, top-down decision-making at the national level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demands by organization</td>
<td>Low demands in terms of time, energy and money</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collective rituals</td>
<td>All parties have rituals that they perform at the beginning and end of their public meetings</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The parties employ a range symbolic party emblem, colour combination, flag, slogan, hand sign, anthem, member's pledge, membership card, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership in organization</td>
<td>In parties whose national leaders were exiled, a sense of lost direction was palpable and the core members found it harder to stay motivated</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Paucity of data to make a more precise assessment  
** MSD – teachers, clarify formal and informal aspect  
† Difference between MSD and others  

As shown in Table 2, character of the engagement at the individual and social relations levels is predominantly conducive to retention (5x Yes and 1x Neutral). At the level of organization, the results of our probe are mixed (2x Yes, 1x Neutral, 1x No). Of course, the only variable which clearly does not encourage retention (leadership in organization) is completely beyond the parties' control. The party leaders did not go to exile out of their whim but were forced to do so. In any case, the general tendency is obvious. The grid summarizes the main traits of the core members and allows us to conclude that the nature of their engagement in congruent with the findings of psychologically oriented literature on social movements.

**Motivational dynamics**

While the overall character of the core members' engagement is conducive to their retention, their motivational dynamics of remain unclear. In political parties literature, the continuing involvement is explained by members' incentives (Ware 1996: 67–78). The writing on incentives is rooted in collective action theory and the free rider problem. In our opinion, this approach does not do justice to our puzzle: the emergence of core members and their long-term struggle on behalf of
particular political identities in an extremely hostile, though nominally competitive, environment. In contrast to the previous section, where we relied on an analogy with social movements, here we are going to present our own understanding of the matter.

Several characteristics of the core party members appear to be important to grasp their motivation. Above all, they belong local elites but not in the sense of coming from high-status or wealthy family networks; rather, they are elites because they managed to rise above the peasant life-style. They achieved secondary or university education; they are able to read and write both in Kirundi and French; they secured qualified, salaried jobs; they know the “big world”. Some of them got involved in politics at the primary school during the civil war already, others during their university studies in Bujumbura. Some of them joined the political parties on their own, others were solicited by leadership of the parties during their formative period and accepted out of sense of responsibility. Who else should take part in the political fermentation if not them, “les intellectuels” with the right administrative, communication and organizational skills and contacts. The core members tend to be more closely identified with the party as organization than the popular constituency they represent, if nothing else then because of the cultural gap. At the same time, the fieldwork showed that they had no doubt that their parties’ constituencies are sizeable enough to merit their party’s existence. Importantly, some have first-hand experience of being temporarily involved with CNDD-FDD, from the times when it was still an armed movement or during its formative period as a political party before and after the 2005 elections; but, for various reasons, CNDD-FDD did not appeal to them. They deliberately chose to oppose CNDD-FDD and they think that they can withstand the repression and its biographical consequences. Those with “opportunist” motives left the opposition after the 2010 election boycott.

Conceptually, we consider fruitful to view the core members as a mixture of Tetlock’s (2002) intuitive politicians and theologians who are simultaneously, in social psychological terminology, high identifiers (Simon et al. 1998; cf. Van Zomeren and Spears 2009). The latter characteristic is almost self-evident. It is well known that close identification with a politicized social movement organization is a strong determinant of participation (cf. Klandermans 2004: 367; Simon and Klandermans 2001: 328); there is no reason to believe it would be otherwise in Burundian political parties.24 As for the former characteristic, Tetlock’s (2002) model is highly abstract. Intuitive politicians and theologians (and prosecutors) are metaphors25 of social functionalism or “functional orientation[s] that the vast majority of people can, under the right activating conditions, adopt toward the social world” (Tetlock 2002: 452). Tetlock (2002) contrasts them with intra-psychic functional orientations, that of an intuitive economist and scientist, which have dominated social sciences until now, including the research on collective action. In principle, all five orientations exist in every individual. The essence of the intuitive politician metaphor consists in the presumption that people “are accountable to a variety of constituencies, and[ ]they suffer consequences when they fail to create desired impressions on key constituencies” (Tetlock 2002:454). Elsewhere, referring to the same metaphor, Tetlock (1999: 119) notes that “[t]he central function of judgement and choice is ... to protect one’s social identity in the eyes of key constituencies”. The core of the intuitive theologian metaphor is “the goal of reaffirming individual and group commitment to the sacred value”, i.e. “values that—by community consensus—are deemed beyond quantification or fungibility” (Tetlock 2002: 454). The concepts of intuitive politician and theologian illuminates several important features of the core members’ motivational dynamics. Firstly, it is the members’ acute awareness that there held accountable by three different constituencies: their party organization, their party’s potential voters and the regime (cf. Simon and Klandermans 2001: 322–323). In this sense, the core members resemble skilful “constituency managers” that carefully walk the line between the three constituencies. Secondly, once a person forms his or her “opposition” and “party” identities, they cannot be easily changed without “losing face”. Thirdly, to a smaller or larger extent, moral dimension seems to be integral to the act of opposition participation (cf. van Zomeren 2013: 381–382).’

Identity: connecting the individual and institutional orders

Having examined the core members’ character of engagement and the dynamics that motivate them, the key role of identity in our account of opposition party cohesion becomes apparent: identity gives meaning to the core members’ political behaviour, it connects them to their parties, and through their parties, it links them to the wider society. In Jenkin’s (2008: 40) words, “[t]he proper sociological place for the concept of ‘identity’ is at the heart of our thinking about the relationships between concrete individual behaviour and the necessary abstraction of collectivity”.

24 See the variable “Sense of camaraderie and loyalty” in Table 2.
25 One should always keep in mind that they are metaphors only. Saying that someone acts as an intuitive politicians, for example, does not mean that the person would necessarily be pulled toward becoming a real-life politician.
In terms of the topic of our paper, i.e. capturing the logic of the Burundian party system, the identity-centred approach pinpoints the processes that lie at the roots of the parties cohesion. Firstly, by virtue of the country's tumultuous political trajectory and the nominally competitive legal-bureaucratic framework, there are political minded and morally driven individuals that are deeply committed to practising opposition politics. However, given the harsh circumstances, they are only few. Secondly, once such a person, by virtue of his or her life course trajectory, commits to a party on the highly charged political scene, the person is making a far-reaching “identity statement”. Since the society's identity divisions are so profound, changing one's allegiance is difficult not only with regards to the pro-regime and opposition camps, but also between different opposition parties.

Party strategies

The last theme to examine before we conclude the article are differential goals and strategies of the ruling and opposition parties. The overarching goal of the CNDD-FDD is to stay in power indefinitely; the idea of ceding power is simply inadmissible. 'No one will leave voluntarily at the end of the mandate, it is an African problem', summarized the issue a young teacher. In this light, the CNDD-FDD's concerted efforts to turn elections into a tool to legitimize its hegemony, make perfect sense. CNDD-FDD attempts to isolate rural voters and to prevent alternative political discourses from reaching them. The party has already lost the capital city: in Bujumbura, it obtained mere 28% of votes in the 2010 communal elections (Vandeginste 2011: 318). “As yet people have not grasped what politics is about; it will change gradually; their expectations will slowly increase; they will want to make choices as town people do; but for the moment they are happy with the little they have”, explained a village priest and pointed at a ragged man (who evidently had nothing) sleeping on a ledge in the middle of the afternoon. One is tempted to say that the party pursues a kind of “bread and circuses” policy towards the rural voters. On one hand, it delivers tangible public goods such as peace, security, roads, schools, health care, etc. “Since 2005 [in seven years], the CNDD-FDD has done more for the people than the UPRONA in 30 years”, noted an otherwise not very eager member of the party. On the other hand, CNDD-FDD organizes various small- and large-scale social events, celebrations, festivals, sports competitions, etc. and practises mass pre-electoral gift-giving.

The opposition parties' primary goal is to survive as organizations and to focus on elections. Maintaining cohesion, i.e. withstanding outside pressure to fragment and for members to defect, is of utmost importance. The parties' main asset are their highly committed human resources. If the circumstances permit it, the parties keep intra-party communication active and their segments hold mandatory meetings. They may stage a public celebration of the anniversary of their founding to lift the members' spirits. By doing so, the party also sends a signal to its constituency that it is still operational. But even these kinds of events are often suppressed by the authorities. Convening a protest demonstration means risking a mass arrest. The party resembles an organizational structure in reserve that is waiting for the right moment to be put in motion. The party's constituency does not demand much more as its identity is deeply carved anyway. Once cohesion is secured, the party will channel its limited human and financial resources into planning of the election campaign which it will then execute with maximum efficiency and creativity.

Conclusion

The Burundian party system consists of one hegemonic party (CNDD-FDD) and four opposition parties (FNL, FRODEBU, UPRONA, and MSD). Each of the five parties in the system represents a sizeable constituency with a distinct and strong identity that reflects large-scale historical processes and events during the past 60 years. The contrasting identities of these constituencies are inscribed in the parties’ formation and evolution and have created a relatively stable but sharp-edged political scene. The strong political identities divide the opposition but simultaneously keep individual opposition parties cohesive. Each of them relies on its own network of core members that are ready for a long-term opposition activity. While the ruling CNDD-FDD attempts to maintain and extend its hegemony via the party-state merger and the tight control over its reservoir of rural voters, it cannot eliminate the four opposition parties because their constituencies are large enough to produce sufficient numbers of highly committed followers and they are geographically spread to penetrate the whole territory. Given the extreme nature of the fault lines, it is difficult to imagine similarly determined core groups emerging and coalescing around new political parties outside the five main constituencies. Also, there seems be no more “space” for strong parties to emerge from within these constituencies. In our opinion, the small parties such as CNDD, UPD, MRC, UPD, etc. will remain marginal.
It follows from our interpretation of the Burundian party system, that even if the CNDD-FDD regime bans the four opposition parties from electoral competition, as it has partially happened, the system will freeze but will not disintegrate. It will keep influencing electoral competition indirectly. The four main opposition parties will remain distinct and in existence, either overt or covert. There is little chance that the opposition, even if it unites behind one presidential candidate, wins elections in the near future. As long as CNDD-FDD succeeds in maintaining the dense network of structures and does not lose touch with the general mood in the rural population, it may keep winning elections for another 5, 10, 15 years. If the competition becomes too tough, it can deploy a whole menu of institutional and other manipulation to stay in power (cf. Schedler 2002). At present, the Constitution limits the number of consecutive presidential mandates to two. In 2014, CNDD-FDD unsuccessfully attempted to change it to enable President Nkurunziza to run for the third mandate. Very probably, he will do so anyway and will justify his decision by saying that he was elected indirectly in 2005 and a victory in 2015 would only be his second “real” (direct) mandate from the population. If an opportunity for political turnover arises at all, it will likely be related to a weakening of CNDD-FDD via factionalism, struggle over succession in 2020 (in case CNDD-FDD fails again to amend the Constitution), etc. rather than a sudden increase in popular support for the opposition.

Bibliography


26 For example, Alliance pour la démocratie et le développement intégral, an ethno-regional opposition party in northern Togo, survived 23 years in an operational mode similar to the Burundian opposition, before it gained parliamentary representation as a member of a multi-party coalition in 2013.

27 The transfer of votes between FNL and FRODEBU in 2010 as compared to 2005 is a good example of this indirect effect (see Table 1).


