Abstract

This dissertation compares political parties in three countries of sub-Saharan Africa: Zambia, Burundi and Togo. It draws on fieldwork that included 71 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with party representatives and ordinary members (23 in Zambia, 24 in Burundi, and 24 in Togo). The interviews were conducted mostly in provincial urban centres over a period of four months in 2011 and 2012. The study conceives political parties as strategically acting organizations embedded in unique socio-political contexts; it argues that two hitherto neglected terms are especially useful for understanding and comparing them: cohesion and party-voter linkage. The argument is grounded on three key features of sub-Saharan party politics: a hostile operating environment, the prevalence of face-to-face political communication, and the supposed absence of ideology (which is re-interpreted as the presence of a single dominant ideology - development). The study conceptualizes cohesion as a prerequisite of Panebianco's (1988) institutionalization. A new, expanded classification of party – voter linkage types is formulated and a distinction is made between linkage proper and the genre in which it is enacted. Cohesion and linkage are combined in a comparative framework that enables generation of specific hypotheses about parties’ behaviour.

Keywords: political parties, Zambia, Burundi, Togo, organization, cohesion, linkage
Credits

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This PhD dissertation is dedicated to my informants in Burundi, Togo, and Zambia. Without their courage, trust, and openness it could have never been conceived.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>Alliance for Development and Democracy (Zambia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADDI</td>
<td>Alliance pour la démocratie et le développement intégral (Togo)</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France-Presse (news agency)</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>Alliance nationale pour le changement (Togo)</td>
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<td>ATOP</td>
<td>Agence togolaise de presse (Togo)</td>
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<td>AZ</td>
<td>Agenda for Zambia (Zambia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Botswana Democratic Party (Botswana)</td>
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<td>BNF</td>
<td>Botswana Democratic Front (Botswana)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Comité d'action pour le renouveau (Togo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDPA</td>
<td>Convention démocratique des peuples africains (Togo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENI</td>
<td>Commission électorale nationale indépendante (Burundi or Togo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>franc de la Communauté financière africaine (currency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFD</td>
<td>Coalition des forces démocratiques (Togo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNF</td>
<td>Convention des forces nouvelles (Togo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (Burundi)</td>
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<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie - Les Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (Burundi)</td>
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<td>COSOME</td>
<td>Coalition de la société civile pour le monitoring électoral (Burundi)</td>
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<td>CST</td>
<td>Collectif sauvons le Togo (Togo)</td>
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<td>CUT</td>
<td>Comité de l’unité togolaise (Togo)</td>
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<td>CVJR</td>
<td>Commission Vérité Justice et Réconciliation (Togo)</td>
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<td>EPDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (Ethiopia)</td>
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<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forum for Democracy and Development (Zambia)</td>
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<td>FIDH</td>
<td>Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme</td>
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<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces nationales pour la libération (Burundi)</td>
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<td>FODPEP</td>
<td>Foundation for Democratic Process (Zambia)</td>
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<td>FRELIJO</td>
<td>Mozambique Liberation Front (Mozambique)</td>
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<td>FRODEBU Nyakuri</td>
<td>Sahwanya FRODEBU Nyakuri – Iragi rya Ndadaye (Burundi)</td>
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<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (Burundi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross national income</td>
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<td>HP</td>
<td>Heritage Party (Zambia)</td>
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<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Networks (news agency)</td>
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<td>JUVENTO</td>
<td>Mouvement de la jeunesse togolaise (Togo)</td>
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<td>LTDO</td>
<td>Ligue togolaise des droits de l’Homme (Togo)</td>
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<td>MCD</td>
<td>Mouvement citoyen pour la démocratie et le développement (Togo)</td>
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<td>MCP</td>
<td>Malawi Congress party (Malawi)</td>
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<td>MDM</td>
<td>Mozambique Democratic Movement (Mozambique)</td>
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<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multiparty Democracy (Zambia)</td>
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<td>MOCEP</td>
<td>Mouvement des croyants pour l’égalité et la paix (Togo)</td>
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<td>MOE UE</td>
<td>Mission d’observation électorale de l’Union européenne (EU)</td>
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<td>MPT</td>
<td>Mouvement populaire togolais (Togo)</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mouvement de rassemblement pour la réhabilitation du citoyen – Rurenzangemero (Burundi)</td>
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<td>MSD</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la solidarité et la démocratie (Burundi)</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Mouvement de soutien au président Faure (Togo)</td>
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<td>NAREP</td>
<td>National Restoration Party (Zambia)</td>
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<td>NDF</td>
<td>National Democratic Focus (Zambia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute (USA)</td>
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<td>NSPF</td>
<td>Nouvelle Jeunesse pour le soutien au Président Faure (Togo)</td>
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<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party (Zambia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAG</td>
<td>Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale (Burundi)</td>
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<td>OBUTS</td>
<td>Organisation pour bâtir dans l’union un Togo solidaire (Togo)</td>
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<td>PALIPE-Agakiza</td>
<td>Parti libérateur du peuple burundais (Burundi)</td>
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<td>PARENA</td>
<td>Parti pour le redressement national (Burundi)</td>
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<td>PDP</td>
<td>People's Democratic Party (Nigeria)</td>
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<td>PDS</td>
<td>Parti démocratique sénégalais (Senegal)</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front (Zambia)</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>Parti du peuple (Burundi)</td>
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<td>PRP</td>
<td>Parti pour la réconciliation du peuple (Burundi)</td>
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<td>PSR</td>
<td>Pacte socialiste pour le renouveau (Togo)</td>
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<td>RADDAS</td>
<td>Ralliement pour la démocratie et le développement économique et social (Burundi)</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance (Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>Radio France internationale (news agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPB</td>
<td>Rassemblement du peuple burundais (Burundi)</td>
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<td>RPT</td>
<td>Rassemblement du peuple togolais (Togo)</td>
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<td>RSDD</td>
<td>Rassemblement pour le soutien de la démocratie et le développement (Togo)</td>
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<td>Sangwe PADER</td>
<td>Sangwe - Le Parti pour la démocratie et la réconciliation (Burundi)</td>
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<td>UCT</td>
<td>Union des communes du Togo (Togo)</td>
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<td>UDA</td>
<td>United Democratic Alliance (Zambia)</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Party (Malawi)</td>
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<td>UDPS</td>
<td>Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (Togo)</td>
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<td>UDS-Togo</td>
<td>Union des démocrates socialistes-Togo (Togo)</td>
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<td>UFC</td>
<td>Union de forces du changement (Togo)</td>
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<td>UID</td>
<td>Union pour la justice et la démocratie (Togo)</td>
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<td>ULP</td>
<td>United Liberal Party (Zambia)</td>
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<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party (Zambia)</td>
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<td>UNIR</td>
<td>Union pour la République (Togo)</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Angola)</td>
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<td>UPD</td>
<td>Union pour la paix et la démocratie (Burundi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPND</td>
<td>United Party for National Development (Zambia)</td>
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<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Unité pour le progrès national (Burundi)</td>
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<td>UTD</td>
<td>Union togolaise pour la démocratie (Togo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America (news agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZADECO</td>
<td>Zambian Democratic Congress (Zambia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZRP</td>
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1 INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is an exploratory study into political parties in sub-Saharan Africa. It conceives political parties as strategically acting organizations that operate within larger macro-social constraints that are partially or completely beyond their control. The dissertation argues that these political parties are best approached using two concepts: cohesion and party-voter linkage. In the text, cohesion is defined as the ability of a party to withstand outside pressure to fragment and/or for members to defect and to preserve a minimal potential to act as an organization under the circumstances of a hostile operating environment. Linkage is defined as interactive party-voter connections. Since the preferred type of political communication in sub-Saharan Africa is unmediated, face-to-face encounters, such is also the usual channel of party-voter linkage.

This dissertation attempts to tackle several lacunae in party research in sub-Saharan Africa:
(1) Few studies pay sufficient attention to political parties as agency-wielding organizations. The bulk of party research emphasizes structural factors such as the institutional environment, party systems, social cleavages, etc. The parties’ behaviour supposedly reflects these structural prescriptions.
(2) The studies that take political parties seriously as organizations in their own right provide few insights into micro-social mechanisms through which the parties operate. Also, conclusions of these studies are very general, masking a diversity of pathways and dynamics which undoubtedly exist in such a huge geographic area.
(3) From the methodological point of view, most research on these parties has been based on election results, media coverage, and reports of international NGOs. If a fieldwork on the spot was conducted, it drew on interviews with party elites and political observers in the capital.

In sum, and in contrast to the bulk of hitherto published literature on sub-Saharan politics, the dissertation is firmly rooted in the organization paradigm of political party studies that has been the most cogently expressed by Panebianco (1988). It pursues a strictly non-normative line research which makes no assumptions about the relationship between multi-party competition on one hand, and vertical accountability and governance on the other hand.

1.1 Research problem

The research problem that lies at the heart of this undertaking can be described as follows: If we conceive of sub-Saharan political parties as strategic actors that operate within the constraints of post-Cold War multipartism, what are their main goals and how they go about attaining them? In trying to develop a theoretical perspective along these lines, the author faced two problems. Firstly, not enough micro-level data is available on party organization and party-population interactions both during and in between elections. For this reason, it is difficult to formulate specific hypotheses prior to starting fieldwork. Secondly, most of the literature examines sub-Saharan political parties from the standpoint of "democracy". However, the author was keen to avoid any kind of value-laden discourse. Parallel to these challenges stood two assumptions that the author felt safe to make. They concern the importance of context and the degree of diversity. As for the former, the author took care to put the sub-Saharan party competition in its economic, demographic, historical, and cultural context. As for the latter, the author expected to find significant macro- and micro-level diversity both between and within individual countries.

Under the "winner takes all" circumstances of sub-Saharan electoral competition, the overarching goal of every party is to win elections and capture the state. An alternative goal is to set up a political party that, at the right time, aligns with the winner in exchange for material or other benefits. These overarching goals translate into a number of "smaller goals". One of them is ensuring that electoral competition works to one's advantage. Another one is make people actually vote for the party. It is primarily the latter "smaller goal" that the dissertation aims at. How do the political parties attract voters? The question has two aspects. The first one is
organizational and concerns the parties’ human resources, their motivation, funding, activities, procedures, etc. The second aspect is the party-voter interface and concerns concrete campaign strategies. The dissertation enquires into both of them.

A set of general initial conjectures was formulated according to which the sub-Saharan parties were primarily labels set-up by local strongmen with clientelistic following to expand their realm in terms of power, status, and money. Alternatively, the parties could be understood as labels that court (compete for attention of) powerful patrons who, together with their following, freely circulate between them. The patrons would tend to align with the parties that offer them the best return on their investment. This hypothesis sketched the electoral competition and campaign strategies in purely clientelistic terms. As far as party organization is concerned, we expected clientelism to be more important than pure (non-clientelistic) ethno-regional loyalties or ideology. Implicitly, we assumed that some kind of “organizational glue” has to be present for a meaningful multi-party competition to work.

The dissertation takes the current form of liberal, constitutionally sanctioned multi-partism for granted and does not have the ambition to contribute to the debate about one-party states and/or alternative systems of political participation and representation. Also, it does not tackle the relationship between societal conflict, multi-partism, political alteration, and governance (LeBas 2011). The text avoids any kind of “assessment discourse” on political parties that has dominated the literature since the early 1990s (cf. Osei 2012: 23-28). Instead, we try to explain why political actors (in this case political parties) behave the way they do and what makes them change their ways.

1.2 Research procedure

Given the considerations noted above, a research agenda was prepared and put to practice. It was clear from the beginning that the study would be exploratory and inductive logic would, therefore, play an important role in generating theory. Ethnographic fieldwork was chosen as the main research method because it suited both the need to get close to the actors examined and the author's anthropological background. It was decided right at the start that the fieldwork would privilege actors' point of view at the expense of expert views. Also, the ethnographic questioning and observation would focus on party activists in the field rather than party elites in the capital. Comparing three countries was deemed to provide sufficient grounding and it seemed manageable given the time and budgetary limitations. The case selection is explained in Section XXX below.

In terms of time frame, the argument concerns post-Cold War party politics, i.e. the period from 1990 to 2013. The dissertation is based on four months of intensive fieldwork in Zambia (September/October 2011), Burundi (September/October 2012), and Togo (October/November 2012) plus about one year of desk research. The author made effort to witness general elections in all the three countries but succeeded only in two of them because the legislative elections in Togo which were supposed to be held by the end of October 2012 (when the mandate of the MPs expired according to the country's Constitution) were kept being postponed and eventually took place in July 2013. With regards to the project as a whole, it was important that the fieldwork was conducted in two phases. There was a year gap between the first and second fieldwork where the author had time to analyse the research material and adjust his methodology. It turned out that the research yielded sufficiently rich and focussed information so the same kind of ethnographic fieldwork was performed a year later. More details about the research methodology are provided in Chapter XXX below.

1.3 Structuring of the text

The dissertation roughly follows the general format of any kind of empirical search: theory, methodology, data,
analysis, discussion, and conclusion. To a certain extent, country-level analysis is already included in the ethnographic section (Chapter 6) but the main analytical section is the comparison of the three countries in terms of their differences (Chapter 7).

Chapter 2 - Context
In line with the emphasis on the context in which the party competition is embedded, the chapter introduces the state, society, and ways of political communication in sub-Saharan Africa.

Chapter 3 - Literature
The chapter provides a review of literature on political parties as organizations in post-Cold War sub-Saharan Africa.

Chapter 4 - Theoretical concepts
In the first part of this chapter, four building blocks of the argument are defined: political party, electoral competition, cohesion, and linkage. The former two concepts – political party and electoral competition – were already contained in the initial conjecture. The latter two terms – cohesion and linkage – initially under different rubric, emerged from the analysis of the 2011 fieldwork material. They were then ascertained and refined during the 2012 fieldwork. The second part of Chapter 4 postulates what it calls a “comparative framework”. It is worth to clarify in some detail what this framework stands for and what function it serves in constructing the main argument of the dissertation. The framework was formulated after the two trips to Africa during the subsequent desk research. Copies of two books had reached the author by then and contributed greatly to the undertaking. These works were a comparative study of political party formation in Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe by LeBas (2011); and a comparative study of political party linkage in Senegal and Ghana by Osei (2012). At that period, the author of the dissertation was looking for a way how to tie cohesion and linkage together in a single scheme. While the two concepts are connected via a subsidiary argument about the role of ideology in sub-Saharan politics (see below), it was felt that a more fundamental scheme was needed to theorize the cross-country comparison which gradually led to the formulation of the framework. Nevertheless, the empirical argument of the dissertation centres on cohesion and linkage and makes sense even if the framework is omitted; when put within the framework, the argument is more interesting and has a wider reach in terms of both theorizing and empirical research. The comparative framework is:

1. Centred on electoral aspects of party politics rather than parties’ day-to-day internal functioning or parties’ behaviour in government.
2. Tentative. It does not serve as a hypothesis to be proven or disproven. Since the dissertation deals only with two specific elements of the framework – cohesion and linkage – it cannot fully evaluate its veracity.
3. General. The framework is very basic and therefore it cannot be considered a model of party politics; it does not have such ambition; it “frames” rather than “models”.
4. Context-dependent. The framework is inextricably linked to the particular socio-economic context of sub-Saharan politics which is described in Chapter XXX. The most immediate contextual variables are “hostile operating environment”, face-to-face political communication, and presumed absence of party ideology.
5. Open-ended. The framework is not self-contained; it can be extended and inter-related with other socio-political phenomena.

Chapter 5 - Methodology
This methodological chapter locates the study within paradigms of social research, it explains and justifies case selection, and describes the research technique used during the fieldwork phase.

Chapter 6 - Country findings
This chapter presents the results of the ethnographic and the supplementary desk research. The chapter deals with each country separately and uses a common format: socio-political environment, political parties (including post-Cold War election results), party organization, cohesion, and linkage. The sub-section on party
organization is further divided into descriptions of membership, structure, procedures, supreme organs, and funding.

Chapter 7 - Comparison
This chapter compares the three countries in terms of their similarities and differences.

Chapter 8 – Theoretical lessons
This chapter attends to the theoretical issues opened in Chapter 4. It elaborates and substantiates the concept of party cohesion. It refines the concept of linkage and produces a new classification of linkage types. It introduces a distinction between linkage types and genres in which they are enacted. It applies the comparative framework to the issue of linkage strategies and territorial penetration.

Chapter 9 – Conclusion
This chapter offers final remarks on the two paradigms of party research (parties as agents of “democracy” and parties as organizations), comments on attempts to compare political parties in Western countries with those in sub-Saharan Africa and suggests new venues of research.

Bibliography
We adhere to the distinction between primary and secondary sources so the reader is advised to consult both sections in case the nature of a source is not obvious. All webpages cited in the dissertation were saved in pdf format and archived by the author; they are available upon request.

2 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: STATE, SOCIETY, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Given the fact that the main argument of this dissertation is predicated on the specific socio-political context of multi-party competition in sub-Saharan Africa, it is logical to begin the undertaking by familiarizing the reader with what we consider to be its relevant features. Each of the world regions is different and any model of politics should be accompanied by a description of the context in which it is embedded (cf. Osei 2012: 274). By not making sufficiently clear what the relevant features of the context are we strip the model of its comparative dimension. The fact that in most models of party politics the context is taken for granted has to do with the history of political science rather than academic rigour. This chapter outlines those characteristics of the state, society and political communication in Zambia, Burundi and Togo that, in our opinion, put important constraints on the behaviour of political parties and the parameters of the competition: they are the characteristics that set the stage for sub-Saharan multi-party competition. We take all of them from extant literature and claim no originality of our “checklist”.4 Most of these characteristics apply to the whole region (apart from the Republic of South Africa). Additional contextual variables will be brought up in the chapters dedicated to individual countries.

2.1 The state

2.1.1 Neo-patrimonial logic of state functioning

In the words of Chabal and Daloz: “the state in Africa was never properly institutionalized because it was never significantly emancipated from society” (1999: 4). In a strong version of this assertion, they claim that “the state is no more than a décor, a pseudo-Western façade masking the realities of deeply personalized political relations” (1999: 16). Neo-patrimonialism is the term to characterize the two types of Weberian “legitimate domination” in place: coexistence and blending of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic logic (Erdmann and Engel 2006: 17-20). Thus, on the one hand, political representatives are “accountable to their followers and ... their legitimacy derives from their ability to deliver resources to them” (the patrimonial logic), on the other

4 Compare with similar “checklists” by Ngomba (2011: 294) and Osei (2011: 253).
hand, they are supposed to care about “the destiny of all citizens and work for the improvement of the general well-being of the country as a whole” (bureaucratic logic) (Chabal 2010: 12-13, original emphasis). As for the topic of this dissertation, the most important aspect of neo-patrimonial governance is that all levels of state institutions are, to larger or small degree, “informally privatized”: apart from serving the citizenry, they are simultaneously used for personal gains and/or they serve particularistic group interests. Clientelism, patronage, corruption, economy of affection, rent-seeking are the terms that describe various types of this behaviour (cf. Erdmann and Engel 2006; Hydén 2008; Olivier de Sardan 2013).

2.1.2 Presidentialism

From the constitutional point of view, almost all sub-Saharan states are highly centralized with strong presidencies and weak parliaments (Rakner and van de Walle 2009; van de Walle 2003). Legislators have little say over state budget and cabinet appointments: “the presidency emerges as the dominant arena for decision-making, to the point that regular ministerial structures are relegated to an executant’s role”; the president “typically enjoys considerable decree powers and does not need a stable [parliamentary] majority to rule effectively” (van de Walle 2003: 310-311). The election cycle is usually five years plus the presidents control the electoral calendar and thus “have been able to defer having to face the voters” (Rakner and van de Walle 2009: 113).

2.1.3 Dependency of economic sphere on politics

Both presidential rule and the neo-patrimonial governance, together with a multitude of other factors (post-colonial history, reliance on exportation of raw materials, foreign aid channelled through the state, state interference in the economic activities to name but a few) entails that the economic sphere is not as autonomous of politics as in Western countries. Independent private sector is weak. The most exciting economic opportunities are directly or indirectly under control of those who hold political power: public sector jobs, state contracts, licenses, monopolies, etc. (cf. Manning 2005: 716; Rakner and van de Walle 2009: 115).

2.1.4 Lack of infrastructure

The inadequacy of infrastructure in sub-Saharan countries is well known. A book-length treatment of the topic by a group of World Bank experts starts with statements such as “Africa’s infrastructure networks increasingly lag behind those of other developing countries and are characterized by missing regional links and stagnant household access” (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010: 1). A recent article on the relationship between infrastructure, economic growth and poverty reduction reads “[a]vailable evidence shows that lives and livelihoods are suffering from the fragile state of infrastructure in SSA. The lack of adequate transport, power, communication networks, water, sanitation and other infrastructure put severe constraints on economic growth and poverty reduction across the region” (Jerome 2011: 128). This handicap is all the more glaring given rapid population growth in many sub-Saharan countries (Heller 2010). The lack infrastructure influences politics in several, sometimes contradictory ways. It makes parties’ territorial penetration logistically and organizationally complicated, it increases the costs of face-to-face campaigning outside urban centres, it contributes to parochial sentiments of rural dwellers in general, it narrows the meaning of politics to bringing “development”, it provides political parties with a ready-made blueprint of their manifestos, etc.

2.2 Society

2.2.1 Multifaceted role of ethnicity

It has been claimed that ethnicity plays a major role in sub-Saharan party politics and both LeBas (2011: 29-34) and Osei (2012: 92-97) discuss this topic extensively. While the region is without question ethnically hugely diverse and very detailed accounts of the use and abuse of ethnicity in politics have been published (de Smedt
most studies treat ethnicity as a black-box without taking into account its negotiated, multifaceted and often ambiguous nature due to intermarriage, migration, overlapping of ethnic, ethno-linguistic, and regional identity. Different ethnic dimensions such as moral ethnicity versus political tribalism, primordial ethnicity versus instrumentalized social differentiation of other kinds, are rarely distinguished, so is the fact that numerical data on ethnic groups come from colonial times and the category of tribe itself was a colonial administrative tool. While this dissertation describes the different role that ethnicity plays in party politics in each of the three countries examined (i.e. Zambia, Burundi, and Togo) it does not treat it as something self-evident. For example, it conceptualizes Hutu/Tutsi dichotomy in Burundi as a caste-like social categorization to set it apart from ethnic identities in Togo and Zambia that are tied to more or less clear primordial substrates.

2.2.2 Poverty

In socioeconomic terms, the great majority of sub-Saharan countries are poor. In fact, Zambia, Burundi, and Togo belong to the poorest countries in the world, both in terms of gross national income per capita and human development indicators. While the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the three countries has grown during the past ten years it is less clear who benefited from this growth because of insufficient data on income inequality. A solid time series of Gini coefficients is available for Zambia only where this measure of wealth inequality grew in parallel with the GDP; and its current value is one of the highest in the world. Table XXX summarizes some basic socioeconomic statistical indicators of the three countries (Bulgaria, the poorest member state of the European Union, is added as a reference point).
### TABLE 1
BURUNDI, TOGO, ZAMBI, AND BULGARIA: SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1: Population (millions)</th>
<th>2: Population density</th>
<th>3: GNI per capita</th>
<th>4: GINI index</th>
<th>5: % of population at 1.25 USD a day</th>
<th>6: % of population at 2 USD a day</th>
<th>7: % of urban population</th>
<th>8: % urban below national poverty line</th>
<th>9: % rural below national poverty line</th>
<th>10: % of population ages 0-14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOGO</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMBI</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1620</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>15390</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank 2013
All data for 2012 unless stated otherwise

a 2006
b 2011
c 2010
d 2007

Indicators in full:
1 - Population, total
2 - Population density (people per sq. km of land area)
3 - GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) (gross national income per capita based on purchasing power parity)
4 - GINI index
5 - Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)
6 - Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)
7 - Urban population (% of total)
8 - Poverty headcount ratio at urban poverty line (% of rural population)
9 - Poverty headcount ratio at rural poverty line (% of rural population)
10 - Population ages 0-14 (% of total)

If we take the numbers in Table XXX at face value, they show an interesting mixture of differences and commonalities. In all three countries, about the same proportion of the population is under the national poverty line. This is in spite the fact that Zambia has 20 times lower population density, four times higher proportion of urban population and three times higher GDP per capita than Burundi. The latter fact is certainly related to the high GINI index in Zambia.

#### 2.2.3 Few stable and reasonably well-paid jobs outside the public and semi-public sector

To get a more precise idea about the predicament of the population, a few words should be said about the structure of the job market. According to a 2006 survey, there were only 290,000 jobs in Burundi that offered a reasonable chance (> 75%) to escape poverty: 140,000 in the informal private sector and 150,000 in the public sector, the latter offering twice as much economic standing than the former; all other job categories gave less than 50% chance of escaping poverty (International Monetary Fund 2009: 22). In the same year, the total labour force was 3.7 million people (World Bank 2013b). In Zambia, it is estimated that 28% of the people were unemployed in 2010 and “[f]or those who are employed, 95% are … in vulnerable work, mostly in low productive informal activities” (African Economic Outlook 2013). It would mean there were about 200,000

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The significantly lower poverty rate in Togo as expressed in USD is difficult to interpret. It either means that Togo is more expensive, or that the methodology of calculating the national poverty line is not commensurable with the other two countries.

The Burundian statistics do not differentiate between employed and self-employed. The statistics for Zambia seem to talk specifically about the “employed” in the sense of wage earners. The dissertation uses the term “job” for any productive activity and “wage-earning job” for salaried work to differentiate between the two categories.
"non-vulnerable" wage-earning jobs available for the total labour force of 5.6 million in Zambia in 2010 (World Bank 2013b). According to a survey conducted in Zambia in 2003, the proportion of public plus parastatal (or semi-state) jobs was 6% and "private wage formal/permanent" jobs 3.3% of the total employment and self-employment opportunities (Stampini et al. 2013). Assuming that this proportion has remained the same and equating the jobs cited by Stampini et al. (2013) with the non-vulnerable category mentioned above, it gives us 130,000 non-vulnerable public/parastatal jobs and 70,000 non-vulnerable private jobs in absolute numbers in 2010. The figures are summarized in Table XXX (the category "non-vulnerable" is extended to the 290,000 jobs in Burundi).

**TABLE 2**

**BURUNDI AND ZAMBIA: NON-VULNERABLE JOBS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total work force in millions</th>
<th>Non-vulnerable jobs total</th>
<th>Non-vulnerable jobs per capita of total work force</th>
<th>Non-vulnerable public/parastatal jobs total</th>
<th>Non-vulnerable public/parastatal jobs per capita of total work force</th>
<th>Non-vulnerable private jobs total</th>
<th>Non-vulnerable private jobs per capita of total work force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BURUNDI</strong></td>
<td>3.7 (2006)</td>
<td>290,000</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ZAMBIA</strong></td>
<td>5.6 (2010)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: see previous paragraph

While the statistics come from different sources and therefore, strictly speaking, are not comparable, they give us a rough idea about the overall structure of the job market. In both countries, there are more "non-vulnerable" jobs in the public/parastatal sector than in the private sector. In Zambia, the private sector offers only 1-2 reasonably well paid positions for 100 people who are available for work and in Burundi it offers 3-5 such positions. Let us remind ourselves that in developed countries, any job guarantees a basic living standard because of the existence of minimum wage.

### 2.2.4 Rural majority

Notwithstanding rapid social changes, sub-Saharan countries are still predominantly rural. In addition, recent literature suggests that urbanization rate in sub-Saharan Africa has been decreasing or stagnating and will continue to do so (Bocquier and Mukandila 2011; Potts 2012). Without going into the debate about the importance of “peri-urban” spaces (Trefon 2009) there is no doubt that even in relatively urbanized Zambia and Togo smallholding peasants make up as much as one half of the population; in Burundi it may be up to 90% (see Table XXX above). Most of them practice low-intensity subsistence farming and sell their surplus (if any) at small market places close to where they live. While some of them may supplement their income by unskilled or semi-skilled non-agricultural jobs in nearby villages and secondary towns (Hydén 2008: 28; Christiaensen, De Weerdt and Todo 2013), they all share two, mutually opposed characteristics that have important impact on party competition. Firstly, their culture of reciprocity, economic self-sufficiency and the fact they less dependent on infrastructure make them relatively autonomous from “the whip of the state or the carrot of the market”; in Hydén’s (2008: 16) words they remain “uncaptured”. This characteristic enables them to resist manipulation and to “exit” the political process if they choose to do so (for Togo see Macé 2004). Secondly, due to their lack of formal education and limited exposure to nation-wide questions of politics and economy, they interests remain primarily parochial and, in many regards, they are (paradoxically, given the previous point) easier to manipulate than other population groups. Generally higher illiteracy rates in the countryside (World Bank 2013a: 92; Zhang 2006) and the difference between urban and rural poverty rates (see Table XXX above) contribute further to the distinctiveness of this group.

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7 Zambia: 72% of total labour force = 4.032 million. 5% of 4.032 million = 201,600.
2.2.5 Low awareness of modern state functioning

By “low awareness of modern state functioning” we mean something different than “illiteracy” or “lack of education” (XXX). We mean the gap between the implanted constitutional arrangements that wholly rely on concepts of Western political philosophy (hence “modern state functioning”) and most people's lack of familiarity (hence “low awareness”) with these arrangements and concepts such as citizenship, political representation, constitution, bureaucratic logic, rule of law, division of powers, horizontal and vertical accountability, taxation, local versus national government, etc. In essence, what we called “neo-patrimonial logic” at the level of the state (see Section XXX above) has its reflection at the level of ordinary citizens. We are not saying that people’s understanding of politics is wrong or deficient; we just want to point out the incongruence between the countries’ constitutional language and local understandings of power, representation, governance, accountability etc. Unless they are brought more in line, either by the people internalizing the implanted concepts or by adapting the constitutions to local understandings, this gap will persist and will give a unique twist to all state-citizen political processes. We realize that the awareness of modern state functioning is very unevenly distributed in the population with a non-negligible proportion having a good grasp of Western political language. From this point of view, three factors interact: the constitutional ideal, the political elite that understands it rather well abuses it as it sees fit, and ordinary citizens who, on average, have a low awareness what the constitutional precept consists of. We acknowledge that a degree incongruence between constitutional ideals and local understandings exists all countries; we only stress that the “mismatch” is more profound in sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Chabal 2010: 15-17; cf. Chabal, Feinman and Skalník 2004; cf. Skalník 2002).

2.3 Political communication

2.3.1 Mass media and new technologies

Mass media play a minor role in the ways in which political parties communicate with the population (cf. Osei 2012: 253-255). It applies especially to the newspapers, the television and the internet (both fixed line and mobile) which are all present and highly dynamic but their reach is limited to urban areas. The radio is significantly more important. There are state- and privately-owned national and local radio stations that cover most rural hinterlands. Political parties are well aware of the impact of radio broadcasting and try to get on the airwaves whenever they can. From the point of view of users, radio is by far the most cost-effective medium: the device lasts long, it is inexpensive, it does not consume much battery power, and it can be listened to in a group. As for new technologies, Africa has the fastest growing mobile phone sector in the world. In mid-2013, there were 253 million unique mobile phones subscribers (about 28% of the population) with 502 million active SIM cards (GSMA Intelligence 2013).8,9 The impact of the mobile phone use on election campaigning and party-voter relationship in general is difficult to assess. In Kenya, political parties were observed to use text messages to spread rumours and incite violence (Osborn 2008).

2.3.2 Face-to-face interaction

In spite of the media and the mobile phone availability, the bulk of party-voter communication, including election campaigns, is conducted face-to-face, usually directly, sometimes via intermediaries such as traditional authorities. This phenomenon is arguably the single most striking difference from the way political parties operate in other continents. Writing about the situation in Cameroon, Ngomba (2011: 295) even observes that “the developments in the media sector … have not led to a significant adoption by parties of media-based campaign communication strategies. On the contrary, … [they] have been occurring in tandem with a noticeable increase in parties' and candidates' prioritization of non-mediated forms of campaign communication

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8 According to the World Development Indicators Database, the total population of sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels) was 911 million in 2012 (World Bank 2013b).
9 According to the World Development Indicators Database, proportion of the population with access to electricity was 35% in sub-Saharan Africa in 2010 (World Bank 2013b).
strategies”. While the general trend may be opposite in other countries, the primary focus on face-to-face political communication applies to all sub-Saharan Africa irrespectively of geography, population density, and poor transportation infrastructure. Reasons for this deliberate emphasis on “man-to-man” or “body-to-body” contact are complex and difficult to pinpoint (Ngomba 2011: 307). The role of face-to-face communication in creating and maintaining the link between sub-Saharan political parties and their voters is one of the key themes of this dissertation.

2.4 Summary

In the crudest sense, the stakes of sub-Saharan politics are much higher than elsewhere. Due to the combination of factors mentioned above, the state, the ultimate prey of multi-party electoral competition, is too precious to be left to anybody. There is little role for the opposition which can be barred from state resources and appointments for years. The system has a strong “winner takes all” effect (Svåsand 2013). At the same time, political parties tend to appeal to ethno-linguistically diverse populations using the most direct channel: face-to-face interaction.

3 LITERATURE REVIEW: PARTIES AS ORGANIZATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The literature on political parties in sub-Saharan Africa can be reviewed in two basic ways. Some authors take stock of what is known about the political parties in this part of the world (Rakner and van de Walle 2009; Randall and Svåsand 2002b; Sanches 2010; van de Walle 2003; van de Walle and Butler 1999; Wolkenhauer 2013). Other authors have a more analytical approach and classify the studies in terms of research questions and theoretical approaches (Carbone 2007; Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010; Osei 2012; Stroh 2010). Of course, it is also possible to mix the two perspectives (Fiala 2005; LeBas 2011). This review is more of the analytical kind. For reasons of space, convenience and research focus, it does not start with the classical works of the 1960s (Coleman and Rosberg 1964; Hodgkin 1961; Morgenthau 1964; Sklar 1963; Zolberg 1966) that describe political parties in the context of nation-building and national integration. Instead, it confines oneself to the literature on the post-Cold War multipartism and the studies that treat political parties as organizations with their own history, internal structure, procedures, strategies, etc. Even though we classify the studies under seven different headings, the reader is reminded that this classification is partly arbitrary as most of the studies weave together several themes at once.

3.1 Party formation and historical trajectory

Description on individual political parties’ formation and development enrich any account of party politics. For many of the authors mentioned below, these factors have a wider theoretical significance. The concept of cohesion, as employed in this dissertation, also relies on “genetic” approach.

Berhanu (2003) provides a general overview of political parties’ formation, legal-constitutional context, and election performance, including the internal organisation of the opposition subjects, in post-1991 Ethiopia. The author is sceptical about what he calls the “sustainability of political parties” (2003: 118). The “exclusionist policies” of the nearly hegemonic Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coupled with the inability of the opposition to create durable alliances and “the remaining [negative] traits of the traditional Ethiopian political culture” make ‘sustainability a futile and far-fetched aim” (2003: 144-145).

Nuvunga et Adalima (2011: 31-32) describe the formation and political trajectory of the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), a new opposition party, during the first two years of existence. They conclude that “[t]he motives leading to its formation as breakaway party indeed fall into the African pattern of root causes for such parties, mainly highly personalized, informalised and personality-based politics; lack of internal democracy and poorly institutionalized mother parties”. They provide evidence to the effect that “the
perception of a party amongst the MDM leadership is similar to that existing in other parties: a social network to capture and control the state and its resources” and that the MDM post-election behaviour was characterized by internal fights, violation of party statutes and nepotism in the management of party structures.

3.2 Internal organisation

Accounts of sub-Saharan parties’ internal organization show that the concepts developed for the study of political parties elsewhere can be fruitfully applied in Africa. They concur with the conclusions of this dissertation which starts with the same premise. Two remarks should be made here. Firstly, the transfer works well for the concepts that treat parties as organizations and much less for those that treat parties as agents of democracy. Secondly, as the reader will see in Chapter XXX, any concept employed may require some degree of adjustment to the sub-Saharan context.

Maundeni et Lotshwao (2012) draw on Michels (1968 [1911]) and Duverger (1981 [1951]) to focus on internal stability of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF). They claim that the lack of the internal stability of the latter party prevented it from dislodging the incumbent BDP. The authors discuss such topic such as existence of clear party rules and adherence to them, problems related to the renewal of the parties' inner circle (handling of succession, for example), and the role of compromise in settling factional disputes. Their (largely implicit) conclusion is that open disunity of the party and violation of internal party rules tarnishes its credibility vis-à-vis the voters and discourages party militants and activists and vice versa.

Paget (2010) draws on the work of Bueno de Mesquita et al (2002), Panebianco (1988), and Boucek (2009) to develop a two-pronged approach for studying the patterns of factional activity within the then ruling Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in Zambia. He finds that although the party's institutions set "[t]he rhythm of faction contests and the size of factions, the dynamics of factionalism ... have been mercy to context and contingency ... the party plays host to a faction non-system".

Kura (2011: 289) provides an account of the formation, candidate selection, and funding of the Nigeria’s ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). He describes how the so called “godfathers” or financial donors of the party and members of wealthy political elites, “manipulate all its [PDP’s] major activities. They determined who is selected, nominated or appointed to occupy which party or public office. Godfathers have become the owners of the PDP” (2011: 289, original emphasis). He also provides examples that suggest that “internal and external [formal] party rules are only used as window-dressing. Often informal arrangements become the substantive rules of the processes”.

3.3 Former armed movements

This stream of literature teaches us that post-conflict dynamics and the parties evolving from armed groups at final stages of civil wars have their unique features. Therefore, such parties are often better compared with analogous formations in other post-conflict societies rather than purely “civilian” parties from the same country. Burundi, one of the three countries researched in this dissertation, is typical case in question.

Manning (2007) studies transformations of former armed movements into political parties. For example, she compares organizational evolution of FRELIMO and RENAMO in Mozambique. This account is focused on the administrative, governmental, and parliamentary behaviour of these parties. For example, she describes the internal struggle within party elite once it is divided between the government, the parliament, and organizational structures of the party itself.

Within the same strand of literature, Pearce (2010) compares the transformation of Angolan UNITA and Mozambique’s RENAMO. He pays particular attention to the relationship between the movements’ organization
and the way it linked their respective the support base. He also attempts to distinguish to what extent the way these two movements act as opposition parties is influenced by their particular history and to what extent it simply reflects the problems that are common to all opposition parties.

Nindorera (2007) discusses both the stimuli and the obstacles to the transformation of the Burundian CNDD-FDD and the challenges it faced as a new political part that decisively won the first post-conflict elections. His account focuses on wider contextual factors and the structure and timeline of the Burundian peace process. A supplementary study by the same author details the origins of the movement and the internal and external developments up to the elections in 2005 (Nindorera 2012).

### 3.4 Institutionalization

Political party institutionalization is studied within both organization and democratic paradigms. We include both streams of literature in this review because their findings impinge directly on our discussion of cohesion. It is of note that our concept of cohesion logically precedes rather than complements or even follows the process of institutionalization (see Section XXX below).

Rakner (2011) points out the importance of external factors with regards to what she calls “limited institutionalization” of political parties, party system, and multi-party democracy in Zambia. According to her, political and economic liberalization of the 1990s further strengthened the incumbency advantage already underscored by presidentialism and executive dominance. Also, aid from international actors was disbursed via the MDD controlled executive and/or non-governmental organizations while “[d]emocracy support to political parties and parliament has been limited” (2011: 1118). In a section more relevant to this dissertation, she argues that the top-down character of internal decision-making contributes to a continuing fragmentation of both the ruling and the opposition parties.

Hopkins’ (2010: 17) work enquires into “the processes of institutionalization and mobilization with the [Patriotic Front] PF”, the then main opposition party in Zambia. He argues that since 2006 the PF has moved some way from Carothers’ (2006) briefcase party towards an institutionalized party. Also, in terms of election strategy, drawing on Stokes’ and Nichter’s models of vote and turnout buying, Hopkins (2010: 37) provides evidence that the PF has “combined a hybrid strategy of turnout targeting amongst the party’s core Bemba supporters and [populist] vote targeting amongst the urban poor” and thereby diversifying its campaign beyond simply ethnic considerations.

Kalua (2011) applies Randall and Svåsand’s (2002a) model of party institutionalization to the UDF and the MCP in Malawi. The author finds that the parties are “poorly institutionalized” which “constrains their contribution to democratic consolidation” (Kalua 2011: 43).

Basedau and Stroh (2008) adjusted Randall and Svåsand’s (2002a) model of party institutionalization and measured the so called Index of the Institutionalization of Parties in 28 political parties in sub-Saharan Africa. To calculate the index for four characteristics along two dimensions (external and internal), they used altogether 15 indices, both quantitative and qualitative. They conclude that “[g]enerally, [t]he parties show rather low degrees of institutionalization” and “a fairly large diversity … with regard to both dimensions” with somewhat lesser diversity with regard to national aggregates (Basedau and Stroh 2008: 22).

Toulabor (2005a) enquires into territorial penetration of three main opposition parties (UFC, CAR, CDPA) at the level of the capital Lomé, provincial centres and villages in post-1990 Togo. His account is based on a fieldwork conducted in 2002 and 2003. The author describes the mechanisms through which new party structures are set up in formally “un-conquered” regions and ties the uneven spread of the penetration both to the degree of state repression in different parts of the country and the different sets of symbols the parties mobilize.
Carey (2002) compares the trajectory of political parties in Kenya, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo since before independence till about 2001. Her analysis straddles the study of political parties and such and that of party systems. She focuses on interest aggregation, the role of civil society, and political communication, a term she uses in a similar way the concept of linkage is employed in this dissertation (2002: 61-65).

3.5 Vertical accountability

The most sophisticated discussion of party politics in sub-Saharan African to date has been offered by LeBas (2011) in her book From Protest to Parties. In contrast to most authors, she treats party organization as an independent variable: “Party organization is not simply an effect of electoral rules, socioeconomic and ethnic cleavages, or the incentives that differences in these factors create for political factors” (LeBas 2011: 35). She notices that in sub-Sahara Africa “[c]ards are stacked against durable opposition party organization” (LeBas 2011: 250). For political parties to play their role of ensuring vertical accountability, they have to be able to resist fragmentation and to maintain a continued mobilization potential in the long run (LeBas 2011: 256). According to LeBas (2011: 25), such strong parties have “(a) formal structures that are used to convey information across levels of the organization; (b) decision-making procedures that manage conflict and create consensus within the party; and (c) ties with popular constituencies that are based on common understandings and, to some extent, a share identity”. Apart from strategic decisions that the party elites have to make in this regard, two factors are fundamental: firstly, presence of cross-ethnic and cross-regional social networks the party can lean on and/or co-opt; secondly, a strong and intentional inter-party polarization that fosters ”shared identity and affective loyalties” and creates disincentives to switch sides (2011: 36-47). The resultant picture is thus shaped by the country's history, structural constraints on party competition, and strategic decisions within parties.

3.6 Strategic behaviour

A number of studies have recently been published that look at parties as strategically acting organization without necessarily relating their behaviour to vertical accountability, governance or democracy. Most of them examine intricacies of party – voter interaction and the choices the parties make to beat their competitors. Nugent’s (2007) article and Osei’s (2012) book come extremely close to the way we treat the same topic in this dissertation. Somewhat surprisingly, none of these works grounds explicitly their understanding of political parties in organization paradigm.

Larmer and Fraser (2007: 613) make use of Laclau’s (2005) definition of populism to describe the political style of Michael Sata, President of the PF in Zambia. They analyse “the symbols and arguments that Sata has developed to successfully transform pre-existing popular [urban] concerns – such as health and safety standards in Chinese-owned mines, the shortage of market stalls for informal traders, inadequate urban housing, and the disorganized nature of bus stations – into a common set of problems ... from which he can benefit electorally”. In doing so, Sata diverges from the attitude of the Zambian elite that “has usually been happy to leave the polis out of politics” (Larmer and Fraser 2007: 624, original emphasis). While the PF campaign before 2006 parliamentary elections focussed on Bemba-speaking provinces, Sata simultaneously managed to harness cross-ethnic urban discontent by developing “in ... interviews and on national tours ... ad hoc policy positions in relation to news developments and local conditions” (2007: 627, original emphasis). According to the authors, “[h]e was able to do this because of the informal nature of PF structures and his dominance of a party established as a vehicle for his personal ambitions” (2007: 627, emphasis added).

Cheeseman and Hinflaar’s (2010: 71-75) study of the run-up to the 2008 presidential by-election in Zambia can be read as an extension of Larmer and Fraser’s article. They analyse succession dynamics within the then dominant MMD, polarization of parties’ policy platforms during the campaign, and calculate proportion of
Sata’s support depending on population densities of individual constituencies to assess the degree of ethnic versus populist support. They observe that Sata dominated all high-density (urban) constituencies while the only low-density (rural) constituencies that he won were in predominantly Bemba-speaking provinces. It leads the authors to point out that “parties need not be simply ‘ethnic’ or ‘populist’, and are often most successful when they utilize diverse strategies of political mobilization.

The populist strategies of the PF in Zambia were also researched by Resnick (2012). She makes a general argument that “an opposition party reliant on populist strategies to mobilize the urban poor is more likely to achieve the latter’s support” (2012: 1359). On the theoretical level, she relies on and elaborates Kitschelt’s (2000) typology of party-voter linkages. On the empirical level, Resnick supports her argument by a survey of 200 informal sector workers that she conducted in Lusaka.

Nugent (2007) examines electoral politics in post-1990 Ghana with emphasis on party – voter interaction and the use of money in party funding and election campaigning. He claims that “banknotes need to be converted into some kind of moral authority, which is weighed in the scales against other (non-material) claims to the exercise of leadership” (Nugent 2007: 255). He describes what he calls “political styles” of political parties, a situation where “[i]n the minds of voters, the parties have come to symbolize different things” while “there is little real ideological contestation either over the configuration of the state or over social issues” (Nugent 2007: 259-260). Among the components of “moral authority”, Nugent (2007) lists a range of appeals that have to do with social values, competence, group identity, and paternalism. This dissertation can be read as an attempt at theoretical elaboration of Nugent’s (2007) perspective on party – voter interaction.

Stroh (2010: 1-3) focuses on the “strategic micro-behaviour of [political] parties” in Burkina Faso which draws on what he calls “actor-oriented approaches to party politics such as electoral clientelism … the personalization of parties … and rational behavioralism”. He contrasts this approach with “the dominant structuralist thinking in party research on Africa” that “is inspired by macro-sociological cleavage theory on voting behaviour”. His quantitative analysis is based on non-aggregated election data. To win seats, Burkinabé party elites strategically allocated their organizations’ human and financial given their assessment of “local social demography, infrastructural accessibility, electoral institutions, advantages of incumbency, and the strongholds of other parties” (Stroh 2010: 23). While doing so, they rely on the so called “fils de terroir” principle, “which builds upon personal proximity to voters with basically parochial material interests”. According to Stroh (2010: 23), it “appears to be one key mechanism of party politics in Africa”. Stroh’s (2010: 6) orientation on the “the supply side of sub-Saharan party politics” as opposed to “rational choice models outlining the voting decisions of individual voters” is echoed by several recent studies.

In her book entitled ‘Party-Voter Linkage in Africa’, Osei (2012) gives an in-depth account of party and party system evolution in Ghana and Senegal including parties’ organisation, ideological orientation, voting patterns of various social groups, and a survey of voter’s attitudes. In all these regards, she finds similarities as well as differences across the parties and the two countries. For example, with regards to the party system, she observes that “political parties in Ghana tend to be ‘stronger’ than their Senegalese counterparts in many respects. They are better organised, more stable, more active, have more members, and are structured along identifiable cleavage lines. In Senegal, party politics is much more fluid; parties have no clearly defined target groups and are more personalised” (Osei 2012: 241), ethnicity is a minor factor in party politics. She argues that “[t]he key variable appears to be party formation at independence … whether or not social cleavages are translated into the party system” (Osei 2012: 249). Similarly to Stroh (2010), her research question aims at the supply side of politics: “what do parties do to win voters and what are the conditions under which they take their strategic decisions?” (Osei 2012: 267). Comparing party linkage strategies, she finds that “[i]n principle, the strategies employed by parties in Ghana and Senegal are similar. Yet, the different parties invest in the different forms of linkage to varying degrees. In Senegal, for example, intermediaries play a greater role than in Ghana, and in both countries patronage is used by ruling parties rather than by the opposition” (Osei 2012: 253). Thus, Osei’s work reveals a significant degree of diversity that, however, can be explained without
resorting to exceptionalism: "there is nothing to say against the application of established research concepts to African countries as long as they are sufficiently context-sensitive" (Osei 2012: 274). Electoral clientelism and ethnicity have only relative importance. Sub-Saharan parties can be strongly rooted in the society. Parties tend to have little internal democracy and little vertical accountability but, at the same time, “they must also try to forge moral bonds to the electorate and communicate an identifiable image to the voters” (Osei 2012: 271).

3.7 Political communication

While all the approaches mentioned thus far provide us with important evidence and theoretical underpinnings, it perhaps this last, somewhat marginal stream of literature that best epitomizes what preoccupations guided our research. They are the studies that examine political communication as such. Besides emphasizing the power of symbols in politics, they point out the key role of of face-to-face contact in party – voter interaction.

One of the rare studies of election campaigning and the closest ethnographic supplement to the topic of this dissertation was written by Foucher (2007). The article is a “symbology political shows” that were performed during the run-up to the 2000 general elections in Senegal that were won by the opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade and his PDS (2007: 111). Specifically, it analyses complex meanings of the so called “blue marches”: public street performances that were staged by the opposition coalition throughout the country. While the primary motivation for launching this new type of campaigning was the lack of money and the marches were initially viewed with scepticisms, they turned to play “a key role in the eventual alternance” (2007: 111, original emphasis). They did so by skilfully manipulating both new and old social, cultural, and political symbols and managed to mobilize a “rhetoric of rebellion and conquest” that deeply resonated with their participants and audience (2007: 125). The ritualized mass rallies of the ruling party that drew on older idioms of kinship, hierarchy, and “authentic” demonstrations of allegiance to the state were suddenly perceived as uninspiring and stale (2007: 115, 119).

Another study of the nature of political campaigning comes from the run-up to the first municipal multi-party elections in Cameroon in 1996 (Hansen 2010). It is an ethnographic account of public rallies of two competing political parties in the northern town of Ngaoundéré: “[t]hese meetings were social events, often the only social event of that grandeur in the town for weeks. The political meetings offered free music and dances, and were an excellent opportunity for conversation and laughter. Daily routines were abandoned and a climate of excitement, fun and pleasure prevailed” (Hansen 2010: 434). Hansen (2010: 441) analyses the meetings in terms of music, dance, religion, language, commercial exchanges, abuse of state resources, public displays of wealth, etc. She shows how people manipulate “the prevalent neo-patrimonial political cultures during the campaign” and “take advantage of a system that they cannot or do not want to change”.

In a more general study of political communication, Ngomba (2011: 295) attempts to explain the puzzle, why the rapid growth of the liberalized media sector in Cameroon after 1990 “have not led to a significant adoption by parties of media-based campaign communication strategies”. On the contrary, drawing on dozens of semi-structured interviews and an analysis of almost 2000 press cuttings Ngomba (2011: 295) provides substantial evidence that “the developments in the media sector have been occurring in tandem, with a noticeable increase in parties’ and candidates’ prioritization of non-mediated forms of campaign communication strategies”. He puts forward five specific reasons for the preference of the proximity-based, mostly door-to-door campaigning. They are affordability, presumed effectiveness, technical and cultural appropriateness, political parties’ long-term organizational culture, and the parties’ hierarchical way of functioning. He concludes by saying that the often condescending views of the proximity campaigning on the side of political journalists “do not portray a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of political campaign communication in Cameroon” (Ngomba 2011: 311).
3.8 Summary

The literature examines sub-Saharan political parties from multiple, seemingly unrelated perspectives: history, internal organization, the role of violence, institutionalization, channelling of social conflict, strategic choices, party – voter interaction, etc. Even though not all of these phenomena and their specific treatments can be grouped under one theoretical umbrella, the dissertation seeks to find a common logic that underlies a number of them. It does so by its explicit reliance on organization paradigm and by drawing on those studies that emphasize parties' strategic behaviour and focus on party – voter interaction.

4 THEORY: POLITICAL PARTY, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, PARTY COHESION, AND LINKAGE

This chapter defines the four main theoretical concepts that are used to structure and interpret the research material: political party, electoral competition, cohesion, and linkage. Two of them - party and linkage – have been formulated to theorize political parties in the West. The other two – electoral competition and cohesion – have their direct precursors in the same theories. For "electoral competition", the precursor is "elections"; for "cohesion", the precursor is "membership incentives" (cf. Panebianco 1988: 54; cf. Ware 1996: 68-72) or, alternatively, "intra-party linkage" (Jonasson 2004: 18-21). We tailor the definitions to the specific context of sub-Saharan Africa. The last section introduces parameters of the comparative framework which ties the four concepts to a single scheme of electoral politics. The four concepts plus the framework are attended to once more in the final chapter of the study (Chapter XXX) and their utility is re-assessed.

4.1 Political party

The dissertation understands political parties in terms of Sartori's (1976) and Panebianco's (1988) minimal definitions with some qualifications (cf. Bogaards 2013: 267-268). According to Sartori (1976: 64), "[a] party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office". Similarly, Panebianco (1988: 6, original emphasis) wrote that "parties … can be distinguished by referring to the specific environment in which they carry out a specific activity ... parties are the only organizations which operate in the electoral arena, which compete for votes". Three elements are important.

Firstly, we would like to emphasize the organizational dimension which is explicit in Panebianco (1988) and in a diminished form in Sartori’s (1976: 63-64, emphasis added) slightly expanded definition where he says that "[a] party is any political group identified by an official label" and requires "that the group in question be effective and cohesive enough (in only on a spontaneous, election-by-election, organizationless basis) to have some of its candidates elected”. As for the word "organizationless", we would argue that to present oneself under a unified public label and to be ready to undergo the legal-bureaucratic process of registering and participating in elections already requires at least some level of organization. At the same time, we would refuse Sartori's expressions "official label" and "presents at elections". We would not like to end up in a tautology whereby an organization cannot be considered a political party because its label is not sufficiently "official" or because it cannot "present at elections" because of legal-bureaucratic obstacles. Establishing a party and participating at elections are, among other things, official legal-bureaucratic processes. We can easily imagine a perfectly well functioning political party that is refused registration and its lists of candidates are turned down because it is supposedly "ethnic" or "terrorist" or because of another legalistic excuse.

Secondly, we would certainly tie political parties to the electoral arena on which Sartori (1976) and Panebianco (1988) agree. In accordance with Sartori's (1976: 63, emphasis added) expanded definition where a party "is capable of placing through elections (free or unfree), candidates for public office", we would not hinge the inclusion in the definition on some kind of "quality assessment" of the elections but on the fact that they take place.
Thirdly, we would insist on Sartori’s (1976) public office dimension. Election participation and competition for votes can still be a mere gesture, an experiment, or a hoax; a political party may emerge under very dubious circumstances. What is important is not the mere participation but the readiness to accept the office. Also, we would insist on the "public" aspect of the office, i.e. the office is there to do something on behalf of the public; in other words, the office holder has to honour some kind of social contract between him/herself and the public (cf. Nugent 2011). If the election-participating organization has no intention to honour a social contract and takes the office for extracting or criminal reasons along the saying "when we are dead and gone, who cares", then such organization is better studied within a different than political party framework. Besides this public office dimension, we deliberately leave open the question why political groups, even those that are organizationally thin, financially dependent on their founder, and / or with little chance of long-term survival, enter the electoral arena. We argue that this question is something to be studied rather than presumed.

In brief, the concept of ‘political party’ employed in this dissertation has the following characteristics:
- It is an organization that presents under a unified label.
- It operates in the electoral arena, irrespective of whether the elections are free or unfree.
- It is able to place candidates in public office (in the sense of honouring, to some extent at least, the “public” dimension of the role).

### 4.2 Electoral competition

We prefer to use the concept of “electoral competition” to the usual term “elections” which implies procedural aspects and their public expressions, i.e. mainly election campaigns, the act of voting, counting of votes, and publication of results. We understand electoral competition in the broadest possible sense as a continuous cyclical process that comprises legal-bureaucratic, institutional, financial, technological, communication and other practices of all actors, state and non-state, that are somehow related to the enactment of the selection of political representation by the “people”. By doing so, we want to emphasize that while electoral competition can be manipulated in countless number of ways, it is a process that can never be completely controlled. Firstly, the electoral process is procedurally very complex, half public, half hidden, involves large part of the population, and includes a number of checks and balances that are open to scrutiny by experts and/or motivated laypersons alike. Secondly, the act of competition between candidates and the act of voting are easily grasped by anybody, irrespective of his or her social or cultural background; they are highly accessible intuitively and thus have the potential to appeal to the majority of the population. This combination of complexity and intuitive accessibility means that electoral competition brings into the political arena a dose of unpredictability that every actor tries to turn to his or her advantage. According to our definition, the fight for control over the rules of the competition is already part of the competition. A good example of such fight can be found in Morency-Laflamme’s (2010: 65-68) comparison of the “democratic” transitions in Togo and Benin where he describes the different results that the opposition and the transitional government achieved when negotiating electoral rules with the authoritarian government in the early 1990s.

### 4.3 Cohesion

The terms “cohesion” and “glue” often appear in literature when party institutionalization is discussed. More often than not they are used as metaphors (especially “glue”) and not as precise analytic concepts although “group cohesion” is an established concept in social psychology (see for example Forsyth 2010: 116-142). Panebianco (1988) is exceptional in this regard. He uses the term “degree of internal cohesion” consistently throughout his book as one of three characteristics of the “dominant coalition” (his preferred word for a party’s elite): “Degree of cohesion is based upon the extent to which vertical exchanges (the elite-follower exchanges) are concentrated in the hands of a few, or are dispersed amongst numerous leaders” (Panebianco 1988: 38-39).

In a looser way, the terms “cohesion” and “cohesive party” are also employed by Sartori (1976: 64, 85-86) in the sense of describing a political group capable of acting in unity, a group that is not fractioned. In yet another
way, Randall and Svåsand (2002a: 11, 13, 19-20) talk about “sources of cohesion” of political parties and
distinguish cohesion in relation to the “party's success in creating its own distinctive culture or value-system”
from “organizational cohesion” which they discuss in relation to factionalism. They also mention cohesion in
relation to the autonomy of individuals within the party when they write about “party politicians with the
means and motivation to build up their own careers at the expense of the district and ultimately the party”
(Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 20). All these meanings of cohesion go some way but not quite to how we employ
the term in this dissertation; the main difference being that we define cohesion vis-à-vis the pressure that
threatens to crush the unit (organization) and/or pull vital elements out of the unit.

A clarification of our approach is provided by LeBas (2011). While constructing her argument about the
importance of the study of party organization for explaining party systems in Africa, she writes:

"Opposition parties lack the resources to provide even minimal support to candidate campaigns ... they contest
elections on playing fields that are heavily tilted toward incumbent success ... opposition politicians regularly
face harassment, imprisonment, and even physical attack ... [c]alculations of long-term gains are ... unlikely to
sway the decisions of activists and aspirants to office ... [m]aterial incentives for party loyalty are thin, while
those fuelling defection and organizational fragmentation are more substantial. The formation of opposition
party splinters can yield concrete benefits, either through increased access to patronage or via direct co-
opation by the ruling party." (LeBas 2011: 250)

In this dissertation, cohesion is the party's ability to withstand the pressures described above by LeBas plus an
ability to maintain a potential to act as an organization. It has therefore two dimensions: external and internal.
The external dimension has to do with preventing defections of party members or whole organizational
structures and preventing party fragmentation. The internal dimension of cohesion has to do with the parties
continuing ability to maintain communication channels between members, to mobilize members and
supporters, to act in unison under one label, etc. It is not important if cohesion is achieved via formal or
informal mechanisms (Levitsky 1998), via material, solidary, or purposive incentives (Ware 1996: 68-78), or
through fear of losing face (LeBas 2011: 47). Neither it is important whether the internal dimension of cohesion
is continually enacted or exists as a potential that is activated when necessary. It is neither relevant, whether a
party maintains cohesion because it mainly has electoral ambitions (winning votes) or for other purposes. For
example, even a party performing poorly at elections but having a credible level of cohesion (perhaps thanks to
the personality of its leader) owns a valuable electoral asset. It is a certain kind of prize that can be "bought" by
an incumbent or another strong party (cf. LeBas 2011: 35; van de Walle and Butler 1999: 23).

4.4 Linkage

The term linkage entered the study of political parties with a volume edited by Lawson (1980b). Lawson
conceives linkage in a rather abstract way as "a connection, usually with a connotation of interaction: the
elements linked behave differently because they are linked" (Lawson 1980a: 5, original emphasis). More
specifically, there is a focus here on “how parties help (or hinder) the creation of links between citizens and
governments” (Lawson 1980a: 12, original emphasis). Thus the units linked are citizens and governments and
the parties act as "agencies", "channels", or "vehicles" of the link. Lawson's (1980a: 13-14) original volume
contains fifteen case studies from all continents apart from Australia. Based on this empirical material, Lawson
formulated four basic types of "linkage by party": participatory, policy-responsive, by reward, and directive.
Later in her career she added two more categories: revolutionary linkage and linkage for sale (Lawson 2010:
204). Lawson’s model is summarized in Table XXX.
TABLE 3
TYPES OF LINKAGE BY PARTY ACCORDING TO LAWSON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage type</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participatory</td>
<td>Linkage by political parties that serve as agencies through which citizens can participate in government</td>
<td>Examples: recruiting members of support groups for positions of power in party and government, citizens’ influence over programme and candidate selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-responsive</td>
<td>Linkage by political parties that serve as agencies for ensuring that government officials will be responsible to the views of rank-and-file voters</td>
<td>Examples: control of party representatives over governmental decision-making processes, across-party accommodation within the government, determination of voters’ views via opinion polls, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By reward</td>
<td>Linkage by political parties that act primarily as channels for the exchange of votes for favours</td>
<td>Example: patron-clients networks, distribution of patronage (government jobs, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive</td>
<td>Linkage by political parties that act primarily as channels for the exchange of votes for favours</td>
<td>Example: one-party or multi-party state where the government employs parties to manipulate and control the population, to repress the opposition, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Linkage to an imagined, acceptable state by newly established parties during the era of liberation from autocratic rule</td>
<td>Temporary linkage where autocratic state has not fallen but political parties are already forming to fight for liberty. Citizens usually have no other choice then to identify with charismatic leaders of the opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For sale</td>
<td>Linkage by political parties that are clients of rich patrons who themselves do not hold party positions</td>
<td>Context: overwhelming power of advertising and the consequent need for vast sums of money to win votes. Countercurrent: well-financed mass movements that become patrons themselves.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Lawson (1980a; 2010) and Barr (2009)

Apart from Lawson, linkage has been theorized by Kitschelt (2000), Kitschelt & Kselman (2010), and Poguntke (2002). Kitschelt arrives to the concept via a different trajectory without citing Lawson. He draws on Aldrich’s (2000: 847-848) account of “political problem solving by parties in democratic politics” in terms of collective action (building of organizational infrastructure) and social choice (programme formation). Based on a matrix summarized in Table XXX, Kitschelt (2000: 847-853) defines three “democratic linkage types”.

TABLE 4
TYPES OF DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE ACCORDING TO KITSCHELT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage type</th>
<th>Investment in party’s organizational infrastructure</th>
<th>Investment in formulation of party’s programme</th>
<th>Citizens’ “logic of choice”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charismatic / affective linkage</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Affective bonds, irrational sentimentality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientelistic linkage</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Instrumental-rational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic linkage</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Instrumental-rational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Kitschelt (2000) and Kitschelt & Kselman (2010)

Poguntke (2002) adds a new perspective to the nature of linkage by distinguishing between “direct” and “organizational” linkage. Poguntke defines direct linkage as party elites establishing connections to voters “by communicating through the mass media, by using techniques of political marketing and, increasingly, by using means of individualised direct communication like direct mailing, email campaigns and the internet” (Poguntke 2002: 2-3).10 Organizational linkage are connections to voters “through different organizational mediator” based on formal and/or informal ties between the party and the organization. Poguntke’s (2002) scheme is summarized in Table XXX.

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10 Poguntke clearly refers to Western political parties only. In this regard, his word “direct” is somewhat inconvenient because he means mostly mediated communication.
### TABLE 5
**TYPES OF LINKAGE ACCORDING TO POGUNTKE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage type</th>
<th>Linkage channel</th>
<th>Examples of party elite-voter interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct linkage</td>
<td>Individualized politician-voter exchanges</td>
<td>Mass media, opinion surveys, political marketing, new technologies, internet, face-to-face encounters, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational linkage</td>
<td>New social movements</td>
<td>Any new social movements with political dimension: ecological, anti-poverty, anti-system, human rights, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collateral organizations</td>
<td>Youth, religious, women, trade union organizations, etc. either fully or partially integrated with the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party membership</td>
<td>Rank-and-file members and middle-level party elites</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Poguntke (2002)

It is important to notice that each author conceptualizes linkage in a different way.

- For Lawson, the term is abstract, the linked units are government and citizens, political parties mediate the linkage, the linkage enables citizens to shape and control government but it can work in the opposite sense as well.
- For Kitschelt and Kselman (2010: 2), "[i]n democratic elections, political parties and/or individual candidates offer citizens some mix of policy promises, material benefits, and symbolic cues, in exchange for which they hope to secure votes, labor, campaign contributions, etc.". They define these “exchange relations” as “democratic linkages”. Thus the units linked are parties/candidates and citizens and the context is "democracy".
- For Poguntke (2002), the context is also "democratic party competition" where political parties fulfil "linkage function": political parties represent "a central linkage between citizens’ preferences and actions of democratic governments”. This fact is a “by-product of party competition”. Similarly to Lawson (1980a; 2010), the units linked are the citizens (their preferences) and government (its actions). By virtue of their "linkage function", the parties as organizations try "stabilise one of their most important environments, namely their electoral support. Parties can follow two strategies to achieve this goal: they can try to communicate directly with individual voters; they can connect to voters through different organisational mediators” (Poguntke 2002: 1-2). The two strategies / mechanisms are Poguntke’s two types of linkage.

The concept of linkage has been applied to sub-Saharan political parties by Osei (2012) and Resnick (2012). The concept is also implicitly present in other recent studies such as Cheeseman & Hinfelaar (2010) and Larmer and Fraser (2007) and in studies of parties’ election campaigns (Foucher 2007; Hansen 2010; Ngomba 2011).

For the purpose of this study, we define linkage somewhat differently than the hitherto mentioned authors. We make it more concrete than Lawson (1980a; 2010) and we remove it from the framework of “democratic elections” to fit our more general concept of electoral competition (see above). For us, the elements linked are political parties and voters. We draw on Barr’s (2009: 34) summary that "[l]inkage refers to an interactive connection between two units ... More specifically, it concerns the means by which political actors and constituents exchange support and influence”. In our approach, party – voter linkages are interactive connections that create and re-create more or less durable bonds between parties and voters; we mean those connections that go beyond the simple act of voting. The space we aim at is, at one end, delimited by parties’ appeals (parties’ requests for support, parties courting voters) to members of the public where there is no interaction. At the other end, our domain of interest merges with the parties’ inner, organizational environment, intra-party linkage, and the parties’ incentives for members and activists. The domain thus

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11 Resnick combines certain characteristics of Kitschelt’s three linkages into a new distinct type: populist linkage (2012: 1356-1358)
12 For the difference between appeal and linkage see Barr (2009: 34-35); for an overview of parties’ incentives see Ware (1996: 65-72).
includes party supporters (non-members who are ready to help the party in one way or another), party sympathizers, and any other potential voters who would respond to a party’s appeals/courtship by some kind of tangible behaviour: for example, they would attend an election rally, they would participate in discussion on the party’s Facebook election page, they would wear a party badge in front of party members, they would donate material to the party, they would take part in a sport competition or any other activity organized by the party, etc. In mass parties, the linkage space may comprise those party members that are important simply as voters rather than persons who would be expected to play some role in party organization. Table XXX lists the type of appeals (or controls) that may initiate the interactive connections and the types of linkage that follow from them. The reasoning behind the classification is discussed in detail in the final theoretical chapter of this dissertation. Overall, Table XXX includes the six types of linkage defined by Lawson (see Table XXX above) plus a group of linkages that we put in “governance” category. The governance appeals/linkages routinely appear in party literature with the exception of “paternalistic linkage” which is a novelty of this dissertation (for further details see Section XXX below). Lawson’s revolutionary and market linkages exist is sub-Saharan Africa but were not encountered during the field research.¹³

**TABLE 6**

**PARTY APPEALS (CONTROLS) AND TYPES OF LINKAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appeal / control</th>
<th>Linkage type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We will enable your political participation</td>
<td>Participatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will implement our programme</td>
<td>Programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will ensure your views will be taken into account</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will reward you if you support us</td>
<td>Clientelistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will coerce you if you do not comply</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will govern well because we share your identity</td>
<td>Identity-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will govern well because we are competent</td>
<td>Competence-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will govern well because we are moral</td>
<td>Ethos-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will govern well because we care about people</td>
<td>Paternalistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I will shatter the establishment</td>
<td>Populist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will free you from oppression</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will attend to your views via our patrons’ candidates</td>
<td>Market</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 4.5 Comparative framework

The comparative framework presented here ties the four analytical concepts (party, competition, cohesion, linkage) in a common scheme of electoral politics. It takes some themes that are present in the general context of party politics (see Chapter XXX above) and combines them with other factors described in extant literature to formulate a set of principles and party strategies that follow from them.

(1) **Incumbent/opposition disparity.** Sub-Saharan political parties face radically different predicaments depending on their degree of their control over state institutions and access to state resources (see for example Nugent 2007). The different positions of the parties vis-à-vis the state have different consequences for them in terms of how they organize their activities.

(2) **High stakes of politics.** The incumbent party enjoys advantages stemming from the control of the neo-

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¹³ Lawson’s (2010) revolutionary linkage concerns changes from autocratic rule (one-party state) to multiparty competition. These events took place 20 to 24 years ago and would require a more focused fieldwork. As for the market linkage, Lawson (2010) formulated it to describe the circumstances in the contemporary United States of America; Nigeria could probably serve as a sub-Saharan example (cf. Kura 2011).
patrimonial state and its members get involved in various sorts of favouritism, clientelism and/or outright illegal practices. The incumbent party and its supporters have access to state finances, jobs, and contracts. Alternative economic opportunities are few and/or much more demanding. Losing control over key state institutions such as security apparatus and the judiciary may result in facing criminal charges in case of a political alteration.

(3) Hostile operating environment. The term comes from Helle et al. (2011: 2) but the phenomenon has been observed since the 1990s. Though electoral competition is “the only game in town”, its concrete shape is part and parcel of political struggle; no rules, procedures, or practices can be taken for granted. Due to the high stakes of party competition, the greatest danger for the ruling party is to lose elections. The government controlled by the incumbent party therefore deploys a whole “menu of manipulation” to stay in power (Schedler 2002: 39). Legal and institutional safeguards are bent in the incumbent’s favour, security forces and/or pro-governmental militias may resort to violence against opposition members; opposition supporters are threatened and harassed.

(4) Ideology and ethno-regional loyalties. So far, there has been a consensus that ideology plays little role in sub-Saharan party politics (see for example Erdmann 2007: 39-40). Even though this dissertation paints a different picture, it is clear that the parties do not routinely use ideology to differentiate themselves from their competitors (see Section XXX below for a more thorough discussion of these propositions). Similarly, the parties cannot rely on ethno-regional loyalties only. Firstly, an ethno-regional majority is usually not present; secondly, explicit reliance on it is illegal and can lead to a backlash.

(5) Diversity of linkage. Under the circumstances of the general preference for face-to-face political communication, the low differentiation potential of ideology and the impossibility to rely solely or too explicitly on ethno-regional loyalties, importance of other types of linkage grows. Creation, cultivation and strategic use of these non-programmatic, non-ethno-regional linkages give meaning to multi-party competition; these linkages move to the centre stage of politics. Due to the incumbent/opposition disparity, the high stakes of politics and the hostile operating environment their strategic use and enactment will differ between the incumbent party and the opposition.

(6) Ruling party strategy. Apart from applying the whole “menu of manipulation”, the party (or parties) controlling the state and its resources will increase density of its structures all over the territory, will try to co-opt members of local elite (whether they are members of other parties or not), will deepen, diversify, and otherwise cultivate its linkages with the population.

(7) Opposition strategy. From the opposition parties’ perspective, be they governance-oriented or simply entrepreneurial (profit-oriented), the most immediate preoccupation is to maintain cohesion: to withstand outside pressure to fragment and/or for members to defect and to preserve a potential to act as an organization. If these parties survive at all, most of them remain limited to their ethno-regional base, are kept alive thanks to the powerful sponsors who founded them and/or become irrelevant. If an opposition party succeeds in carrying on, its further strategy and chances of seizing power would be country-specific. In general, such party will channel its limited human and financial resources into developing selected linkages with the population. It will do so with maximum efficiency and creativity. The goals in order of priority will be to maintain cohesion, to identify the best combination of linkages to focus on, to use the limited human and financial resources to create and maintain these linkages, and to prepare for the next election campaign.

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14 The term “opposition parties” is misleading but will be used as a matter of convenience. These parties may not actually be in any kind “political opposition” vis-à-vis the government; some of them may be entrepreneurial creations; the distinguishing factor is whether they have or do not have access to state resources (cf. Manning 2005: 724).
4.6 Summary

Political party, electoral competition, cohesion, and linkage provide a bare-bone conceptual apparatus to analyse multi-party competition in the three selected countries. While the individual concepts come originally from the mainstream of party studies, all of them require substantial adaptation to fit the general context of sub-Saharan politics. Competition in hostile environment lies at the heart of our approach. Even though this kind of setting usually favours the incumbent, there are situations when the outcome is by no means certain.

5 METHODOLOGY

This chapter uses a broad conception of methodology and is divided in four sections. The first one situates the dissertation within existing social-scientific paradigms. The second section describes and justifies the method of case selection. The third section deal with the research techniques that were employed in the field. Lastly, important ethical considerations are discussed.

5.1 Social-scientific paradigm

The dissertation is grounded in two paradigms: constructivist and critical. Constructivism focuses on the “constitutive role of micro-social patterns of relations in creating and maintaining social structure” (Maréchal 2010: 223). In doing so, this paradigm attempts to reconcile the opposition between structure and agency by claiming that “society is both an objective and a subjective reality” (Sharrock 2009: 1014). In accordance with this perspective, this dissertation tries to strike a balance between purposeful, intentional actions of individuals and organizations and larger socio-political and economic constraints. While the constructivist paradigm informs the central argument of the dissertation as a whole, the fieldwork that supplied most of the research material used the extended case method (Burawoy 1998). This method falls within the critical science paradigm where “[w]hat a researcher studies, how he or she studies it, and what happens to the results involve values and morality, because knowledge has tangible effects on people’s lives” (Neuman 2003: 86-87). Besides the moral aspects which were acutely felt during the fieldwork itself, the extended case method strongly influenced the dissertation in terms of theory generation: instead of approving or rejecting hypotheses, the method "has the purpose of discovering flaws in, and then modifying, existing social theories” (Babbie 2010: 310). It does so by starting with an explicit prior theory (or at least conjecture) which “[t]he researcher constantly builds and rebuilds ... in a dialogue with the people studied and ... other researchers” (Neuman 2003: 87). In Burawoy’s own words, “[t]he conjectures of yesterday’s analysis are refuted by today’s observations and then reconstructed in tomorrow’s analysis. But there is a second running exchange, that between analysis and existing theory, in which the latter is reconstructed on the basis of emergent anomalies” (1991: 10-11). The researcher thus looks for anomalies that challenge already existing theories and by analysing these anomalies he or she suggests modifications of these theories, a process Burawoy (1998: 18) calls a “successive approximation”. The method itself is called ‘extended’ because it ‘extends out’ from the ‘locality’ to macro-social forces that frame it and constrain it (Burawoy 1998: 5, 15). This emphasis on the interaction of the micro and macro level fits well the constructivist notions on how social reality is constituted.

5.2 Case selection

This dissertation follows Gerring’s (2007) approach to case study research. As apparent from the comparative framework presented in Section XXX above, it enquires into two causal relationships. In the first one, the most proximate causal factor (independent variable) is the hostile operating environment and the closely related phenomena such as the incumbent/opposition disparity, high stakes of politics and the like. The outcome (dependent variable) is different forms of party cohesion. In the second causal relationship, the most proximate causal factors are the established preference for face-to-face communication between parties and voters plus the low significance of ideology for party differentiation. The outcome is the diversity of linkage types that the
parties employ. The population of cases where these two causal relationships are supposed to apply is sub-Saharan Africa as characterized in Chapter 2 above.

Out of all sub-Saharan countries, Zambia, Burundi and Togo were selected according to the diverse-case method which “has as its primary objective the achievement of maximum variance along relevant dimensions” (Gerring 2007: 97). “[T]he logic of diverse-case analysis rests upon the logic of typological theorizing – where different combinations of variables are assumed to have effects on an outcome that vary across types” (Gerring 2007: 98, original emphasis). In this dissertation, the “types” are the individual countries. Discovering a significant macro- and micro-level diversity in the way political parties operate both between and within countries was one of the basic assumptions of the project (see Section XXX above). Table XXX lists the relevant dimensions that were used to obtain the maximum variance between the three cases.

### TABLE 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevant dimension</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land area</td>
<td>Miniscule (25,680 km²)</td>
<td>Small (54,390 km²)</td>
<td>Huge (743,390 km²)</td>
<td>For the number inhabitants per km² see Table XXX above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>Mountainous, landlocked</td>
<td>Highlands and lowlands, diverse climatic zones, important sea port</td>
<td>Varied, large mineral deposits, landlocked, railway connections</td>
<td>TAZARA railway connects Zambia to Dar es Salaam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial heritage</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Traces of German influence in Togo and Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture area</td>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity of ethnic relations</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>One common language spoken in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political violence</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Proportional with majoritarian elements</td>
<td>First-past-the-post</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political alteration after 1990</td>
<td>Two alterations via elections and two coups d'etat</td>
<td>No alteration via elections</td>
<td>Two alterations via elections</td>
<td>Togo: transfer of presidential powers from father to son in 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
Text
World Bank (2013b)

As far as the first three dimensions are concerned (land area, population density and geography), the reasons for their inclusion were general ones: political dynamics spread over large or small area of various population density and diverse geographies with or without active extraction of mineral resources as well as possible differences in party penetration and organization under such circumstances. Potential political impact of the latter six dimensions is obvious. Overall, the countries differ in all nine dimensions, often to an extreme degree. Ethnic relations deserve a special note. Depending on the way one classifies them, Zambia harbours between 40 to 70 ethnic groups and 45 to 70 indigenous languages; in Togo, one can count between 20 to 50 ethnic groups and about 40 languages (Ethnologue.com 2013a; Ethnologue.com 2013b; Labarthe 2013: 58-63; Leclerc 2013a; Leclerc 2013b; Posner 2005: 52-55). In spite of these estimates, we argue that ethnic, ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious relations are significantly more complex in Togo for the following reasons: (1) greater ethno-religious diversity in Togo, (2) wider range of responses to colonization between ethnic groups in Togo, (3) picture complicated by rural – rural migration that German and French colonial powers encouraged in Togo, and (4) the ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity of Togo thus circumscribed is squeezed in a territory more than 13 times smaller than that of Zambia. The chapters dedicated to individual countries below contain more detailed information about some of the nine relevant dimensions.

15 Other dimensions where the three countries differ with important consequences for party politics were identified during the field research. They are discussed in Chapter XXX below.
16 The question of Barotseland has had a minor influence on party politics in Zambia so far.
Apart from these purely methodological criteria, the case selection was influenced by several pragmatic/logistical considerations (Gerring 2007: 149-150). Most importantly, the author had prior experience with Togo and especially with Burundi. Also, the fact that Zambia's 2011 general elections coincided with the first window for fieldwork contributed to the inclusion of this country. Similarly, the expected coincidence of the legislative elections in Togo with the second window for fieldwork contributed to the selection of this country (though the elections were later postponed). The lack of literature on political parties in Togo also played a role.

5.3 Ethical considerations

As mentioned above, political parties in sub-Saharan Africa rely heavily on face-to-face contact with their voters. At the same time, the parties resemble a state within a state with its own (often confidential) procedures, records, intelligence, and counter-intelligence. More often than not, their internal workings are inaccessible to participant observation; their archives are not opened to researchers. One possible way to glean a picture of the parties' organization and strategic planning of linkage are discreet conversations with party representatives and activists in the field.

The bulk of the fieldwork for this dissertation consisted of research interviews. The research encounters took place in periods of severe political competition and/or government – opposition negotiations. In many interviews, sensitive issues were raised by the researcher such as (non)adherence to party regulations, party finances, intra-party corruption, disciplinary procedures, etc. The interviewees thus faced several dilemmas when sharing their knowledge and opinions with a white stranger: they could threaten their own position in the party by disclosing anything in the first place, they could disclose a piece of information that would be useful to competing political parties, they could put their party in a bad light, and they could put their country's political culture in a bad light in front of a foreign visitor.

Informed consent procedure was performed with all interviewees and they were all offered confidentiality. A permission to take hand-written notes was obtained. The author's student card and passport were offered for inspection and perusal. To preclude any possible ethical lapses the nature of the research and the format of the interviews were explained as fully as possible including the right of the respondent to withdraw from the process at any time. Given the hostile political environment of Burundi and Togo, computer files with the interview notes were encrypted, password-protected and immediately sent out of the country by e-mail. In Burundi, handwritten notes from the interviews were periodically destroyed. As the interviews were conducted on an explicitly voluntary, informal basis and resulted from good will of individual citizens, no research permit was sought from the state authorities. The author did not seek any institutional support from any state or non-state actors.

5.4 Research techniques

All interviews were conducted in French or English. The opening theme of each interview was the interviewee's political autobiography. Subsequent discussion covered the following topics: party membership, party structure and procedures, party activities, funding, party statutes, congresses, programme, selection of party officials, selection of election candidates, ethnic / regional factors, relationship between political parties, etc. Not all topics were covered in each interview and not exactly in the same order. The list of topics differed slightly from one country to another depending on the relevance of the items in the particular country. Concrete examples and descriptions of events and situations were elicited whenever possible. At the end of the questioning, the participants were encouraged to pose their own question about the research itself, the political system in the Czech Republic, the European Union, etc. This ‘raw data’ was captured in the author’s mother

17 Interview no. 9 in Burundi was partly interpreted from Kirundi, see Annex 2.
tongue with some citations in French or English. As soon as possible after the interview, usually the same day or the day after, the notes and everything else the researcher remembered was transcribed onto a computer. For each interview, an assessment of credibility and the psychological dynamics of the encounter were recorded. A summary of the interview process in the three countries is presented in Table XXX. More detailed information about the interviews and the specific challenges encountered in each country can be found in the annexes (Zambia – Annex 1, Burundi – Annex 2, Togo – Annex 3).

### TABLE 8
**BURUNDI, TOGO, AND ZAMBIA: SUMMARY OF THE INTERVIEWS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
<th>Average length of one interview in minutes</th>
<th>Number of provinces/regions covered</th>
<th>Number of national level party respondents</th>
<th>Number of middle and local level party respondents</th>
<th>Number of non-party respondents</th>
<th>Length of interview notes in words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td>Sep-Oct 2012</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>87 min</td>
<td>7 of 17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOGO</td>
<td>Oct-Nov 2012</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>74 min</td>
<td>5 of 5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>Sep-Oct 2011</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>90 min</td>
<td>3 of 9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>117 days</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>84 min</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>103,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: field notes
Note: most interviews were conducted with individuals. A few interviews were conducted with more than one person, usually one or two (see Annexes 1-3 for details).

Several ways of selecting interviewees were used and the purpose was to have as diverse a sample as possible given the logistical and time constraints on the fieldwork. Party members were approached in and around party offices, via phone numbers posted on party web pages, on recommendation of other party members and ordinary citizens etc. In Zambia, where an election campaign was in full swing, the author also approached party members during day-to-day campaign activities, on election rallies, in front of polling stations, via contact lists provided by elections observers, etc. A time and place of meetings were agreed either face to face or via phone calls. Most of the encounters took place in restaurants of various guesthouses, a few on party premises, in private homes, in the open air, etc. The interviewees were not paid. Identifying, setting appointments with, and actually meeting suitable informants for an interview did not pose serious problems; and people's responses to interview requests were generally positive. Being a visitor from an obscure Central European country probably helped as well. All interviews took place in a good, respectful atmosphere. As far as the main goals of this study are concerned, middle and lower party cadres, and ordinary members tended to contribute more useful information. High-ranking politicians tended to present rather smooth and coherent stories and they shielded off tricky questions more easily. As far as the researcher is able to judge, evasion and/or clichés (rather than making things up) were the chief strategies employed by the interviewees when invited to share information they considered too sensitive. Data analysis itself was performed in three phases. First, during the interviews when notes were being taken and selective attention of the researcher focused on the flow of the conversation. The second phase took place when the notes were transcribed and supplemented by recollections from short-term memory. One could say that during the second phase the interviews were “frozen in time”. The third analysis was performed while preparing academic text based on the field notes which often took place several months later.

To make the fieldwork material as transparent as possible, a decision to reference individual interviewees throughout the dissertation was taken. The coding scheme is B = Burundian, T = Togolese, Z = Zambian and the tables in Annexes 1-3 indicate how many times each respondent is referenced. It allows the reader to assess to what extent the text is based on statements from a few or a multitude of informants. The second reason is to show geographic distribution of the fieldwork material. Unfortunately, due to security and ethical concerns, this was possible for Zambia only where the respondents are coded chronologically and their list indicates both their party affiliation and the location of the interview (see Annex 1). Burundian and Togolese respondents were coded in a randomized way and the location of the interview is not given. This method also makes the
date of the interview much less precise because the field work period is delimited by month only (and not by
exact dates as in Zambia) (see Annexes 2-3).

The researcher had many casual discussions with ordinary people on buses, on the street, in guesthouses, etc.
Compared to the more formal interviews, these conversations touched upon a wider range of issues besides
politics and elections: living standards, jobs, ethnicity, education, religion, media etc. Most of this secondary
information was not written down but was used to interpret the main interviews. In Zambia, several election
rallies were attended and other campaign activities directly observed. Party activities were also directly
observed in Togo, though on two occasions only.

Apart from the fieldwork in the three countries, the study involved a substantial volume of desk research. The
main data sources were internet news servers, websites of governmental institutions including electoral
commissions, websites of political parties, as well as occasional "grey zone" sources (blogs, for example).
Several acts of law, party statutes, party press releases, and other primary documents were obtained in this
manner.

6 COUNTRY FINDINGS

This chapter presents the research findings separately for each country in a common format: socio-political
environment, political parties, party organization, cohesion, and linkage. The sections on party organization,
cohesion, and linkage make extensive use of the ethnographic material to illustrate key points and mechanisms.
The evidence presented is necessarily selective. In does not strive to be systematic or exhaustive and it cannot
be so, as this would require presentation of a huge volume of ethnographic descriptions. The statements and
opinions provided by the interviewees should not be understood literally. While they have been corroborated
and in some instances verified against external sources, they first and foremost approximate the life-world of
active members of various political parties.

6.1 Zambia

6.1.1 Socio-political environment

Zambia is nominally a republic with separation of powers and a liberal representative model of political
participation. It has a Societies Act (XXX) regulating the existence of associations, including political parties, and
an Electoral Act (XXX). Both acts conform to international standards. In terms of governance, Zambia is a
centralized country with a strong presidency, a weak parliament, and a weak local government. As in other
former colonies, a modern state constitution was hastily implanted on the racist and exploitative system of rule
shortly before independence in 1964 and the country became a one-party state in 1973. Zambia has been a
“low-conflict polity” for many decades (Burnell 2005). After the end of the Cold War, multi-partism was re-
introduced and competitive general elections have taken place on a regular basis since 1991. Since 2001,
presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections have been held on the same day; the mandate is for
five years. The country uses a first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system for all three organs: the presidency,
the unicameral parliament, and the local government. All legislative elections between 1991 and 2006 were
won by the MMD (see Table XXX) and all presidential elections between 1991 and 2008 were won by MMD
candidates (President Levy Mwanawasa died in the middle of his second term and a presidential by-election
was held in 2008). The last tripartite elections in September 2011 were won by the main opposition party, the
Patriotic Front (PF), and its presidential candidate Michael Sata: the first political alteration since Kenneth
Kaunda's UNIP lost to the MMD in 1991.
6.1.2 Political parties

There are currently three well established parties in Zambia (PF, MMD, UPND), two formerly strong parties are in decline (UNIP, FDD), and two new parties have recently entered the electoral arena (ADD, NAREP).

For about eight years, three political parties have been the strongest players in Zambia: the PF, the MMD, and the UPND. As already mentioned, the MMD ruled from 1991 till September 2011 when it was replaced by the PF. The third well established party, the UPND, narrowly lost 2001 elections and currently holds about 20% parliamentary seats (see Table XXX above). It is of note that many observers believe the 2001 elections were rigged. In Gould's opinion "Mazoka [UPND chairman and presidential candidate] probably had the greater share of popular support, but was deftly out-maneuvered by the MMD which ruthlessly exploited its control of state resources during the campaign period" (Gould 2007). Similarly, the Carter Center observation mission concluded that "the ECZ [the Electoral Commission of Zambia] and government failed to administer a fair and transparent election and address electoral irregularities that clearly could have affected the outcome of a close race" (Carter Center 2002: 48). In terms of their support base, all three parties have an ethnic flavour and are...
often said to represent three largest ethno-linguistic groupings: Nyanja (the MMD), Bemba (the PF) and Tonga (the UPND). As for the parties’ origins, the MMD was born in 1990 as a broad-based pro-democracy movement to challenge one-party rule (Momba and Madimutsa 2009). Over the years, many influential politicians left the MMD and founded their own parties (Momba and Madimutsa 2009: 9-11): as a PF interviewee remarked, Zambian political parties were formed based on “emotional differences” or “personal differences” with the underlying logic “if I do not like you, I will found my own party” (Z26). On the other hand, the almost obligatory membership of so many politically active Zambians in the MDD is not surprising as it originally was a movement rather than a party.18 The UPND was founded by a wealthy businessman, Anderson Mazoka in 1998. Though Mazoka was an MMD treasurer at the constituency level, the party cannot be considered a proper MMD splinter (Momba and Madimutsa 2009: 10). This label suits better the PF which was founded by Michael Sata in 2001. Sata held governmental positions and parliamentary seats during both the pre-1991 UNIP and the subsequent MMD rule; he was the MMD national secretary until September 2001 (Gould 2007; Larmer and Fraser 2007: 624; Momba and Madimutsa 2009: 6).

Two one-time influential parties seem to be in irreversible decline: the UNIP and the FDD. The UNIP, the former single party, last gained parliamentary seats in the 2001 elections (13 out of 150); in 2006 the party was a junior member of the UDA coalition dominated by the UPND and in 2011 elections it did not win even a single constituency. The second party sinking into oblivion is the FDD, the most significant MMD splinter which “came about in 2001 when Chiluba and his close supporters attempted to change the constitution to permit him to hold office as president for a third time. During this period a total of 22 MMD parliamentarians, including Zambia’s Vice-President Christon Tembo and five cabinet ministers, openly took issue with Chiluba and were subsequently expelled from the party. They together formed the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD)” (Momba and Madimutsa 2009: 10). The party came third in the 2001 elections but failed to score significant results within the UDA coalition in 2006. It currently has one MP (see Table XXX above). To complete the current party list, two new parties that were registered before the 2011 elections deserve to be mentioned - the ADD and the NAREP – though more time is needed to assess their long-term potential. The ADD formed in 2009 and selected Charles Milupi, a businessman and an independent MP of Lozi (ethnic) origin, as its president in 2010 (Lusaka Times 2010).19 In the 2011 elections, the party won one parliamentary seat in the western, Lozi-dominated province of Barotseland, which was a disappointing result. The second new party, the NAREP, was founded by a corporate lawyer Elias Chipimo and has attracted support mainly among members of urban elites, intelligentsia, and students (Z2). The party did not win any parliamentary seats in 2011 elections, but it has been very active ever since, in contrast to the ADD.20

6.1.3 Party organization

Membership

Any adult can become a member of a Zambian political party; no recommendation by existing members is required. One registers at the lowest party segment that exists in the area, usually a ward or a branch. This unit needs to be ascertained (Z7, Z20, Z21). The register of

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18 In this regard, the MMD can be compared to the Civic Forum which formed during the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1989. The Civic Forum won 68 out of 101 National Assembly seats in the Czech part of the federation in the first free elections in 1990. In contrast to the MMD, the Civic Forum voluntarily dissolved in 1991 and the resultant political formations entered the 1992 election race independently and under different names.

19 Lozi is the fourth largest ethno-linguistic group.

20 To compare the current activity of the ADD and the NAREP the author performed three simple tests in July 2013. Firstly, the website of the party was checked. NAREP’s website <newzambia.org> was apparently regularly updated and full of material. ADD’s website <addzambia.org> returned the following message: „This account is currently disabled“. Secondly, number of hits in Google News was checked for keyword combinations “Chipimo NAREP Zambia” and “Milupi ADD Zambia”. The ratio was 35:5 in favour of the NAREP; for South African edition the ratio was 14:5; in simple Google search the ratio was 21600:19800 in favour of the NAREP. Thirdly, several parliamentary by-elections have taken place since 2012. The author found no signs that the ADD put up any candidates in any of the polls. The NAREP put up candidates for Feira by-election held on 20 June 2013, Kafulafuta by-election held on 25 July 2013, and possibly other by-elections as well (Electoral Commission of Zambia 2013; Lusaka Times 2013).
members is kept by the unit’s head and is not considered a valuable or sensitive document (Z21). Some parties, such as the MMD, the UPND, the ULP, and the ADD, issue cards to their members (Z6, Z9, Z11, Z14). The PF does not issue any cards; the membership ‘is in your heart’ (Z7). The MMD, the ADD or the NAREP charge a small fee for the card/membership. The fee is equivalent to anything between 10 and 50 US cents so that anybody could afford it (Z1, Z6, Z9). The PF and the UPND do not charge any membership fees (Z7, Z11).

Members are free to switch to another party without the need to tell anyone. As for losing one's membership involuntarily, the use of disciplinary procedures against members is not just theoretical: membership suspensions, expulsion, and related court challenges are common. Two levels have to be distinguished: national versus provincial and local. Even a cursory look at the national political arena clearly shows that disciplinary procedures are used to get rid of intra-party opponents. As for the provinces, a total of 16 cases of expulsion or suspension were mentioned (Z9, Z19, Z20, Z25, Z26, Z27) by the respondents and details were shared about 12 of them: six had to do with working for, or corruption by, other parties; and three with the lack of discipline or competence; while the rest were special cases. In contrast to the way disciplinary procedures are applied at the national level, a great majority of the provincial cases resembled genuine disciplinary problems rather than a targeting of opponents.

Structure

Party structure mirrors administrative division of the country into provinces, districts, constituencies, and wards. In terms of national political representation, each parliamentary seat equals one constituency. As for local government, districts are the biggest units for which councils exist. Council areas (be they district, township, municipal, or city) are divided into wards with each ward equalling one councillor seat. Party structures below the level of the ward consist of so called 'branches'. Some party constitutions indicate the minimum number of members that can form a branch, for example, it has to be at least 50 in the PF and 30 in the FDD. In reality, anything between 25 and 50 seems to suffice. For example, PF branches in the Chipata Central constituency already split in two when the number of their members reached 50 (Z22, Z23). The number of wards and especially branches may increase substantially during the months and week before elections. For example, branches in one of four wards of the Chipata central constituency multiplied from 12 to 50 during 2011 pre-election period (Z22, Z23).

According to party constitutions, the size of executive organs below the national level should range from four to 11 people (ADD 2011; Patriotic Front 2011; UPND 2011). In practice, executive and policy making positions merge to a smaller or larger extent. As there had been 24 government ministries until September 2011, the parties attempted to set up a kind of shadow cabinets and they did so not only at national level but at lower levels as well. Thus, for example, the so called “district” and “provincial committees” consist of 24 people in the PF (Z7, Z8, Z20) and 45 people in the ADD (Z9). For the PF, 72 districts plus nine provinces have to be counted which yields 1,944 party members eligible to attend a national party convention (Z7, Z8). Similar inflation and merging occurs at national level and it is sometimes difficult to establish a relationship between what party statutes say and the actual size and composition of party organs is.

Zambian political parties have hardly any paid staff. According to a PF member, their headquarters in Lusaka had five paid employees in the period preceding the September 2011 elections (Z15). A UNIP member confirmed a few paid employees at their headquarters (Z28). The MMD itself certainly had more people on a regular payroll at the headquarters and may have had some at provincial level as well (Z2). It is unclear whether the party had any full-time employees at lower levels.

Procedures

Several respondents claimed that the structures and formal procedures of the parties are similar (Z2, Z7, Z8, Z9, Z15) and nobody contradicted this view. Comparison of selected party statutes supports this claim (ADD 2011;
FDD 2011; Patriotic Front 2011; UPND 2011). Some respondents said that the structures and formal procedures of Zambian political parties were the same, only the terminology (for example, the way party organs are named) might differ (Z7, Z8, Z9). Adherence to statutes was discussed with seven interviewees: four of them were evasive (Z25, Z27, Z28), one of them admitted that the party constitution was not always followed (Z11) and three others gave concrete examples of non-compliance (Z7, Z20, Z26). As these cases well illustrate the importance of informal behaviour, we present them in full.

In the first example, a PF member reported the case of two persons who were not re-elected to their positions during a provincial conference. They “petitioned the central committee” who “nullified” the vote and re-instated them. Local party officials complained and the matter was put straight a few months later when the PF vice-president visited the province. However, “for the sake of the unity of the party” the central committee created special positions for the two disgruntled petitioners so that they would not end up empty-handed (Z20).

The second example also concerns elections for party positions in the PF. The interviewee supposedly observed four ward chairmen who voted during a provincial conference even though they did not have the right to do so. Other delegates complained, but no formal protest was submitted. The same interviewee described a case of a former district chairman who took part in such a conference although he was not supposed to be there at all. He not only voted, but competed for positions in spite of the fact that only official conference delegates could do so. It has even happened that an un-authorized person was elected to a provincial level position in this way (Z26).

Thirdly, in the opinion of another PF member, regulations were followed as long as they did not prevent influential party officials from pursuing their goals. When the statutes are perceived as burdensome or counter-productive, they are simply bypassed and overruled by ‘local culture’ (Z7). The same person spontaneously remarked that Africans lived two lives: one, a life lived in their own culture, and a second one, pretending to adhere to Western culture and democracy (Z7). Two informants also agreed that ignorance rather than intention could be the cause of non-adherence to the regulations, especially at lower levels of the party hierarchy (Z20, Z26). From the dispassionate and down-to-earth way the participants referred to non-adherence and the amount of detail they provided, one can safely conclude that party statutes are certainly not followed to the letter; they rather serve as a general “guide” (Z11).

In theory, all positions in party organs are elective. Reality is more complicated for the following three reasons. Firstly, elections may not be held as the case of party conventions shows (see below). Secondly, constitutions may include clauses that limit or extend members’ right to be elected. For example, Article 32 of the PF Constitution states that “[p]ersons standing for posts in the Ward Committees shall be subject to approval of the District and Provincial Committees” (Patriotic Front 2011). Thirdly, as already demonstrated, the election process may diverge from written procedures.

Supreme party organs

A national conference is the supreme organ of all Zambian parties: it adopts the constitution, elects the party president and members of the central committee with extensive powers. In the case of a newly founded party, all structures remain provisional in nature until the first convention (Z16). Most party constitutions state a convention shall be held every five years (ADD 2011; Patriotic Front 2011; UPND 2011). In reality, especially the opposition parties do not hold conventions as often as envisaged. For example, it took the PF ten years to organize its first convention and to approve the constitution. The ADD was founded in 2010 but has not held a convention so far. The UPND held a convention that elected party leaders in 2006 and does not plan to organize another one until 2014 (Lusaka Times 2012). Furthermore, even when a conference does take place, little genuine competition for the positions in the central committee and the presidency is expected. According to a PF member, hardly anybody dares to submit a candidacy without prior approval by party leaders. People would be sent to ‘explain’ to the contender (even using violence or the threat of it) to make him or her withdraw his or
her candidacy (Z7). This does not mean, however, that the conventions are completely ceremonial or staged. Intra-party tensions may boil over and the event can turn to an arena of intense political struggle (for example, the UPND conference after the death of Mazoka in 2006 or the MMD convention in April 2011).

Funding

Zambian political parties get no contributions from the state budget and there is no law obliging them to disclose the sources of their funding (Z2). There is a widespread consensus that the ruling party abuses state resources to fund itself (Z12). In all parties, voluntary donations of rich members and sympathizers either in cash or in kind are accepted at any level (Z6, Z16, Z19, Z20). The national headquarters are partly funded from the salaries of members on state payroll, such as MPs, ministers, and high-ranking state employees (Z7, Z8). Such a way of funding can only work if the party has members in such positions at all. The only other option is funding from private wealth. For example, a UNPD member remarked that Hakainde Hichilema, the current President of the UPND, a successful businessman, was currently irreplaceable as there was no other rich person in the central committee who would be able to fund the party (Z19). Provincial, district, and other officials of the opposition have to fund their party segments out of their own pockets (Z3, Z18, Z27). Some of these structures receive small and often secret gifts from sympathizing businessmen in the order of tens or hundreds of US dollars (Z20). The only examples of funding by the head office that the respondents mentioned were high-profile visits of party leaders from Lusaka (Z2) and a contribution for the funerals of two long-time party members (Z20).

Presidential, parliamentary, and local government election campaigns are financed by the candidates themselves (Z7, Z8, Z9). Estimates of the total cost of one MP campaign varied wildly from as high as US$300,000 (Z24), US$400,000 (Z18) and US$10,000 per week (Z27) to “at least US$20,000” (Z28). Though all candidates have sponsors (Z9, Z14) and may get a contribution from their party, it is themselves who bear the brunt of the costs. Council seats seem to be the only elective positions within the reach of persons of average socioeconomic status. A candidate’s competence, political skills and rhetorical support from a popular MP candidate of the same party may suffice to become elected (Z19). The plutocracy effect works the other way round as well: an interviewee from the UNIP admitted that his party attracted mostly poor candidates because their chances of winning on the UNIP ticket were low (Z27).

Candidate selection

As the fieldwork in Zambia was conducted in the heat of the election campaign, the selection process of party candidates was researched in some detail. The candidacy contenders are selected by party organs, a process that theoretically starts at the grass-roots level and moves up via the constituency, district, and province to the national committees (or even the party president), where the final list of names is approved. Up to the provincial level, the contenders are interviewed by the so called interviewing committees, whose size, composition, and style of work differ from one party to another. The committees work under time pressure, with limited resources, limited access to information, and are exposed to various kinds of manipulation (Z11, Z26). For example, a committee may receive a party intelligence report or an anonymous letter accusing the applicant of corrupting members of a lower level committee (Z6, Z26) or of having been bought by another party (Z11). However, these accusations may be related to intra-party power struggle which makes it difficult for the committee to evaluate them (Z26). A disgruntled contender for the MMD parliamentary ticket vividly described an atmosphere of time pressure, noise, and confusion during a provincial round of interviews with 52 applicants from 17 constituencies. There was no timetable, no food and no drinks, with the procedure continuing until late in the evening. The questioning itself was short and formal with rumours flying around that some applicants had already been shortlisted. In his opinion the process was a sham (this informant’s identification is withheld for confidentiality reasons).

A number of interviewees admitted that intra- and/or inter-party corruption was taking place during the
candidate selection process (Z6, Z9, Z11, Z13, Z14, Z19, Z20, Z26) and two denied it (Z15, Z27). Multiple concrete cases of corruption were discussed with the author. At least three different ways of bribing were brought up. Firstly, members of an interviewing committee can be bribed by a contender to influence the committee’s ranking (Z13, Z20). There may be signs that such thing has happened. For example, at the ward level, one contender may get no votes and the other one all of them (Z9). Similarly, it can happen that lower level party officials suddenly start to support one contender but they are not able to explain why (Z14). The fact that evaluations by the constituency, district, and province are not in agreement is another warning sign (Z11). Secondly, candidates themselves can be bribed by another party to withdraw their candidacy at the last moment when it becomes too late for the party to submit another name to the ECZ (Electoral Commission of Zambia). In this way, the party ends up with no candidate in the constituency. For this reason, the party may keep the list of the approved candidates secret until the last moment (Z16, Z19). Thirdly, a party official can be bribed by another party to withhold important documents, which in turn results in candidates’ submissions to the ECZ being incomplete and their nomination not being approved (Z19).

6.1.4 Cohesion

Under different names, cohesion, or rather the lack of it, featured prominently during the interviews. For example, the respondents repeatedly and spontaneously spoke about “buying” of party officials and election candidates by other parties. One can ‘buy’ MPs (Z14), candidates (Z16, Z19, Z20), or anybody, even whole parties (Z12, Z23). In general, changing parties is common in Zambia (Z4, Z25, Z26) and not necessarily looked down upon (Z17, Z18). When leaving for another party it is not necessary to cancel the previous membership (Z14). Among the 23 party members who discussed their political biography with the author, 10 of them have never been in any other party and eight have been in two parties, and five in three parties (non-active membership in pre-1991 UNIP is not counted). Altogether, out of 10 persons that had been in the MMD at one time or another, eight were now in the PF, one in the UPND, and one in the ADD.

A fine line must be drawn between (1) leaving for another party because the original one is defunct, lacks potential, or because one's political views change, (2) a defection to a party because it is about to win or has just won elections, and (3) being 'bought' (i.e. offered a material stimulus in exchange for a service against one’s party) which does not necessarily entail a defection (or at least not immediately). Whole party structures change allegiance and become co-opted by another party (Z9, Z17). Encouraging individual or group defections is a conscious strategy. It can have significant influence on general election results, as has happened in 2011 (Z28). Once influential politicians (often from the ruling party) start to feel 'the wind of change' (Z19), some of them start to negotiate the terms of their co-optation with the central committee of a promising competitor (Z9, Z20, Z21, Z27). It is a delicate process that has to be weighed against a potential backlash by aspiring candidates and party structures that may already be in place (Z21). If the local structures are weak or non-existent, the terms of defection are easily agreed. If party structures are already developed, perhaps thanks to several years of hard work by local partisans, the co-optation can lead to a conflict, especially if it concerns whole structures. High-profile defections have a public relations aspect as well. They may be read by the population as signs that the (ruling) party is disintegrating. Using a football metaphor, one informant described party switching as being akin to a good player from a historically strong team transferring to a promising new team (Z20). Party strategists need to strike the right balance between the advantages of retaining many party members whose loyalty is questionable and restricting membership to much smaller groups of strong partisans. As one informant explained: "If you chase them out you are losing out" (Z22).

Another topic that can provide a lot of insight about cohesion are membership incentives or, in other words, intra-party linkage mechanisms. An MMD member explained that working for the party was a voluntary activity: “party is like football” (Z6). At the same time, working for the MMD brought various advantages, bonuses, and occasional cash payments. While some of them were relatively direct and transparent others were less so. As for the former, a party functionary or an active member could profit from the following: a payment for community work such as building a playground or a clinic; a payment for specific tasks during the election
campaign; a payment for gathering intelligence for the party; a payment for attending a meeting, etc. The payments could be made in cash or in kind (a bike, a motorbike, or a car lent by the party) (Z6, Z17). As for the less direct rewards, an MMD member could get a bank loan to start a business or obtain two sacks of subsidized fertilizer from a state agency that non-members would not have received (Z6). Overall, a business-like attitude to party activities prevailed among the interviewees. A PF respondent openly admitted he hoped to get a job via his political connections in case his party won the elections (Z18). An ordinary member of the MMD explained his alignment with the party solely in terms of real or expected material benefits (Z17). On the other hand, other respondents from the then opposition who were not professional politicians were convincing in putting forward ideological reasons as their main motivation (Z10, Z19, Z26).

The patron–client relationship seemed especially strong in case of the then ruling MMD and the author got the impression that one had to ‘deserve’ his or her membership by working on community projects, for example. While an MMD representative claimed the work was paid (Z6), “to be seen” may easily be another motive for participation: in case of personal problems of any kind, the party may be the only organization that can help. It is of note that the MMD also organized periodical fund-raising activities connected to the renewal of one’s card/membership. One had to pay a minimum fee and any amount in excess was considered a donation. The donations could be paid in cash or in kind and vary from one member to another, with high-ranking officials contributing equivalents of tens or hundreds of US dollars (Z6).

6.1.5 Linkage

Participatory linkage

While examples of participatory linkage to party members were noticed, instigated by the members themselves rather than party structures, the researcher found no signs that Zambian political parties would cultivate any participatory linkage with non-members. This is not to claim that such linkage does not exist because the fieldwork was not well suited to assess this phenomenon. In general, the Zambian parties, especially the stronger ones, gave the impression of top-down decision-making. Of course, all opposition parties appreciated and tried to profit from the (half-) spontaneous creation of party structures during the pre-election period. However, more serious member participatory initiatives, such as postulation of candidacy or campaign team formation, seemed to be more tolerated than appreciated (Z13, Z22).

Programmatic linkage

The left-right political spectrum was understood by middle- and high-ranking party officials as revealed by a direct question on the left-right nature of Zambian party competition; and these officials were able to classify individual parties in this way (Z9, Z14, Z15, Z16, Z27). However, when it came to the question of party programmes (manifestos), several participants saw the manifestos of Zambian political parties as similar (Z11, Z20, Z23), identical but expressed in different words (Z2), or outright identical (Z27). Some even accused other parties to have copied their manifesto (Z11, Z16, Z19). Only three informants were able to present details of their party’s programme (Z7, Z8, Z16); and another four were able to indicate some differences in emphasis (Z9, Z14, Z15, Z26). This was a surprisingly mixed picture given the fact that many interviewees were middle and high-ranking party officials.

On three occasions the informants considered the MMD manifesto (current or “original” from the early 1990s) as good but criticized its implementation (Z10, Z13, Z28). In a similar vein, a PF member concluded that the main difference between parties was not in ideas, but in how they acted in practice (Z23). Another informant characterized the communication of his party’s programme in rural settings in the following way: “you tell them you will give them fertilizer and you have a manifesto”. The same person said the decisive factor of election campaigns was the party’s financial resources rather than its programme (Z27). Another party member claimed that the election campaign was not based on any positive programme but on declaring
reasons why the politician left his/her former party and what it did wrong. In his view, parties are formed on personal differences. He remarked that “in a real sense there is no alternative”. He explained that the “majority of Zambians do not know what is in the manifesto. Their choice is based on hardship”. People are not well educated and what they seek from politicians is “liberation” from the hardships of their daily life (Z26). Partly echoing the same line of thought and referring to the MMD and the PF, one responded said that the manifestos of the two parties were similar and that the main difference consisted in the person of party leader (Z21).

Clientelistic linkage

Multiple examples of clientelistic linkages of various kinds were collected. A PF member explained that he had to buy drinks and food when he started to organize groups of party supporters in spring 2011 for the upcoming election campaign otherwise nobody would have lifted a finger (Z18). An MMD member told the author that people were always interested in politics four months before elections but once parties stopped paying them, politics would disappear from their lives (Z13). An interviewee from the UPND spontaneously expressed disapproval over the fact that people expected gifts from political parties in exchange for support rather than asking what they could do for them (Z19). A UPND member warned the author not to be deceived by superficial impressions and attributed the noisy behaviour of young male PF supporters to the work of campaign managers, who were buying the youths ‘tujili-jili’ (plastic sachets with a small amount of liquor such as whiskey, vodka, or brandy), rather than to any genuine enthusiasm (Z11). While it could have been a mere disparaging remark about a competitor, it fits in well with the generally sober views of the respondents about the motivations of party supporters. An MMD member mentioned a vote-rich, resource-poor area of a provincial town that ruling party cadres visit once in a few months and distribute food, small gifts, and money to keep the inhabitants loyal to the party (Z17).

As the fieldwork was mostly conducted in two peripheral provinces away from the capital, the issue of vote buying among poor rural voters was raised very early on during the interview process. The author further probed into the topic by posing a number of questions about the secrecy of the vote. Gift-giving was understood as an integral part of the campaigning of all parties (Z1, Z16, Z22) whether in kind or in cash (Z17, Z19). “People listen but they are disappointed if you do not ‘deliver’ during the campaign”, a UPND member summarized the issue (Z19). “Don’t kubeba” (“don’t tell” in Bemba) was the main slogan of the PF election campaign, meaning implicitly “you are free to accept gifts from other parties, just do not tell you will vote for us”. Poverty was named as the reason why gift-giving works (Z9, Z11, Z12, Z27). A member of the NAREP explained it was gratitude born out of extreme poverty and illiteracy that prevented people from trying to cast their ballot for another candidate/party than they had accepted the gift from (Z1); a UPND member said they felt obliged to do so because they were ‘honest’ (Z11). An interviewee from the PF mentioned they had to stage short theatre performances during election rallies to teach people that they could vote for another party than the one they had accepted a gift from (Z22). Upon direct questioning, three participants claimed the vote was secret (Z20, Z27, Z28), but another two explained how one could see where people were marking the ballot paper if the observer was positioned at the right angle (Z17, Z21). A PF member admitted the marking might have been visible, but the prevention of casting pre-filled ballots was more important than the position of polling booths (Z22) (polling booths were deliberately opened for public inspection during the 2011 vote, with voters using their body to bar others from seeing where they were marking the ballot paper).

The term ‘politics of poverty’ was used by several interviewees to describe Zambia’s party system (Z14, Z18, Z22, Z23). ‘The person who controls the resources controls everything’ was the most general expression of it (Z22, Z23). The two dimensions of the concept were cogently explained by an ADD member: ‘the parties want to keep the people poor, they make sure they keep them poor’ and he added that ‘[poor] people’s minds are easily manipulated’ (Z14). It is only before elections that the parties flood people with gifts; the politicians say: ‘we will give you more if you vote for us’ but they never show up again once they are elected (Z14). Several interviewees saw the only possibility how to break the circle was better education that would gradually improve people’s understanding of politics (Z11, Z13, Z14, Z26). However, two interviewees pointed out there

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were limits to voters’ manipulation and a link between the parties’ governance record/competence and the results of electoral competition did exist (Z9, Z26).

Coercive linkage

The researcher found no signs of coercive linkage. As with the participatory linkage, it does not mean that such linkage does not exist because the fieldwork was not suitable to identify it. However, party-controlled vigilante groups that used to rule over bus terminals and market places during the eras of Presidents Kenneth Kaunda (1964-1991) and Frederick Chiluba (1991-2002) were mentioned by a PF respondent (Z21).

Governance linkage

Among the various dimensions of the governance linkage (see Table XXX above), competence, ethos, paternalism, and populism were very much present. The communication style of the then opposition PF and Michael Sata has been analysed in detail by several authors who pointed out its populist and symbolic aspects (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010; Larmer and Fraser 2007; Resnick 2012). Other obvious features of the discourse, namely its emphasis on being competent (more professional, result-oriented, educated) and moral (not corrupt) have attracted less attention. Responding to a question about people’s support for this or that party, an ADD member told the author that “most people prefer parties according to who is the leader”. He elaborated that the ADD had been trying to “talk issues and not personalities”, but unfortunately it had always reverted to personalities. According to this respondent, one deals with “personality-based politics” in Zambia (Z14). This line was pursued in an interesting direction by another interviewee from the ADD who postulated a strongly intuitive bond between political leaders and voters: “You vote for a person”, he said and likened the position of the voter vis-à-vis the politician to the process whereby a wife is selecting a husband. She learns about him what she can, but ultimately only she “knows” why she made her choice and even then she may not be able to give a coherent account of why she acted the way she did (Z9). In a similar context, a UPND member emphasized the need for face-to-face contact between candidates and their potential voters (Z19). The need to see with one’s own eyes that a politician is “fit for the job” (competent) seems to in direct relationship with mass participation on rallies organized by political parties. As for paternalism, this linkage was employed by the than ruling MMD. Thanks to its access to state resources, the party could offer concrete benefits regardless the election cycle such as sport events, workshops on health, agriculture, nutrition, poverty alleviation, etc. (Z6, Z17). While intensity and success of these undertakings certainly varied from one region to another and from one party segment to another, they reached beyond the party membership out to sympathizers and whole communities.

6.1.6 Summary

The plutocratic nature of Zambian party politics has to be emphasized in the first place. The ethnographic material also suggests that the same political ideology (development) is shared by all political actors rather than being absent. The co-optation and circulation of party members and structures means that the Zambian parties by-pass rather than resolve the problem of cohesion. Lastly, the clientelistic and governance linkages are clearly the most important ones. The ruling and opposition parties as well as individual politicians pursue different mixtures of appeals to link with different social groups.

6.2 Burundi

6.2.1 Socio-political environment

On all accounts, Burundi is tiny (only 27,816 km²) and overpopulated (see Table XXX above). The country was a decentralized kingdom for centuries and, unlike in other former colonies, its current borders overlap with
those of the ancient political unit. Historically, the population was divided into several caste-like social groups. With the gradual breakdown of the royal social order and the complicated web of relationship between the groups, two of these categories - Hutu and Tutsi - became dominant and highly antagonistic. The country ceased to exist as a kingdom in 1966, shortly after independence in 1962. Though socio-cultural stereotypes of Hutus and Tutsis exist, due to a high rate of mixed marriages and the unclear origin of these labels, there is no reliable way of distinguishing a Hutu from a Tutsi by his or her language, religion, customs, and the like. The only possibility is to know one’s patrilineage (a father’s identity passes on to all his children) or self-identification. In statistical terms, the Tutsi make up 10 to 20% of the population and the Hutus 80 to 90%.

From the constitutional point of view, Burundi is a republic with a liberal representative model of political participation, strong presidency, and weak local government. It has a bi-cameral parliament composed of a directly elected National Assembly and an indirectly elected Senate. The legislation on political parties and elections conforms to international standards. The electoral system for the National Assembly is proportional with closed lists and the election districts being the country's 17 provinces. The mandate of all representative positions is five years. After two multi-party elections for the National Assembly in 1961 and 1965 a period of Tutsi hegemony and Hutu socio-political exclusion ensued from 1966 to 1993. Only a single political party, the UPRONA, was permitted to exist. In 1972, under the rule of General Michel Micombero, the Tutsi-dominated army perpetrated an act of genocide against two to three hundred thousand educated Hutus. Approximately 150,000 Hutus took refuge in neighbouring countries.

Multi-party elections were re-introduced in 1993, but the experiment degenerated into a civil war between the Tutsi-dominated army and Hutu armed movements and later between various Hutu fractions. The war lasted until 2005 with occasional bouts of fighting flaring up until 2008; the conflict claimed from two to three hundred thousand lives, mostly civilians; about 1.2 million person were displaced, hundreds of thousands of them abroad. The first peace agreement was signed in 2000 in Tanzanian Arusha; and the first transitional government was set up in 2001. The Arusha agreement stipulates quotas for proportions of men and women, “ethnic” groups, and political parties in both the parliament and the government. The cease-fire with the strongest armed movement was implemented in 2003 and multiparty general elections (local government and legislative) took place in 2005. The last armed group disbanded in 2008 and turned into a political party in 2009, followed by general elections in 2010 (local government, presidential, legislative, and hillside) (see Table XXX). These last elections were marred by a boycott by main opposition parties who alleged massive fraud during the first vote (the communal one) and withdrew from the process.
TABLE 10
BURUNDI: RESULTS OF ELECTIONS TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN 1993 AND 2005 AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of registered voters</td>
<td>2 360 090</td>
<td>3 167 124</td>
<td>3 555 731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>91 %</td>
<td>77 %</td>
<td>91 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>Result (%)</td>
<td>Result (%)</td>
<td>Result (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>72.54</td>
<td>21.70</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>21.89</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPB (Le Rassemblement du peuple burundais)</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP (Le Parti pour la réconciliation du peuple)</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADDRES (Le Ralliement pour la démocratie et le développement économique et social)</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP (Le Parti du peuple)</td>
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<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>58.55</td>
<td>64.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC (Le Mouvement de rassemblement pour la réhabilitation du citoyen – Rurenzangemero)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARENA (Le Parti pour le redressement national)</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALIPE-Agakiza (Le Parti libérateur du peuple burundais)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPD (L’Union pour la paix et la démocratie)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU Nyakuri (Sahwanya FRODEBU Nyakuri – Iragi rya Ndadaye)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other political formations</td>
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<td>0.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
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<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Included in “other political formations”

Note: For 2010, communal election results are used as the measure of parties’ electoral weight because the other 2010 polls were boycotted by the opposition.

Sources:
Burundi News (2005) (unofficial results of the RPB, the PP and the PALIPE in 2005)
MOE UE (2010: 25, 51) (number of registered voters and participation in 2010)

6.2.2 Political parties

Eight political parties have featured prominently in recent years: two original parties tied to the Tutsi/Hutu social categorization (UPRONA, FRODEBU), parties born out of Hutu armed movements (CNDD-FDD, FNL, CNDD), a liberal party of urban youth and “les intellectuels” (the educated) (MSD), a Hutu entrepreneurial project (FRODEBU Nyakuri), and a CNDD-FDD splinter group (UPD).

Two long-established political parties, each of the tied to one of the opposing categories – Hutu and Tutsi – exist in Burundi. The UPRONA formed in 1957 and one of its leader was Prince Louis Rwagasore, the first-born son of the then ruling monarch King Mwambutsa IV. The nationalist UPRONA won the first parliamentary elections in 1961, but Rwagasore was murdered by a competing royal clan a few months later. By 1965 the party was taken over by the Tutsi minority and ruled unopposed until 1993. The origins of the FRODEBU can be traced to Hutu refugee circles in neighbouring Rwanda in the early 1980s. When the ruling Tutsi clique liberalized the political environment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the FRODEBU officially registered as a political party and challenged the UPRONA in the fateful 1993 elections. FRODEBU President Melchior Ndadaye won a direct presidential poll and became the first Hutu president. A few months later he was murdered together with
many other Hutu politicians during a coup d’état organized by radical elements of the Tutsi-dominated army which triggered massacres of Tutsi civilians in the countryside and a civil war. The electoral weight of both the UPRONA and the FRODEBU has diminished in recent years because the categories of Hutu and Tutsi have been gradually losing their political salience. However, both parties will remain important players for the foreseeable future.

At the end of the war, armed rebel movements transformed into several political parties and three of them have had a lasting impact on the Burundian political scene. The largest Hutu armed movement gave rise to the CNDD-FDD which has ruled the country since the first post-conflict elections in 2005. Its leader Pierre Nkurunziza became the country's president; and thanks to his immense popularity among the rural population he will almost certainly win a third term in office in the elections scheduled for 2015. The CNDD-FDD, in spite of its heavy-handed approach to human rights and multi-party politics, increased its share of the vote in the 2010 and is by far the strongest party with very dense structures all over Burundi. PALIPEHUT-FNL, the most intransigent Hutu rebellion force, transformed itself into the FNL political party in 2009. It gained 14 % of votes in the first (local government) poll. Together with other, smaller, opposition parties (including the FRODEBU but not the UPRONA) the FNL alleged "massive fraud" and decided to boycott the electoral process, the parties even withdrew their already elected local councillors. FNL President Agathon Rwasa went underground in June 2010, supposedly for reasons of personal safety. He probably resides in one of the neighbouring countries and his precise whereabouts are unknown. Since his departure the FNL has found itself in disarray, its representatives under heavy pressure of state security forces and the CNDD-FDD youth militia (so called "Imbonerakure"). The future of the FNL as a party is therefore unclear. The third party born of a Hutu armed movement, the CNDD, has been chaired by Léonard Nyangoma, former minister of the interior in the first FRODEBU government. The CNDD won four seats in the first post-war National Assembly. The party has been in decline ever since due to its inability step out of the shadow of Nyangoma’s strong personality and extend its membership base. It is likely this moribund party will disappear in the coming years.

Three more newly formed parties entered the electoral arena between 2007 and 2010. The first of them, the MSD, was created by Alexis Sinduhije, an internationally acclaimed Burundian journalist. The party has a solid support base among urban liberals, students, and teachers, especially in the capital Bujumbura where it obtained 18 % of the votes in 2010. In 2008, a parliamentary faction around a FRODEBU veteran politician Jean Minani split off the FRODEBU and formed the so called FRODEBU Nyakuri (“real” FRODEBU). It is a regional, clientelistic project close the ruling CNDD-FDD. Similarly to the UPRONA, the FRODEBU Nyakuri refused to boycott the 2010 polls; and thus managed to secure five seats in the National Assembly, far above its real support. The last party that deserves to be noted is the UPD which split off the CNDD-FDD in 2007. It unites loyalists of Hussein Radjabu, former CNDD-FDD strongmen who was expelled from the party and currently serves a long prison sentence. The party has very limited support outside the capital and its long-term potential is doubtful. At the time of the fieldwork, three important figures of the opposition parties resided abroad in self-imposed exile: Agathon Rwasa (FNL), Alexis Sinduhije (MSD), Léonard Nyangoma (CNDD), and Pascaline Kampayano (republican presidential candidate of the UPD in 2010). It should also be noted that the FNL and the UPD have CNDD-FDD-induced “doubles”, a process called “nyakurization” in popular parlance. Thus the genuine FNL is technically illegal and the current legal status of the UPD is ambiguous because two different groupings claim the label.

6.2.3 Party organization

Membership

Acceptance of an application for party membership may not be automatic, especially to the CNDD-FDD, and depends on one’s socio-economic status and to what extent one is known to the officials of the segment where one is applying. While an ordinary peasant may be accepted during a hillside meeting (B22), “les intellectuels” may apply to higher-level segments (communal, provincial) (B17, B27) and they are asked to write an
application letter (B7, B17, B19, B20, B22). A period of observation may follow (B23) which lasts from weeks to months, especially in people who defected from other parties (B17, B24). In any case, the local segment is always informed of their application (B4, B17, B19, B27). Other parties are more flexible. An MSD member explained that membership was informal; there were no lists of members apart from provincial presidents having lists of communal committees (B14). Most parties distribute membership cards to their members, usually in exchange for a small fee ranging from 20 to 50 US cents (B3, B14, B15, B16, B20, B21) though it may also be given for free (B27) and it may not be given to all “members” (B20). The cards were shown to the author; they are made of paper and include name, number, emblem, slogan, party pledge, and the date and place of issue. There is no personal photo on the card. The cards were popular before the 2010 elections but hardly anybody uses them now because people know each other and it is not necessary to show the card (B21). The opposition parties seem to have issued hardly any cards since 2010 elections, also because there have been hardly any applicants (B14, B15, B16, B20, B25). In case of doubt, the parties have informal ways of verifying if one is still a loyal member; for example, one is asked to perform a small task for the party (B5, B14, B20, B24).

In the CNDD-FDD, the status of the former fighters and civilian members tend to be unequal. For example, a former CNDD-FDD member complained that civilian members are not taken seriously by former fighters (B26). A current CNDD-FDD member said that he could not talk openly in front of the ex-combatants or fear of being denounced (B21). The ruling CNDD-FDD constantly works on expanding its membership. Expressions such as “recolter” (harvesting) (B7) or “pêcher des poissons” (fishing) (B10) were used to describe the constant recruitment drive. The party’s lists of members are computerized from the provincial level upwards (B17). Expulsions from the party do not seem to play an important role at the provincial and lower levels. Besides the commotion during the Radjabu affair and a few high-profile cases, hardly anybody has been expelled from the CNDD-FDD. As a CNDD-FDD member summarized it, “there is no point in chasing somebody away, everybody may be useful one day” (B23). According to the parties’ code of good practice, one writes down the names of new members in a notebook at the local party segment and regularly forwards this list to higher-level structures where the process is repeated until it reaches national headquarters (B3, B4, B7, B22, B27).

Structure

Party structure copies the administrative division of the country into provinces, communes, zones, and “collines” (hillsides). The CNDD-FDD has by far the highest density of structures. According to a CNDD-FDD cadre, “for each household we know who is with us and who is not, whether a member of the household is in the party” (B17). The high density of the CNDD-FDD structures is not just on paper; regular meetings are held, attendance sheets are signed, reports written, smaller or large-scale activities organized (B6, B7, B11, B17, B19, B21, B22, B23). Opposition parties operate mostly in towns (B9), namely in Bujumbura which is by far the largest urban centre. Besides the CNDD-FDD, the UPRONA is the only other party that has structures in the rural hinterland: in places with high concentration of Tutsi peasants. Some parties have regional strongholds such as the FNL in Bujumbura rural and the FRODEBU Nyakuri in Kirundo.

Procedures

The role of written regulations in party functioning differs from one party to another. The three formerly or currently ruling parties (UPRONA, FRODEBU, CNDD-FDD) certainly make more extensive use of their statutes and produce a larger amount of internal documentation; their administrative culture is more developed, so to say. This is hardly surprising because the other parties are not only smaller but also younger and facing more repression. The FNL was forced to go underground within a year of its existence and the MSD, the CNDD, and the UPD all functioned half-underground at the time of the fieldwork. These parties do not produce any written documents because they ceased functioning (B26) or for security reasons (B14); the archives of most of their structures have been hidden (B15, B16, B20) or they may be kept by ex-members who defected to the CNDD-FDD (B18). No provincial or lower level representative of any party was able to show the party statutes to the researcher. A CNDD-FDD provincial president told the author that his office only had excerpts of the statutes and would call the national headquarters if they needed any advice in this regards (B17). The CNDD-FDD
structures starting from hillsides are supposed to produce (and most of them probably do so) monthly reports (B6, B7, B17, B11, B19, B22, B23) that include sections listing new members, on activities of other parties, development progress, on cooperation with local government, security situation, and possible social and family problems (B17, B22). They are forwarded to higher-level segments where they are compiled into their reports and forwarded again until the process reaches the headquarters (B17, B22). A copy of each report remains in the archive of the segment that produced it (B7, B17, B22, B23). Of course, the amount of paperwork does not necessarily make a party more transparent and even well-established procedures do not have to agree with the parties' written regulations. The MSD emerged from the fieldwork as the most transparent and participatory organization.

Supreme organs

Only the UPRONA, the FRODEBU, and the CNDD-FDD have been capable to organize national congresses on a more or less regular basis. For example, the CNDD-FDD have held at least two ordinary and five extraordinary congresses since its “congrès constitutif” in 2004 (XXX). The FRODEBU has organized five ordinary and four extraordinary congresses since 1993 (B3). The other parties only managed to convene one congress to choose their presidential candidates for the 2010 election (XXX). Several national congresses have been banned or attempted to be banned by the ministry of interior (XXX). Other congresses, organized by CNDD-FDD-friendly factions, have been used to split the opposition parties (XXX). There are no signs that any of the Burundian parties have procedures “for resolving internal conflicts and formulating party policies” (LeBas 2011: 25). An extreme example of top-down decision-making within the parties is the so called “le Conseil des Sages” (The Council of The Wise) of the CNDD-FDD. It is composed of 11 persons (six are “confirmed” by a congress and five are “named” by the party’s president) and has the right to expel from the party anyb

Funding

There is no contribution from the state and the parties are funded by their members and sympathizers (B3) (OAG 2009: 35-36). The CNDD-FDD has the most sophisticated way funding that combines access to state resources with the control of appointments to state jobs (see below). The UPRONA also stands out because it has accumulated some property and raises funds by renting it (B24, B27). The remaining parties are totally dependent on sponsorship and therefore very poorly funded. In all parties, even if there is some prescribed minimum yearly fee (around 0.5 USD for UPRONA), it is not required from poor members (B4, B27). Contributions in cash, in kind, or in labour are sought mainly for election campaigns, and one’s recognition of membership is dependent on it (B8, B16). A member or sympathiser can help by buying a party hat for 7 USD or a party T-shirt for 10 USD (B8), one can give or lend a bike or motorcycle (B15, B26), to pay for fuel (B15), party officials on the campaign trail can ask for various favours such as transport, food, or drink (B8). During the 2010 elections, this system came under pressure because the CNDD-FDD started to give out material things rather than asking its members to finance the campaign as the other parties did (B18). Before the 2010 elections, the opposition parties would require minimum regular contributions from their salaried members. For party officials these ranged from 2 USD monthly at the communal level to 30 USD at the national level (B3, B4, B5, B7, B16, B17, B20, B23, B24, B25, B27). The parties with MPs or members in the state apparatus would require a proportion of their salary if the job was obtained thanks to the party. However, for the past three years, due to the repression and the resultant opposition paralysis, funding has been in disarray. Members of two opposition parties told the author that no regular membership fees had been collected from anybody since the 2010 elections (B14, B20). Numbers of paid staff well illustrate the disparity between the ruling party and the opposition. A CNDD-FDD provincial office may have about 30 full-time and part-time employees including provincial committee officials (B17). A UPRONA provincial office can afford one paid secretary. The FRODEBU has two paid staff members plus a guard at national level and nobody at lower levels (B3). It is possible that the FNL, the MSD, and the UPD have no paid staff whatsoever.
Repression and harassment is the single most important factor influencing party competition in Burundi. Its most extreme forms, such as political assassinations, have been documented in the reports of global organizations such as the Human Rights Watch and the Amnesty International. Not all physical violence is inflicted by the CNDD-FDD upon the opposition, but also vice versa (especially by members of the FNL) and sometimes within individual parties to punish “traitors” (Human Rights Watch 2012: 45-47). Milder forms of repression are intimidation and threats, either by police (B3), secret service (B15), local administration (B27), CNDD-FDD cadres (B15), or Imbonerakure (B12, B15, B18, B27) (United Nations 2013: 4). Members of the FNL are targeted the most often (B12). The intimidation and threats aim at either individuals or groups of party members who are trying to meet (B3). The intimidation is usually verbal, for example people are told to stop opposition activities, to leave their party and to join the ruling one (B12, B15, B27). Sometimes a member of local administration simply denies a permission to organize a party event or arrives on the spot and announces that the meeting cannot take place (B3, B15, B27). According to a UPRONA member, local administrators “make life difficult” for those who are not in the ruling party (B27). More specifically, the informants (including a CNDD-FDD member) claimed that membership in an opposition party may cause one problems in terms of employment, career, business, and when dealing with state institutions (B12, B14, B21). Communal party officials may be questioned by secret service after meeting a provincial cadre (B25). Detentions of members of provincial and communal committees (mostly of presidents and vice-presidents) are common and may last several weeks (B15, B16, B20, B25). The party officials are detained and told that they are suspected of crimes such as financial fraud (B15), terrorism (B16), attempting to organize an armed uprising (B25), possession of arms, or insulting the government (B20). The intimidation is systematic (B15, B27) and started in earnest in the summer 2010 (B15, B16). The informants agreed that the repression is less acute in towns and harsher in the hills where it comes from local government representatives (B14, B25, B27) (Arib News 2013). The intensity of repression is province-specific (B25) and depends on who is the provincial governor and the police chief (B16). On the national level, the Interior Ministry refused to recognize the ADC (L’Alliance des démocrates pour le changement), a platform the opposition parties had formed after the 2010 communal elections. Thus the platform has remained technically illegal and any meeting of its members is unlawful (United Nations 2013: 4). The fact that the opposition parties have been paralyzed was admitted by several of their members. The paralysis is said to affect all levels (B15, B16) or, above all, communal and lower-level structures (B18, B20, B25). Again, the FNL is the worst affected (B8); the situation of the FRODEBU and the UPRONA is somewhat better (B13). Opposition party members, especially from communal and lower-level segments are scared to participate in any activities (B13, B18, B20, B25). Two MSD officials claimed that people had fear to admit they were their members or sympathizers (B14, B25). Another MSD official claimed it was too dangerous for the party to collect funds (B20) and an MSD provincial committee preferred to open a bank account under the name of a civic association (B25). The measures taken by individuals range from emigration to Europe (party leadership), hiding three weeks in Kigali (B26), moving to relatives inside the country, sleeping outside one’s home for weeks because one is supposedly on the “list of the condemned” (B16) (Human Rights Watch 2012: 37-40). The party may hide its archive and party documents (B15, B16, B20), party structures stop communicating in writing (B14), committee members at all levels stop holding formal meetings and start using informal channels to exchange information. They meet unofficially on the street as if by accident, in small groups or even one to one (B3, B16, B20) though in another province they may be able to hold provincial meetings in private houses or restaurants (B14). The party may give up its office or stops using it for security reasons (B14) though another MSD member claimed they had an office with the party archive and were not worried the police would come to confiscate it (B25). The most extreme measure is switching to a kind of concealment mode as (spontaneously) practiced by FNL members (B8, B16). Non-members may be exposed to repression as well. A FRODEBU member explained in detail how the owner of a building they had rented for a
provincial congress (without openly declaring it) was subsequently intimidated by the Imbonerakure (B18).

Sources of cohesion

In spite of the extreme pressure, the opposition parties have not disintegrated. When the fieldwork was conducted in September and October 2012, opposition party members held strong convictions about the role of their parties in Burundian politics and were already deliberating organization of the 2015 election campaign (B20, B25). Only one CNDD member admitted that he was losing hope in opposition politics (B26). An interviewee from the MSD believed that their party will win in 2015 if the playing field will be level (B20). An FNL official said that his party can "win the population" (B8). Another FNL official claimed that eight out of ten members of their 2010 provincial committee were still loyal to the party (B16). An MSD official from another province said that 11 out of 12 member of their 2010 provincial committees were still operational; and some party members who had defected to the CNDD-FDD in 2010 were now coming back (B25). The informants also mentioned the existence of "secret members" and claimed that some defectors remained loyal "inside" and that the party can count on them (B14, B15, B21). There are other signs of the continuing relevance of the existing parties as well. As of March 2013, Alexis Sinduhije (MSD) and Pascaline Kampayano (UPD) returned from exile and participated in UN-sponsored negotiations with the government regarding preparations of the 2015 elections (AFP 2013a). And in August 2013, Agathon Rwasa, President of the FNL, last seen in Burundi in June 2010, made a public appearance in Bujumbura. Rwasa declared via his spokesman that he had never left the country and was ready, together with his party, to compete in 2015 general elections (Jeuneafrique.com 2013b; RFI 2013a).

There may be a lot of wishful thinking on the part of the respondents and the returning exiled leaders. Only the next elections can show to what extent, in spite the highly hostile operating environment, the opposition parties still have any electoral credibility. The fieldwork conducted in the middle of the electoral cycle showed that the opposition parties were by all account paralysed. However, we will argue that the cohesion of the main Burundian opposition parties is strong rather than weak. This interpretation does not stem as much from direct observation or explicit statements by the respondents. Rather, it is based on an overall assessment of the political scene, including the parties' origin and historical trajectory to date. The key element of the argument is the idea that the roots of the parties cohesion derive from their strong identity (sense of purpose). Each of the parties is run by a core group of highly dedicated persons whose shared identity is grounded in one or more of the following phenomena: (1) a caste-like categorization of the population into Hutus and Tutsis plus the long-term economic and political exclusion of the former, (2) a history of extreme violence (especially the 1972 genocide and the 1993 to 2005 civil war), and (3) a huge gap between the life experience of illiterate peasants and the educated, liberal elite.

Genocide

The fortunes of the UPRONA and the FRODEBU are shaped by genocide. The UPRONA was originally set up as a project of the royal Bezi clan without Hutu/Tutsi connotations. After the murder of Rwagasore the society started to split along Hutu / Tutsi lines and the party ceased to exist as a unified body. While the 1972 genocide was mainly perpetrated by the army which was controlled by a Tutsi clan from Bururi, the party did not distance itself in any noticeable way in spite of the fact that the party, its youth wing JRR, the army, the government, and the state were all closely interconnected (Lemarchand 2008). The ideologues of the UPRONA have always justified the exclusion of the Hutus from political and economic life by genocidal tendencies of the Hutus against Tutsis along the Rwandan lines including the killings of 1972 (Lemarchand 1996: 23). While many former upronists now vote other parties or even become members of former Hutu armed movements such as the CNDD-FDD, others continue to see in UPRONA the guarantor of safety of the Tutsi minority.

The FRODEBU emerged from the refugee wave caused by the 1972 genocide. In contrast to other refugee organizations such as the PALIPEHUTU, the goal of the FRODEBU was to change power balance in Burundi via
political means rather than armed struggle. Even after many FRODEBU politicians were murdered during and after the 1993 coup d’état, the majority of FRODEBU leaders refused to rescind their non-violent strategy. The party has never had an armed wing subordinated to it. The party’s elected representatives held positions in the government and other state institutions throughout the civil war despite the huge number of Hutu civilians killed by the "state" army. The refusal of the party leadership to join the armed struggle cost FRODEBU a substantial portion of its credibility: it failed to protect the population. The issue involves a hierarchical twist as well. The people who took to arms against the Tutsi-dominated army and militias in the 1990s were mostly young Hutu men from poor peasant families. In contrast, the FRODEBU leadership that maintained political continuity with Ndadaye's government came mostly from educated Hutu elite. However, these tragic historical events and repeated organizational setbacks have not changed the party's ethos and the pursuit of non-violent politics defines the party until the present. At the same time, the face of the FRODEBU remains oriented toward the past which make it less appealing to the Hutus of a younger generation.

Armed struggle

Since their inception, the Hutu armed movements had undergone repeated splits. A World Bank report lists seven such groups with at least one thousand fighters each (cited in Samii 2010a: 8). During the peace process, each of them pursued a different strategy (McClintock and Nahimana 2008: 80-85; Samii 2010b: 8) that seems to rely, personal ambitions aside, on a cultural stereotype an MSD member called Hutu "obéissance" (obedience to a superior and, by extension, allegiance to a group) (B25), the idea, that, in the end, the Hutu population will flock around one decisive (Hutu) winner. For extended periods of time, members of these armed movements were exposed to the dangers and discomfort of bush fighting; they have direct experience of violence, as both victims and perpetrators. In the end, many regular fighters were integrated into the army and other security forces during the demobilization process; others received financial support to help them to integrate into civilian life. Their leaders became army colonels, police chiefs, heads of government departments, or even MPs. Long-term loyalty to the party is expected from the former fighters. For example, an MSD member mentioned that ex-combatants from the CNDD-FDD and the FNL did not take part in his party's primaries because their former fellow combatants would consider it a betrayal (B20). Also party politics is influenced by culture of violence imported from the times of the civil war (B18, B21). Hard-core ex-combatants view themselves as the party’s military wing in reserve (interview with an ex-combatant). A lukewarm CNDD-FDD member characterized the situation in his own party the following way: the core of the CNDD-FDD come from the "maquis" (jungle); they are not educated and because of it they have an inferiority complex; while they were fighting, others were going to school; they will not relinquish power, they are like Kagame (B21).

Liberal democratic faith

The third source of party identity is liberal democratic faith that is best conceptualized as a modern-day religion (Swidler 2010: 165-167). It originates in the contemporary co-existence of two extreme life-worlds with little space in between: the young, westernized urban elite and the poor peasants practicing primitive subsistence economy. Many of those who broaden their horizon thanks to education and contact with Western NGOs are irresistibly pulled toward the liberal democratic project as if it was offering a kind of salvation to the problems of the country. Simultaneously, a cultural and imagination gap opens between them and the peasants. The discourse of democracy and good governance leaves the parochial peasantry unimpressed. It is no coincidence that the MSD relies heavily on spreading their message via their contact with students and pupils which are subsequently supposed to influence their parents and relatives (B20, B25). Of course, not all "intellectuels" become apostles of democracy. As anywhere else, political repression and heavy-handedness provokes a counter-current. "An army is defeated only by another army" is how a civilian, university-educated FNL official explained his motivation to align himself with the FNL against the CNDD-FDD (B16).

CNDD-FDD cohesion
Two comments with regards to the ruling party should be made here. Firstly, in our comparative framework, the cohesion of the ruling party is seen as relatively non-problematic because it is not exposed to the hostile operating environment, but rather the opposite. The access to state resources and the accompanying economic power should be sufficient to guarantee members' loyalty. Endogenous factionalism may be a greater danger for the effective functioning of a ruling party. It follows from the preceding argument that the ruling CNDD-FDD shares the non-material sources of identity with the opposition parties which gives it further advantage. Secondly, the mass character of the CNDD-FDD blurs the distinction between the various incentives the party offers to its members and linkage which we have defined as interactive connection between the party and voters. We would insist that there is a useful analytical distinction between party members as voters and party members as human resource, i.e. members who are involved in organization of activities and decision-making. Especially in the countryside, the party is systematically trying to recruit all people as members. But the CNDD-FDD is not interested in the masses because it wants to make them active members. The CNDD-FDD needs them as above all as voters. For this reason, even though, formally speaking, we are dealing with members it is more useful to treat this mass intra-party linkage together with other examples of party-voter interactive connections.

6.2.5 Linkage

Participatory linkage

The research provided no signs that any of the Burundian parties would try to create a participatory linkage with non-members. As for intra-party participatory linkage, two examples can be given. Since the period preceding 2005 elections, ambitious Tutsis have been applying for CNDD-FDD membership and the party have accepted them (XXX). Part of this interest is undoubtedly financially motivated. Some Tutsis may also try to profit from ethnic quotas. For instance, on a candidate list, every third person has to be a Tutsi. However, there are certainly some who see in the CNDD-FDD a suitable venue for political activity. Another example, this time concerning the FNL, is a case of a Hutu intellectual, of the first university-educated Hutus in his province of origin. When the FNL offered him to become a position of provincial president, in his words, he could not refuse to take the responsibility (to help his Hutu compatriots). He was one of the few people who had the skills and contacts to set up party structures and organize the election campaign (XXX).

Programmatic linkage

The parties produced written programmes for the 2010 elections and their officials are able to reproduce the most important policies that their parties propose (B6, B16, B18, B20). However, when interacting with their voters, the parties communicate little more than general phrases about development. In fact, after decades of violence and hegemonic rule peace, security, and democracy still remain key terms in the vocabulary of every party to which the opposition adds criticism of the incompetence and corruption of the CNDD-FDD (B3, B9). As a ruling party member summarized the situation: other parties have the same programme, the difference is that they do not put it in practice (B7). According to some informants, people are little interested in programme or ideas: they still vote according to ethnicity because of memories of past violence (B5, B13); once the (traumatized) generation that remembers the 1972 massacres disappears, the situation will gradually change and younger generations will start to show interest in programme (B5). A down-to-earth assessment came from a member of the opposition CNDD that claimed to have conducted a simple survey in his province before the 2010 elections: hunger, low agricultural production, and family feuds about distribution and inheritance of agricultural land were the three issues that preoccupied the population (B26).

The CNDD-FDD's structures are sufficiently dense and their procedures sophisticated enough to monitor wishes of the population, both informally and via the system of regular reporting. The party apparently makes sure that community-level development conforms to peasants’ expectations or, at the least, it is careful not to antagonize them. However, programmatic linkage is usually predicated upon the voter making a choice.
between different policy packages. It is from this sense, the CNDD-FDD achievements can be understood as a show of competence (governance linkage) as much as examples of concrete policy-making.

Clientelistic linkage

The author follows Osei's (2012: 82-92) distinction between clientelism (regular, persistent, asymmetrical relationship between two individuals), patronage (similar relationship between an individual and a group), and vote-buying (particularistic material rewards to individuals or families at election time without long-term obligations). Clientelism can bind peasants via receiving small "favourites" for party work such an umbrella with party logo or strip of tissue for a skirt (B21). "Les intellectuels" can benefit from selective disbursing of state jobs and promotions (B21). The party helping to set up a cooperative by making an initial gift of a few goats (B21) would be an example of patronage. Patronage via selective benefits to constituencies based on their election results was not ascertained during the fieldwork. Only anecdotal evidence was collected in the sense that the birthplaces of important political figures receive proportionally larger funds for development (A9).

Vote buying is certainly practiced in Burundi, mainly by the CNDD-FDD, other parties are too poor. The peasants are the target group. Handing out small gifts and/or cash during election campaign may be combined with monitoring of the casting of the ballot, real or imagined (spread by rumours). As Osei (2012: 262-263) writes, it is difficult to evaluate, to what extent the effect is due to the material value itself as opposed to other aspects that make up the act such proving one's competence and/or a sense of responsibility dictated by local social norms (cf. Hansen 2010; Nugent 2007). Thus the act itself may be combining as much as three linkage types: by reward, competence-based, and ethos-based.

The general way the CNDD-FDD operates is an interesting example of funding combined with cultivation of reciprocity ties. In the CNDD-FDD, neither the peasants nor the ex-combatants are required to pay membership dues (B6). The party collects contributions, both regular and irregular, for party day-to-day functioning or specific purposes such as constructing a party office, congress, or any other event. The money comes mainly from members who have salaried employment, almost uniquely in the public sector. The concrete amount depends on how much one makes (B7, B17, B19, B21) and may be one of the topics discussed during party meetings (B19). Thanks to the party's control over state appointments, in exchange for a portion of the salary, the party offers job security. The more one pays, the higher the probability one will be promoted or otherwise rewarded. A refusal to pay or paying too little may entail falling from grace of the party to the point of losing one's job (B8). To what extent this system is real or imagined is difficult to assess and it does not make a difference. A CNDD-FDD cadre openly admitted that among the motivations why members to give a percentage of their salary to the party is the fact that some of them obtained the job thanks to their CNDD-FDD membership (B17). A regular CNDD-FDD member said that he had been promoted thanks to his work for the party (B21). A MSD member claimed that the whole thing of exchanging loyalty for a job is a myth that "les intellectuels" mistakenly believe; the CNDD-FDD does not have much to offer (B25). In any case, the money collected in this way is used to launch party activities that are appreciated by the non-paying members (peasants) as a group. For example, they can travel for free to another province and get a chance socialize, to meet friends and relatives they would not have otherwise met, a chance to interrupt their daily routine. Or, they can enjoy a small celebration, an artistic or sport competition they would not have been able to launch without financial and organizational contribution of the party.

Coercive linkage

The CNDD-FDD undoubtedly uses the coercive linkage. For example, the COSOME, a Burundian non-governmental organization that fielded the biggest number of election observers in 2011, reported intimidation of voters in front of polling stations though the report does not indicate the party in question (COSOME 2010a; COSOME 2010b: 6). A teacher working for an opposition party described how CNDD-FDD officials approach him after 2005 elections and asked him to pay "membership fees". Specifically, he was asked to sign a monthly transfer of a portion of his salary to a CNDD-FDD bank account otherwise he would risk losing his job. He
signed though he never joined the party and kept working for the opposition. According to him, a similar kind of pressure was put on many other persons in the public sector (respondent's identity not indicated for security reasons). While the fieldwork was much less suited to uncover instances of coercion among Kirundi-speaking peasants, in the author's view, it is the poor peasants who are targeted the most often. Three informants suggested that party officials were able to monitor members' loyalty. Two informants claimed that due to the intimacy of relatively isolated rural communities people know who votes for who (B19 and a teenager introduced by B9). As a village priest summarized it, the elections are decided before the rallies take place; everybody knows everybody; people observe each other; they know that this person sings the song of this party and that one of another party (B9). The analysis of repression presented above (more repression in the rural rather than urban areas) points in the same direction. There are indirect signs that the FNL can be involved in coercive linkage as well: for example, the remark that FNL ex-combatants could not openly participate in the MSD primaries (see above) and the assassination of FNL defectors (Human Rights Watch 2012: 45-47).

Governance linkage

Identity-based
Several respondents claimed that voter-party identification based on Hutu/Tutsi categorization was extremely important (see the discussion of the programmatic linkage above). The fieldwork did not uncover any signs of public enactment of this link. Similar to other African countries, ethnic campaigning is illegal in Burundi. However, commemoration of fallen comrades of the civil war at a large party rally (B19) might be easily interpreted by an audience in ethnic terms.

Competence-based
As far as the ruling party is concerned, the linkage appealing to a generally conceived competence is the most important one and the party cultivates it via multiple channels. The main target group are Hutu peasants. Ensuring peace and security after the war is the first prerequisite. Since the 2005 election victory the party has provided a range of public goods, especially in the domains of infrastructure, education, medical care, and the family. It is primarily the long-forgotten peasants who profit from and appreciate these tangible "réalisations". Two informants summarized the situation cogently: since 2005, the government has fundamentally changed people's lives [for better], said one of them (B9). Since 2005 [in seven years], the CNDD-FDD has done more for the people than the UPRONA in 30 years, noted a member of the ruling party (B19). Large public meetings are the highlight of CNDD-FDD public activities in between elections and include the ritualized welcoming of new members who have defected from other parties. They are meant to show the party's strength and the disintegration of the opposition. The message is clear: align with the strongest player, align with the (future) winner. The newcomers may be expected to publicly denounce their former party. Smooth management of any event, from small hillside feasts and artistic competitions to large multi-provincial gatherings that require country-wide coordination, is noticed by party members (B21).

Ethos-based
Ethos-based connections are sometimes difficult to differentiate from identity-based ones as identities may have their unique moral dimension. The CNDD-FDD makes use of its high moral standing as the victor of the war against exclusion and hegemony (XXX). Ethos-based campaigning is one of few linkage options for the opposition. The pursuit of "true democracy", criticism of the government's corruption, poor human rights record, politicization of civil service, economic mismanagement, etc. are the most common manifestations of it. Further research by a Kirundi-speaker would be needed into the ways ethos is expressed at party members' meetings and public rallies.

Paternalistic
The strong link between the peasants and the country's (and CNDD-FDD's) President Nkurunziza is best understood in paternalistic terms. Young and good-looking, his frequent visits of peasant communities are
highly appreciated. Given the acuteness of the county's socio-economic problems, some commentators have characterized his media shows in the countryside as a pure demagoguism (Africa Confidential 2009; Africa Confidential 2011; East African 2011). However, it is unclear to what extent Nkurunziza controls his party. His "permanent election campaign" may rather be driven by his personal ambitions.

6.2.6 Summary

The way the political parties function replicates, to a large extent, the hierarchical character of the Burundian society. One is almost forced to conclude that all structures, strategies, attitudes, etc. exist twice: once with regards to the peasants and once again with regards to "les intellectuels".

Since its official registration in 2004, the CNDD-FDD has managed to create a well-functioning party machine. It is the only party capable of multiple linkages. Besides mapping the wide range of linkage strategies, the most important finding of the fieldwork is the rich, relentless, and systematic activity of the party throughout the election cycle (for example, compiling computerized lists of probable voters two and a half years before the next poll). As one CNDD-FDD respondent described it: "the campaign continues" (B10).

The opposition parties have had little opportunity to optimize their strategy and organization. Their leaders have been in exile for prolonged periods of time, their structures have been left without guidance, their funding has collapsed, and they face physical violence, harassment, and legal obstacles. While they can rely on their strong identity, their linkages cannot be but underdeveloped, limited to identity-based (mostly in the sense of party identity) and ethos-based (in the sense of claiming to practice "clean" politics). In the middle of the election cycle, these parties are capable of not much more than issuing an occasional press release and at the individual, informal level are limited "to spreading the word".

6.3 Togo

6.3.1 Socio-political environment

The Togolese Republic is a narrow strip of land extending for 600 km in approximately north – south direction between Burkina Faso and the Gulf of Guinea (de Menthon 1993: 13). The capital Lomé, located at the western end of the 50 km long coastline, is one of the most important deep sea ports in West Africa (Piot 2010: 35). Lomé and the adjacent peri-urban space is the economic heartland of the country and simultaneously the homeland of the largest ethno-linguistic political grouping – the Ewe - which makes up about 45 % of the population (Lawrance 2007: 25).21 However, since 1967, Togo has been ruled by a militarized clique of Kabyè ethnicity coming from the mountains of the Kozah and Binah préfectures in the northern third of the country (Toulabor 1986). Since 2005, it has been more precise to speak about a fractious assembly of Kabyè cliques or clans holding power rather than one power centre (Piot 2010: 48-50; Toulabor 2005b). The Kabyè proper form about 15 % of the population (United Nations 2008: 2). Apart from this basic antagonism, Togo is a patchwork of twenty to fifty (depending on the factors one considers relevant) ethnic and ethno-linguistic groups of various size and historical relatedness. Their degree of political cohesion varies too and most of them do not automatically align either with the Ewe or the Kabyè. In general, as elsewhere in West Africa, the spatial distribution of ethnic groups corresponds very roughly to climatic zones running in east – west direction, irrespective of the artificial colonial frontiers and ensuring the continued importance of cross-border identities. In Togo, the German and French colonial power encouraged southward migration from the Kara region to the

21 Proportion of various ethnic groups in the total population of Togo as well as their number differ from one author another (de Menthon 1993; Decalo 1996; Toulabor 1986). It is not surprising because different classifications emphasize different factors: language, customs, religion, political consciousness, etc. The dissertation uses the general population census conducted in 1981 as the starting point (de Menthon 1993: 28; United Nations 2008: 2). The census proportions are combined with information on the groups’ political behaviour to construct basic ethnic political groupings.
sparsely populated centre of country. At the same time, there has recently been a strong “pull” towards the
capital Lomé that has affected all more northern ethnic groups. Neither of these movements has created a zone
of political identity that would unite the population in the north – south direction; and would hence overcome
the basic Ewe – Kabyè antagonism.

Togo gained independence in 1960 under the presidency of Sylvanus Olympio from a powerful Afro-Brazilian
family aligned with the Ewe ethnic grouping. His nationalist (anti-French) alliance composed of three political
parties – the CUT (Comité de l’union togolaise chaired by Olympio), the MPT (Mouvement populaire togolais
chaired by Sylvanus Olympio’s cousin Pedro), and Juvento - won the 1958 parliamentary elections. Olympio
turned out to be an autocrat who imprisoned political opponents, including his former allies, and banned all
political parties apart from the CUT by 1962 (Decalo 1996: 222-223; Lawrance 2007: 179-180; Toulabor 1986:
13-29). In 1963, the regime was overthrown by a group of disgruntled ex-colonial army officers whom Olympio
had refused to integrate in the embryonic national army. The putschists came from northern ethnic groups and
were headed by Etienne Gnassingbé Eyadéma, a Kabyè (Toulabor 1986: 40-52). After a period of instability
when the militarized elements tried to govern the country together with members of pro-French Ewe elite,
Eyadéma officially took power in 1967. A stereotypical African dictator, an admirer of Zaire’s Mobutu, Eyadéma
presided over Togo until his death in 2005. His full-blown patrimonial rule lasted until 1991 when the public
space partially liberalized. In a weakened, more dispersed form, the regime has survived till the present: since
2005, its public face has been President Faure Gnassingbé, one of Eyadéma’s sons (Piot 2010: 21-51).
Eyadéma’s single party (Rassemblement du peuple togolais, RPT) had existed until 2012 when it transformed
into the UNIR (Union pour la République). From 1967, the backbone of the regime has been the ethnically
biased army: about 70 % of soldiers and officer corps are of Kabyè origin (Toulabor 1999: 106-107). From a
wider point of view, since the very beginning, Eyadéma and his “barons” have profited from a steadfast support
of France, including military one (Houngnikpo 2001; Labarthe 2013: 127-156; Pilon 1993: 139-140). The
other two strong international players, the United States and Germany, have been more reserved vis-à-vis the
regime; nevertheless, they have also preferred stability rather than trying to impose a more consensual
political arrangement (Piot 2010: 46-48).

The first public pro-democracy protests broke out in Lomé in October 1990 (Seely 2009: 54). The first multi-
party legislation was adopted by the National Assembly in April 1991. The National Conference along Benin’s
lines was held in July and August 1991 (Heilbrunn 1993; Nwajiaku 1994). This Conference named a provisional
legislative body, the so called High Council of the Republic; the transition government was formed in September
1991 chaired by prime minister Koffigoh, a human rights lawyer (Seely 2009: 118-127). In December 1991, the
army intervened, members of Koffigoh’s personal guard were killed, he was taken hostage, and forced to name
a “national unity government” that included members of Eyadéma’s political party RPT, a de facto coup d’état
(Seely 2009: 121-122). In subsequent months and years, power was gradually regained by Eyadéma although it
never reached the pre-1990 levels. A multi-party constitution was ratified in a referendum in September 1992
(Seely 2009: 122, 128-129). Various explanations have been offered to explain the limited political reform
achieved during this period. They include “the absence of widespread associational activity” under Eyadéma
(Heilbrunn 1993: 298), France’s support of Eyadéma (Nwajiaku 1994), the opposition’s strategies, disunity,
non-inclusiveness, and excessive radicalism (Morency-Laflamme 2010; cf. Seely 2009).

From the constitutional point of view, Togo is a republic with a liberal representative model of political
participation composed of a strong presidency, weak prime minister, and a weak unicameral parliament.23 The
last local government elections at the level of municipality (the lowest one) took place in 1987; prefectural and
regional de-centralization (the middle and the upper level) have not been completed though relevant
legislation exists (MOE UE au Togo 2007: 15; UCT 2013). The electoral system for the National Assembly is
proportional with closed lists, 30 districts and the total of 91 seats (iciLome 2013b). The mandate of all
representative positions is five years but parliamentary and presidential elections do not coincide. The

22 The author accidentally encountered a French military advisor during the 2012 fieldwork.
23 The 1992 Constitution envisages the Senate as well but this chamber has not been established (MOE UE au Togo 2007: 15).
electoral system has been criticized for votes per seat imbalances across electoral districts and small size of most electoral districts given the mandate allocation rules in place (MOE UE au Togo 2007: 14-17, 52-55). Since the first pro-democracy protests in 1990, multi-party competition has been accompanied by social tension, disagreements about legal framework and procedures, public protests, boycotts by political parties, accusations of fraud, refusals to acknowledge results, and violence (Pilon 1994; Piot 2010: 45-46; Roberts 2008; Seely 2006; Seely 2011; Seely 2009; von Trotha 1993). Nine general elections (presidential and legislative) and one important legislative by-election have taken place since the re-introduction of multi-partism. Table XXX shows the extent of opposition boycotts and Table XXX summarizes legislative election results.

TABLE 11
TOGO: BOYCOTTS OF GENERAL ELECTIONS SINCE 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type of election</th>
<th>Boycott / participation</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>Eyadéma 96 % of votes, turnout 36 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Partial boycott (UFC)</td>
<td>UFC considered the strongest opposition party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Legislative by-election</td>
<td>Partial boycott (CAR)</td>
<td>Not clear if UFC boycott as well, all 3 seats won by RPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>All participate</td>
<td>Ministry of interior intervened and proclaimed Eyadéma the winner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>ADDI, CAR, CDPA, UDS-TOGO, CPP, PSR, UFC, Les Rénovateurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>All participate</td>
<td>Olympia banned to run, Eyadéma 58 %, Akitani 34 %, turnout over 72 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>All participate</td>
<td>Olympia banned to run, EU and US declare the vote not free and fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>All participate</td>
<td>The first legislative elections with UFC participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>All participate</td>
<td>Gnassingbé 61 %, Fabre 34 %, turnout 65 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>All participate</td>
<td>Opposition threatened to boycott until 15 days before the vote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
africanelections.tripod.com/tg.html (accessed 19 June 2013)
Apedo-Ahah (1997)
CFD (2002)
Murison (2008)
Panapress (2013)
RFI (2013b)
Roberts (2008)
Seely (2006; 2011; 2009)

24 For example, in 2007 legislative elections, RTP needed 18,500 votes per seat, UFC 32,000 votes per seat, and CAR 48,000 votes per seat (Roberts 2008: 560); in other words, at national level, 40.4 % of popular vote gave 50 seats to the RPT, 38 % of popular vote gave 27 seats to the UFC, and 8.4 % of popular vote gave 4 seats to the CAR (MOE UE au Togo 2007: 53). It is of note that Roberts’ (2008) numbers slightly differ from MOE UE’s numbers.

25 The re-introduction of multi-party competition has markedly increased the level of political violence in Togo. Dozens, sometimes hundreds of people were killed by security forces (mainly the army) each year, others were imprisoned; hundreds of thousands of people were displaced inside the country or took refuge abroad. The repression peaked in 2005 after Eyadéma died and his son was being installed to succeed him. Since then, the number of victims has declined but other forms of repression have persisted and intensified again in early 2013 (CVJR du Togo 2012; Manley 2003: 9-10; Murison 2008: 1207-1208; VOA 2013).
**TABLE 12**
TOGO: RESULTS OF ELECTIONS TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 1994 – 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of registered voters</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Registered (year)</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>c. 65 %</td>
<td>RPT / UNIR</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>boycott</td>
<td>boycott</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Arc-en-ciel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>67 %</td>
<td>UTD</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>85 %</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>66 %</td>
<td>CFN</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>UFC</td>
<td>1992 boycott</td>
<td>boycott</td>
<td>boycott</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>RSDD</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>UDPS</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>JUVENTO</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>MOCEP</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>CST</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Arc-en-ciel</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Tot</td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
- Afreepress.info (2012)
- africanelections.tripod.com/tg.html (accessed 19 June 2013)
- Apedo-Amah (1997)
- Cour constitutionnelle du Togo (2013)
- Decalo (1996)
- Jeuneafrique.com (2012a)

### 6.3.2 Political parties

About one hundred parties registered in Togo between 1991 and 1997 (Apedo-Amah 1997: 257). By 2013, these parties (plus an unknown number that was founded in the meantime) coalesced into five blocks: UNIR et al, UFC, CST, Arc-en-ciel, and CPP et al. The origins of most of the parties that form these five blocks can be traced to the period between April and July 1991 (Apedo-Amah 1997: 267). Table XXX shows the presence of these blocks in the five National Assemblies.
TABLE 13
TOGO: RETROSPECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMPOSITION IN TERMS OF PARTY BLOCKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIR et al</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFC</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arc-en-ciel</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CST</td>
<td></td>
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Source: author’s interpretation of Table XXX above.

UNIR block (former RPT block)
The UNIR is a successor of the RPT, the former single party and instrument of social control founded by Eyadéma in 1969. The first RPT’s general secretary was Edem Kodjo who later became an internationally known politician and founded the UTD (Union togolaise pour la démocratie) in 1991 (see below). The PRT was a “highly decentralized party for much of its existence” and only gradually built its structures over the 1970s and the 1980s. Its core members were of Kabyè ethnicity (T12, T13) plus it attracted opportunists and pragmatics from other ethnic groups. It had four “marching wings” that represented women, youth, labour, and traditional chiefs (Decalo 1996: 239; Seely 2009: 47). In the multi-party era, the RPT created or contributed to creation of several allied parties; five of them obtained parliamentary seats in 1994 or 2002 elections: UJD, RSDD, UDPS, (new) JUVENTO, and MOCEP (see Table XXX above) (Gomez, Houmey and Missodey 2005: 1-2; Le Combat du Peuple 2002). In April 2012, Faure Gnassingbé took a risky strategic step and dissolved the RPT during a congress in Blitta, his birthplace in the centre of the country; simultaneously, a “general assembly of founders” (l’Assemblée Générale des fondateurs) launched a new party - UNIR - in Atakpamé where the RPT was started 43 years earlier. The UNIR is not a renamed RPT. While some 3,000 people convened for the congress in Blitta, only 70 to 100 persons – “personnalités issues de diverses obédiences politiques (RPT, partis et mouvements «pro-Faure», société civile, etc.)” – founded the UNIR party (Adjah 2012; Jeuneafrique.com 2012c; Le Libéral 2012). The party was officially registered several weeks later but its “constitutive congress” has been repeatedly postponed and have not taken places to this date (September 2013) (Koaci.com 2013b; Togo Infos 2013). The interim structures of the new formation seem to be composed mostly of non-RPT members and former RPT membership does not automatically translate into UNIR membership: each individual has to re-apply (see below). From the electoral point of view at least, the gamble has work fine for President Gnassingbé: while in 2007 the RPT gained 62 % of parliamentary seats, in 2013 it was 68 % (calculated from Table XXX above).

UFC
With a sense for paradox, it can be said that the (new) UFC is a splinter group of the (old) UFC. Origins of this party go back to the murdered first president Sylvanus Olympio and the party claims a continuity with the pre-independence nationalist CUT (Apedo-Amah 1997). Olympio’s son Gilchrist, living in exile since mid-1960s, has harboured political ambitions and chaired the formation called the MTD, a Paris-based political vehicle for the Togolese Afro-Brazilians’ interests (Decalo 1996). In 1991, under the label PFC, this formation joined a party grouping called the UFC and quickly became the decisive force within it. Apedo-Ahah charactered the UFC as a party of the bourgeoisie without a veritable political strategy (Apedo-Amah 1997). For many years it was considered the most radical opposition. It boycotted the first three legislative elections and won 27 seats in 2007 (see Table XXX above) with the strongest support coming from the Ewe ethno-linguistic group (MOE UE au Togo 2007: 55-59). After the 2010 presidential election, the UFC’s President Gilchrist Olympio concluded an unexpected deal with the RTP to join the government (AFP 2010) which most supporters perceived as a
betrayal (T8). The party then split with most of its members backing the secretary general Jean-Pierre Fabre plus 90% of the UFC’s executive committee against Olympio. Fabre and his associates were forced to form a new party – Alliance nationale pour le changement (ANC) – because the authorities allowed the Olympio’s fraction to keep the UFC label (Jeuneafrique.com 2010). In this sense, the current UFC became a splinter group of itself. The dwindling fortunes of the (new) UFC are apparent from the 2013 elections results (see Table XXX above).

Collectif Sauvons le Togo (CST)
This assembly of several civil society organizations (mainly from the domain of human rights) and political parties was formed in April 2012 and came to public attention in June 2012 when it organized a series of mass demonstrations in Lomé, the first ones since the bloody presidential election of 2005. It has continued to stage political meetings and mass protests throughout 2012 and 2013. The rallies are sometimes accompanied by violent clashes with the police, injuries on both sides, arrests, and destruction of property (AFP 2012; Jeuneafrique.com 2012a; Jeuneafrique.com 2012b; Jeuneafrique.com 2012d). The most important member of the CST is Fabre’s ANC, the heir of the (old) UFC support base (see above). The somewhat unholy alliance also includes the OBUTS, a personal political party of Agbéyomé Kodjo, who was Eyadéma’s prime minister from 2000 to 2002 (RFI 2002a), and the ADDI, a regional party with its support base in the very north of the country, founded in 1991 (MOE UE au Togo 2007: 55). As a political coalition, the CST scored a convincing success in the 2013 legislative elections (see Table XXX above).

Arc-en-ciel
The coalition Arc-en-ciel came into existence in August 2012, undoubtedly in reaction to the consolidation of the party scene around the CST (Afreepress.info 2012) (T3). It unites the second group of heavy-weight opposition parties led by the CAR that won the first post-Cold War legislative elections in 1994 (see Table XXX above). In 2007 elections, the CAR commanded a solid support between 4 to 12 % of popular vote in all five regions of Togo; the heartland of the party is the Yoto district in the south, the homeland of its founder Yawovi Agboyibo (MOE UE au Togo 2007: 53-59). The CAR/Arc-en-ciel won all three Yoto seats both in 2007 and in 2013 (Cour constitutionnelle du Togo 2013: 11; MOE UE au Togo 2007: 76). Overall, the party lacks fresh personalities and gives the impression of a slow decline (T28). The coalition also includes the CDPA and the UDS-Togo from among the very first parties created in 1991, and three younger formations (Afreepress.info 2012; Apedo-Amah 1997).

CPP et al
Three parties can be classified as representing this block: the UTD and its successor the CPP plus the PDR (Decalo 1996; Gomez, Houmey and Missodey 2005: 2). They are prone to power-sharing with Gnassingbé dynasty. Both the UTD and the PDR belong to the first wave of post-Cold War parties in 1991 (Apedo-Amah 1997). Their respective founders, Edem Kodjo and Zarifou Ayéva, both served in high governmental positions under Eyadéma in the 1970s and the 1980s. The PDR has never held a parliamentary seat and the UTD/CPP has been in electoral decline since the parliamentary elections in 1994 when it formed a coalition with the post-dictatorial RPT to the disappointment of the majority of the population (T1, T2, T3). For 2013 elections, the CPP put up candidates in 12 districts only (Togosite.com 2013).

The relationships between the five blocks, the parties within them, and their constituencies are complex and connected with a host of factors: ethnic, regional, historical, personal, etc. For example, the electoral results clearly show that the Ewe ethno-linguistic group in the south has been ready to vote for a genuine anti-RPT opposition. But its political elites have been split into three and now into four blocks (Olympio, Fabre, Agboyibo, and Edem Kodjo – UFC, CST, Arc-en-ciel, CPP, respectively - all come from this ethno-linguistic group). An example related to the country’s recent political history is the figure of Agbéyomé Kodjo whose OBUTS party may be the best financed member of the CST party goup: apart from holding high

26 Signals that Gilchrist Olympio and Faure Gnassingbé were considering a political deal appeared initially in 2005, but were disclaimed by Olympio (Seely 2006: 614).
governmental and para-statal positions in 1985, Kodjo was the director of the port of Lomé between 1993 and 1999. When Kodjo served as minister of interior in 1993, about 20 people were shot dead by the security forces during a peaceful opposition demonstration (so call Fréau jardin massacre) (CVJR du Togo 2012: 192-194); and he is perceived by many to have been implicated in these killings (T8). Also, when he served as the prime minister from 2000 to 2002, Yawovi Agboyibo, President of the Comité d'action pour le renouveau (CAR, which is now member of the Arc-en-ciel) spent seven months in prison after being sentenced for defaming Kodjo (RFI 2001; RFI 2002b).

6.3.3 Party organization

Membership

To become a member of a political party, one has to fill an application form (fiche d’adhesion) and attach up to three photos (T5, T8, T19, T20, T21, T32, T33, T35, T36). In most parties, acceptance is automatic. Representatives of two parties – Alliance pour la démocratie et le développement intégral (ADDI) and the Union de forces du changement (UFC) – mentioned certain gate-keeping mechanisms. In ADDI, the membership application is evaluated and has to be approved by the prefectoral committee (T35). In the UFC, one is supposedly referred to his/her local sub-section has to find a sponsor, mentor or “buddy” (or is given a buddy). The buddy introduces the applicant to the ideology and culture of the party. After a period of observation, the applicant is accepted. The buddy has to sign the application form (T23). In the UNIR, individual ex-RPT members have to re-apply (T19). At the time of the fieldwork, the party was launching a nation-wide electronic system of member registration (T13). The application form does not ask about previous membership in political parties including the RPT (T12, T13). A clerk, hired from among party members, enters the data from the application into a computer database. If the applicant is present in person, an electronic photo is taken, a plastic card printed and handed out. Neither the record in the database, nor the card indicates whether the person was a member of the RPT. In contrast to the RPT era (1969-2012), there was no pressure to join (T12, T13). Anybody who passes a UNIR office where the IT system is functional can drop in, apply, and get a membership card on the spot. At the time of the research, lines of people surrounded the UNIR offices from early in the morning to obtain a party card. In other parties, one fills an application form which is sent to party headquarters in Lomé where the card is produced and send back to the member (T20). For reasons that are difficult to pinpoint (see below), membership cards are considered very important and the parties seem to compete in who produces fancier ones. The most sophisticated are those of the UNIR and the ANC. They resemble photo ID documents of a credit card size that one finds in many developed countries (T6). More modest cards are plasticised (UFC, T24) or simple paper cards with a stamp over the photo (OBUTS, T8). The UNIR gives out the cards for free (T27, T36). Other parties charge anything between 200 and 1000 CFA.

Membership fees but hardly anybody pays them apart from party officials and some activists (see below) (T4, T8, T25, T28, T35). Nobody pays, summarized the situation a CDPA (Convention démocratique des peuples africains) party member, people expect to get something for any payment may be beyond reach of poor peasants. According to an ADDI official, the party does not even register peasants as members because both the card and the membership are too expensive for them; nevertheless, they can participate in all party activities (T35). As for expulsions, they are rare and concern cases of members who “betrayed”, who are active

27 The author observed it Kpalimé, Atakpamé, Sokodé, and Kara. Electronic = computerized and networked with the headquarters in Lomé.
28 They were shown to the author.
29 The author verified it during casual conversations with other UNIR members as well.
30 1000 CFA (franc de la Communauté financière africaine) is about 2 US dollars (USD) or 100 CFA is worth about 20 cents/USD. Membership card fees in CFA: ADDI 1000 (T35), ANC 500 (T4, T5, T22), CDPA 200-500 (T20, T25), OBUTS 200-500 (T8), PDP 200 (T33), UFC 500 (T4, T23).
31 In French, the word “militant” is used.
32 Monthly membership fees in CFA: ADDI 1000 (T35), ANC 100 (T4, T6, T21), CDPA 100 (T25), UFC 100 (T23).
33 A local UNIR segment was reported to collect 200 CFA per month from its members on its own initiative. Not everybody paid the fee (T36).
in other parties. A wave of expulsions followed the splitting of the UFC in 2011 (T4). Party headquarters are informed and the person is summoned to explain his or her actions before the decision takes effect (T4, T35).

Structure

Party structure tends to copy the administrative division of the country. The country is divided into five regions. Only some parties have regional level committees, le Parti démocratique panafricain (PDP), for example (T33). The five regions comprise 30 préfectures plus the urban commune of Lomé. The most important unit is the préfecture which is, at the same time, an electoral district (MOE UE au Togo 2007: 16). In political parties’ language, this level is called the “federation”. In urban centres where the population density is high, the parties divide the préfecture into two or three federations to make the administrative structures manageable (T5). Thus, for example, the ANC has 60 federations nation-wide (T5). From the administrative point of view, below the préfectures, there are cantons. In the terminology of the Togolese political parties, this level corresponds to “sections”. Below sections there are villages or town quarters which are called "sub-sections". From a geographic point of view, the penetration of individual political parties down to the level of sub-sections is highly uneven. For example, in the Savanes region in the north of Togo, the ANC started to establish its structures in the regional capital only at the beginning of 2012 (T33). A CDPA member estimated that his party was active only in 15 préfectures (T25). The ADDI is firmly implanted only in three préfectures and has activists in five to ten other préfectures (T35). The UNIR, the ANC, and the UFC have the densest organization (T4, T22, T31). The bigger parties also have women's and youth wings with their own parallel structures (T5, T23, T35). A party committee or "bureau" at any level consists of five to twenty persons; the size does not seem to be strictly set (T4, T29, T31, T34, T35). The committee is helped by a group of activists which may number up to a few dozen depending on the strength of the party at the particular location. The number of members / sympathizers of each party segment differs from one party to another, from one place to another, whether the environment is rural or urban. An urban sub-section of a strong party can have up to several thousand of members / sympathizers who are ready to be mobilized if they are asked to do so (T23). As far as the UNIR is concerned, the RPT structures were dissolved by the congress in Blitta (T1, T12, T13). A group of people behind the launch of the UNIR then named interim federal committees of the new party, so called focal points. Little is known about this process and who was in charge of it. The respondents usually referred to Georges Aidam, the Vice-President of UNIR (T10), or simply to Lomé (T1, T2, T19) (Togoactualite.com 2012). The federal committees, the backbone of the party, number five to seven people, usually five (i.e. president, vice-president, treasurer, rapporteur plus one more) (T10, T19, T27, T32). Several informants claimed that the majority of the federal focal point members came from opposition parties (T1, T2, T9, T10, T11, T32). The author had a chance to inquire into the composition of three federal committees of the UNIR totalling 17 persons (T10, T19, T27). Only one of them was a member of the former RPT federal committee. At least four of them were at some point active in an opposition party (ADDI, PDR, CPP, CDPA). The UNIR strategists most probably performed a country-wide search to attract such persons and the word “co-opted” was used to refer to the process (T27). Most of the 17 persons were ex-RPT members who previously held lower-level post if any. These federal focal points then selected lower-level focal points during public meetings and so on down to the sub-section level (T19). At these lower levels, there seem to be a tendency of a greater overlap with the former RPT committees with one ex-RPT bureau member usually keeping his or her post (T19).

Procedures

No issues related to party statutes were mentioned by any of the respondents. Most opposition representatives and activists have been involved in politics for many years, many of them right from the first protests in 1990. Being active in an opposition party brings few rewards and a host of inconveniences and risks (T14, T35).

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34 While there are formally 35 préfectures, only 30 are functional (UCT 2013). For the purpose of the 2013 legislative elections, the urban commune of Lomé together with the préfecture du Golfe were merged into one electoral district (iciLome 2013b).
35 There are about 400 cantons in Togo (Bureau central de recensement 2010: 4).
There is little competition for party positions and the organization and management of party activities tend to be based on long-lasting informal relationships rather than formal guidelines. As for the UNIR, it had no statute at the time of the fieldwork (T27, T32) or at the time of writing. It relied on a mixture of RPT routines, intuition of newly named officials, and top-down communication coming from the headquarters in Lomé. Apart from the naming of the UNIR préfectoral focal points, all positions in all parties were filled via more or less transparent procedures: usually via a secret vote from among two or more candidates or an approval of a single candidate (T20, T29, T31, T33, T35, T36). The respondents did not mention any friction or conflicts in this regard besides the tension between the cancelled RPT and UNIR structures (T19). Parliamentary candidates were in the process of being selected by the parties’ national committees based on lists supplied by the federations (T4, T6, T21, T23, T31). The practice of the UFC to let the federations to compile the party lists for the 2007 general elections was abandoned both by the UFC and the ANC because of the extreme pressure it put on the federation committees (T4, T6). At the time of the fieldwork, the UNIR did not have any procedure in place to perform the selection of MP candidates (T27). The respondents also mentioned a few cases whereby a party position or even an MP candidacy was filled by approaching a member of local elite who was not even a member of the party (T3, T7, T19, T34). The general elections were supposed to be held in October 2012 at the latest. Most parties, especially those united in the CST, the UFC, and the UNIR, were very active. Party committees of all levels held weekly or bi-weekly meetings (T23, T24, T27, T31, T34). The ANC national committee organized weekly meetings with representatives of all 60 federations in Lomé (T5, T22). In terms of internal party communication, few written documents were produced (T25, T28, T31, T35). Information was mostly communicated during face-to-face meetings, by telephone, or via the party webpage (T5, T6). While a few respondents mentioned monthly or quarterly federal reports for the headquarters, they actual regularity and significance remained unclear (T4, T23, T33, T35). Some party segments may take meeting minutes for their own purposes (T4, T36).

Supreme organs

A teacher sympathizing with the opposition summarized the functioning of the Togolese political parties in the following way: the parties are organized around one particular person. They resemble private enterprises. A group of friends or people who know each other has a meeting and they found a party. They are not united by a system of ideas or a vision of a future political regime. The founder is usually the main financier of the party. Before presidential election, the group selects the founder as their presidential candidate (T7). In a similar vein, a CPDA member complained about a stale atmosphere in many opposition parties, about the “vicious circle of leaders” that controls them (T25). Apart from the congresses that split the UFC and dissolved the RPT, only one issue concerning the parties’ supreme organs was mentioned: the repeatedly postponed constitutive congress of the UNIR (T27).

Funding

The UNIR does not collect any dues from its members. Some informants claimed the party was financed by its founding members (T1, T2) (see above); others believed it was directly Faure Gnassingbé who provided the funds (T12, T13). According to a UNIR respondent, federal focal points are not paid, only their travel expenses are reimbursed (T27). Operation costs of the UNIR must be significant. A UNIR member told the author that the party had a new office in every préfecture. They are rented buildings, fenced, freshly painted, and equipped with at least basic furniture; the party intentionally avoids using former RPT premises (T13). A member of the card distribution team estimated the production cost of one card to be anything between 500 and 5000 CFA (5000 CFA is the fee one has to pay obtain a national ID card). Within one month of arriving to one of the UNIR préfectoral seats, the team registered about 50 thousand members. If we multiply this number by the number of préfectures (30) and 5 USD per card (2500 CFA) we get the sum of 7.5 million US dollars. Considering the operation costs of the headquarters in Lomé and the number of promotion gadgets the party hand out (T-shirts,

36 The CAR, the CDPA, and the PDP seemed the least active formations (T20, T25, T28, T33).
37 A focal point of the same préfecture said the RPT used to have 40 thousand members there (identity withheld).
caps, flags, etc.), we can safely assume that between April 2012 and the writing of this dissertation 18 months later, the creators of the UNIR have invested from 5 to 20 million US dollars (USD) in the party (3 to 14 million USD per year).

As for the rest, only the UFC is thought to have “some money” (T20). Since the very beginning, the party has profited from the wealth of its exile leader (Apedo-Amah 1997: 258). A UFC member told the author that the ANC was funded by the diaspora because its president Jean-Pierre Fabre “does not have any money” (T3). A CAR member said that only the party’s four MPs and the members of the national committee contribute financially; however, the party’s national and federation committees managed to assemble enough funds to organize a national congress before the 2010 presidential election (T28). Unable to collect regular membership fees, party activities at all levels are financed from the pockets of the members of the segments’ committees and a circle of activists who can afford it (T4, T31, T29, T33). The members of federal and national bureaus contribute about 500 to 2,000 CFA per month (T6, T23, T25, T33). During a weekly federation meeting the committee’s treasurer can collect 1 to 5 thousand CFA (T29).38 Top-down financial flow from the headquarters is very limited or none at all (T4, T33). Representatives of one ANC federation told the author that the party (back then the UFC) received 3 million CFA (6,000 USD) from the headquarters for the presidential election campaign in 2010 and 600,000 CFA in 2005 (T21).39 A CST march organized by the ADDI in Dapaong in October 2012, the first such event that year, had a budget of 250,000 CFA (500 USD). Party activists and committee members were asked to contribute 5,000 CFA each; the CST headquarters in Lomé contributed 50,000 CFA (100 USD) (T35). On a yet smaller scale, a MCD member told the author that his federation bureau collects about three to four thousand CFA (6 to 8 USD) during its weekly meeting. They spent the money for notebooks, petrol, and somebody to announce their arrival when they visit a village to explain who they are and what they do (T34). If they prepare a well-founded budget for a series of such tours their headquarters may contribute 50,000 CFA (100 USD), for example (T34). Offices of the opposition at federation level, if any all, tend to be a rented bare room without chairs and tables that can accommodate ten to twenty people. The headquarters in Lomé may look like a decent office or a complex of offices with at least one paid administrative secretary, a guard, chairs, tables, binders, computers, printers, etc. Some parties, such as the CDPA or the OBUTS own a building (T8, T25). The lack of funds constrains opposition activities in multiple ways. For example, it prevents the parties to penetrate and campaign in more distant villages and to provide transport and basic necessities to party delegates in polling stations on the Election Day (T6, T23, T29, T34).

6.3.4 Cohesion

The pressure on opposition parties and their members has many different forms ranging from open repression by security forces and obstacles by local authorities to more insidious, indirect methods. The goal is to frustrate and disgust anybody who wants to engage the ruling party in any kind of open competition: ‘we were in the opposition for years, we suffered, nothing came out of it’ (T10). This section does not aspire to provide an exhaustive account of the various pressures, only to illustrate their multitude and omnipresence. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International or la Ligue togolaise des droits de l’Homme (LTDH) have been publishing reports that include many cases of political repression. The last public statement of Amnesty International on Togo from May 2013 mentions the death in custody of a member of the ANC due to a lack of access to health care (Amnesty International 2013). Similarly, the last report of the LTDH (who is now a member of the opposition coalition, the CST) describes harassment of Jean-Pierre Fabre, the ANC President, by the Togolese security forces (LTDH 2011). Without really looking for cases of human rights violations, the author came across two such accounts. A former member of l’Union de forces du changement (UFC) in Lomé related how he was arrested with his wife and child in 2002, held for 12 hours, and then released without

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38 To make another very rough estimate, let us imagine that the ANC collects 5 USD (2,500 CFA) during every weekly meeting in all 60 federations. We obtain the sum of 15,600 USD (5 x 52 x 60) per year. Let us imagine that all other ANC structures (national, section, subsections) collect the same amount as well and we are at 31,200 USD per year. Adding the presumed contribution from the diaspora, we can estimate the yearly budget of the party to be anything between 50,000 and 250,000 USD.

39 If we multiply 6,000 USD by 60 federations we obtain 360,000 USD as the UFC budget for the 2010 presidential campaign. If we consider that the same amount per electoral district, then we obtain 180,000 USD.
charge. The same year, he was arrested again, formally accused of endangering state security, held in detention for 9 months and then released by a judge because "his file was empty". Similarly, a former UFC member told the author that he was held without trial in a building of the gendarmerie in Kara for 13 months starting in 2002, managed to escape with others in 2003, lived in exile in Benin, and returned to Togo only in 2006. While political repression eased between 2006 and the beginning of the street protests in June 2012, the beginning of 2013 saw a mass arrest of CST members including several leading figures in connection with fires that destroyed central market places in Lomé and Kara in January 2013. Altogether, 35 persons were formally accused, 25 were placed in detention, and highly dubious judicial proceedings were started against them. Some of them were released only weeks before the July 2013 elections after a deal was reached between the opposition and the government (AFP 2013b; Jeuneafrique.com 2013a; Koaci.com 2013a; Panapress 2013; VOA 2013). As for the attitude of the local administration to opposition activities, several problems were mentioned by the respondents. For example, a member of an opposition party complained that state officials did not want to give them green light to campaign in villages, meeting places were suddenly taken by other associations, and party activists threatened (T14, T29). In other places, demonstrations were dispersed by the police (T29) or threats were made that it will happen (T35). Co-optation of influential members of the opposition has accompanied the Togolese politics since 1994 when the first MPs from the CAR switched to Eyadéma (T3, T9, T29). A respondent from ADDI mentioned a case of the party’s regional president who switched to the ruling party and became a prefect (T35). Georges Aidam, the current Vice-President of the UNIR, is a former national secretary of CAR (Togoactualite.com 2012). Dozens of similar cases could easily be found though they would have to be assessed on an individual basis. Regarding the recent wave of co-optations into the UNIR, the fieldwork interviews suggested that some of them were “idealists” who joined the party primarily for the political project (they think) it represents rather than material benefits (T1, T9, T10, T11). The fact that any kind of involvement with the opposition may ruin one’s career or severely limit one’s chances to get a state-related job was repeatedly emphasized during the interviews (T5, T6). If you stand up against the government you are zero, they will not employ you anywhere, summarized the situation a member of ADDI (T35). During an informal conversation on a street, a former RPT member expressed a similar idea: "If you want to do politics, they will slap you wrist... What do you want to do if you are hungry? You will line up with the others.” A stealthier method was also mentioned: influential regional bosses from the RPT threatened the parents of youths to dissuade their offspring from opposition activities (T35). Generally speaking, the pressure on opposition activists tends to be more severe in villages than towns; villagers are also more scared than towns’ people (T34).

6.3.5 Linkage

The political scene has been relatively dynamic in recent years. Firstly, presidential and parliamentary elections are not held at the same time: every two to three years there is one or the other. Secondly, the population waits if President Faure Gnassingbé will have the boldness to run for the third term in office. The Constitution currently allows it because the PRT lifted the two terms cap in 2002 (Seely 2006: 612). If Gnassingbé wins, it would extend the rule of his dynasty from 1967 to 2020 (the next presidential election will take place in 2015). Thirdly, the sudden entente between the ruling party and the UFC in 2010, the split of the latter, and its nearly complete loss in the 2013 elections, ended the paramount influence of the Olympio family that goes back to the 1940s and the formation of the first political parties in Togo (Toulabor 1986: 28-29). The parties’ link to the population is via three main activities: voter education tours (tournées de sensibilisation), rallies, and door-to-door campaigning. The tour is a drive of a group of party representatives and activists through the landscape from an urban centre to a village where they present their party, give speeches, and have discussions with the locals. The tours as employed both to create and maintain the linkage. The touring group may comprise 20 persons in a few vehicles and on motorbikes; the event is announced on a private radio station (T31). A smaller political party may assemble a much smaller team, from three to six persons, for example (T34). The activists

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40 In urban settings, they are called voter education séances (séances de sensibilisation) (T23).
may hand out summaries of the party programme (T35). The rally usually takes places in a town and is often accompanied by a march. It is more suitable for maintaining rather than creating the linkage. Door-to-door campaigning is performed by a group of two to three party members and is discreet (T4). It is a typical linkage creation method. The precise pattern of activities depends on the party and geographic region. No formal permit by the authorities is necessary, only a notice to the prefect or a lower level official (chef de quartier) (T4, T14, T31). The ANC and the UNIR were the most active and able to mobilized larger numbers of people (T29), followed by the UFC, the ADDI, and the MCD. As far as the author can judge, the campaigning of the UNIR was the most evenly distributed over the country's territory with good penetration into villages (T27, T29). It also seemed to offer a wide spectrum of activities including communal work, sport, and cultural festivals (T1, T36). The ANC's campaigning in non-Ewe speaking villages emerged from the interviews as relatively limited (T33). Several opposition respondents remarked that the lack of funds prevented them from taking the campaigning deeper into the rural areas (see above).

Participatory linkage

All parties are engaged in participative linkage, at least during the phase of their efflorescence. The UNIR is much stronger than the RPT in this regard. The party attracts many people who are interested in public things but feel they would never get a chance to contribute to the development of their communities as members of the opposition. The opposition comes out as focussed on regime change and little more which, of course, may only reflect its limited financial resources. As everywhere in the world, coming from a political family led some to join a political party (T1, T23). Among opposition members, the most common motivation for political participation was social justice: the fight against privileges of one ethnic or social minority over others (T5, T6, T25, T31). Only one respondent emphasized a class based motivation: he wanted to promote well-being of the country's peasants who, he claimed, were left out of politics (T33). At the same time, some younger respondents complained about opportunism of some opposition leaders ('they are offered a state job or an envelope and it is over, they get themselves bought') (T12, T33) or the limited mobility within opposition parties ('vicious circle of leaders') (see above) (T25).

Programmatic linkage

When asked about their parties' programme, opposition members provided a wide spectrum of answers ranging from the most general ones such as human dignity, human rights, moral integrity, non-violence, dialogue, development, and respect for ethnic diversity, respect for natural environment (T4, T6, T20, T34) to social issues such as equitable sharing of national wealth and resources, creation of job opportunities, better education, free education, better social security, access to water, better health care, better infrastructure (T4, T6, T29, T34) and a few relatively focused policy issues such as limiting the role of the army in civilian life, reforestation, and participative democracy (T28, T34, T35). 'We fight for ideas' (as opposed to clientelism), summarized an MCD member (T34). In one conversation the respondents brought up the left – right orientation: they considered the ANC to be a socialist party and the ADDI a liberal or 'entrepreneurial' party. They also remarked that left wing parties emphasize 'community' while right wing parties emphasize (big) firms (T5, T6). From the point of view of the author, only one discussion of party programme differed from all others: an MCD member clearly stated that his party supports entrepreneurial activities of the youth because the state cannot employ everybody (T34). Overall, the author did not notice much passion during these discussions (besides, of course, the regime change and the related issue of human rights and equitable access to the state). Some interviewees expressed a similar feeling. 'Programme of the CST and Arc-en-ciel is the same thing', noted a CAR member (T28). 'Programme should decide but the population does not pay attention',

To what extent this conviction is justified remains an open question. The UNIR members were split on the question of governance of Faure Gnassingbé versus his father Eyadéma. Some said that nothing had changed (T12), others pointed to certain improvements. For example, one informant claimed Faure Gnassingbé values competence over ethnicity and would dismiss a lazy state employee even if he or she is Kabyé (T1). Other informant said that open competitions to fill state jobs was introduced under Faure Gnassingbé and that state employees were getting their salaries in time while they had been paid several months late under Eyadéma (T10).
complained a young student from the CDPA (T25). As far as the UNIR is concerned, the absence of any written programme was telling. Here was a new, 'progressive' party, supposedly different from the RPT, but without any clear agenda: 'The UNIR is a new party ... it does not have a programme as yet', said a focal point member (T27). An interesting idea was expressed by a rank-and-file member of the party: he read the RPT programme, it was a programme of development, but the RPT did not adhere to it, the party that is best suited to implement it is the UNIR (T32). Without much exaggeration, one can conclude that the main "programme" communicated by UNIR was: UNIR ≠ RPT (T10, T27, T32).

Clientelistic linkage

Some UNIR members had no difficulty to admit that the main linkage between the RPT and the population was clientelistic or ethno-clientelistic. They expressed hope that the UNIR would be different. Some of the same respondents (sic) admitted that they had joined the party because by doing so they stood higher chances to get a good job (T12, T13, T26). The clientelistic nature of the UNIR (and of course the RPT) – voter linkage was brought up by all opposition respondents, including those from the UFC. The respondents gave dozens of examples. They were of two main sorts. The first domain concerned employment, promotion, possibilities to abuse state resources via state employment, and access to better education (T4, T6, T14, T25, T28, T34), the second domain was the distribution of gifts during election campaigns (rice, corn, soap, money, etc.) (T20, T25, T35). A third theme also emerged: co-optation of local elites. This theme included cases of university educated professionals who accepted sought after state post; in exchange, they had to cease to disseminate views that were critical of the ruling party (T33). Other cases under this rubric were payments of the UNIR to "village chiefs" to undermine free expression of opinion in their area (T34) (Piot 2010: 37). As for the pre-election gift-giving, there was no consensus among the respondents about its impact in terms of the actual voting. Some opposition members claimed that peasants are politically mature and able to vote against the ruling party (T4) or accept money and then vote for somebody else (T29). Other interviewees held the opposite view: 'People vote the party who gave them money ... 200 CFA ... because of poverty and ignorance ... they do not understand the vote is secret ... they are not able to cast the ballot for somebody else as in other countries such as Ghana or Sénégal (T33). 'Even very small gifts are enough to buy the population', summarized another opposition member (T14). The distribution of the fancy UNIR membership cards was also understood within the clientelistic framework: 'The ruling party bribes people ... they do not understand the opposition struggle ... in an opposition party they have to pay for the card ... the UNIR gives it for free' (T20). There has also been a persistent opinion among the opposition members that the UNIR pays people, in cash or kind, for registering with the party (or at least promises to do so) (T4, T14, T20, T21). During the desk research following the fieldwork, the author came across a nice example of party – voter clientelistic linkage in an article on one of the Togolese news websites. It describes a visit of the Minister of Agriculture, animal husbandry, and fishing in a town quarter of Koulounde in March 2013. During the visit, the minister gave to local officials an envelope with 1.3 million CFA (2,600 USD) to repair the roof of a local primary school that had been damaged by a storm. The report continues: "This amount comes from membership dues of the UNIR cadres, natives of Tchaoudjo, who are potential candidates for the upcoming legislative elections in their locality ... He [the minister] thanked the inhabitants of the town quarter for their strong participation in the voter registration process and asked them to vote massively for the UNIR when the moment arrives to give President Faure Gnassingbé a chance to pursue his policy of grass-root development" (ATOP 2013). While the mechanisms of the clientelistic linkage may sometimes look straightforward, the interviews brought up a more complex picture: 'Pragmatics in the UNIR vote for other parties', remarked a PDP member (T33). In a similar vein, a young grassroots member of

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42 These cases are called, “achat de conscience” in French and translated as a “sale of (political) consciousness” in this dissertation. Even though “achat” (i.e. the verb acheter) means “buying” in French, in the author’s view, the best translation into English is “sale of” because it draws attention to the voluntaristic nature of the exchange on the part of the person.

43 (0.4 USD)

44 Cette somme est une cotisation faite par les cadres de l’Union pour la République (UNIR), natifs de Tchaoudjo et qui sont potentiellement candidats aux prochaines élections législatives dans leur milieu ... Il les a remercié pour leur forte mobilisation pour le recensement électoral et les a prié de voter massivement pour UNIR au moment venu, afin de donner la chance au président Faure Gnassingbé de poursuivre sa politique de développement à la base.
UNIR told the author that the youth in fact hate the party and they only pretend to like it in order to keep their jobs or to be rewarded by getting some other position (T26). What role UNIR membership or Kabyè ethnicity actually play in state employment hiring and promotion is impossible to quantify as no surveys of this kind have been conducted. Clientelist pressures on opposition parties also exist. An informant from the OBUTS told the author that some people approach the party hoping that it will help them to solve their personal (financial) problems (T8). Similarly, an ANC member admitted that people expect the party to hand out gifts or to help them materially when it arrives to campaign in their area. They have resolved the dilemma (unwillingness to engage in clientelism, lack of resources, and people’s expectations) by distributing chalk to classrooms and Paracetamol (a non-prescription analgesic) to the sick (T29). Again, the matter boils down to the role of poverty: ‘In Africa, what people expect from political parties is money because they are hungry ... when UNIR representatives come to their native regions, everybody runs to them and they give ... not from their salary, from state resources’ (T34).

Coercive linkage

The interviews did not yield any examples of coercive linkage. An opposition representative in Kara claimed that people were “forced” to obtain UNIR membership cards (identity withheld). The author did not have any opportunity to corroborate the statement. If coercive linkage exists in Togo at all, it is probably limited to more distant villages, Kabyè communities in the Kozah préfecture, or members of the army. While it is easy to imagine that some people are exposed to strong social pressure to join or support UNIR there, systematic use of coercive linkage seems improbable.

Governance linkage

Identity-based linkage

Like in other countries, relationships between Togolese ethnic groups can be expressed in stereotypical forms that derive from a mythical and/or historical substrate (Labante 2010; Toulabor 1986: 37-38). Several interviewees referred to these stereotypes (T1, T2, T33, and a member of the NJSPF). As for the relationship between ethnicity and politics, besides the widely cited dichotomies such as South versus North or Kabyè versus the rest, the topic entered the interviews either very explicitly (T25) or very obliquely (T33). In spite of this “imbalanced” message, all suggest that regional and ethnic identities have played the key role in the country’s multi-party competition. ‘Africans like chiefdoms’, summarized a MCD member, ‘everybody gives priority to his region, than to his ethnic group, without even knowing what “his people” think’ (T34).

Manifestations of this linkage are difficult to study as the topic is taboo in Togo (Agbodjan-Prince 2012). In addition, direct observations of the linkage require knowledge of local languages and cultural symbolism. In the interviews, the ethnic linkage was mostly coined in ethno-clientelistic terms as described in the previous section. Only one respondent expressed the linkage in purely ethnic terms by saying that the Kabyè are told by their leaders that if a certain person is not the president, the sun will not rise the following day (identity withheld). Other respondents spoke about regional identity. For example, people (in the north) are supposedly told that if the south wins northern people will be chased back to the north and they will lose everything (T22, T25). According to a UFC member, the RPT/UNIR tells the northerners that if the opposition wins they will become serfs of the southerners (T3). A combined analysis of all sources available to the author shows that only two to three ethnic groups has been inclined to act as political groupings as well: the Ewe ethno-linguistic block in the south and the Kabyè of the Kozah district, and possibly also the Moba of north (CENI Togo 2013; Decalo 1996: 209-210; MOE UE au Togo 2007; MOE UE au Togo 2010). Internal divisions within the Ewe ethno-linguistic block complicate the picture, but the general tendency had been overwhelmingly anti-RPT until the foundation of the UNIR. The arrival of the UNIR split the Ewe vote. While the Ewe ethno-linguistic block scooped 95 % of the National Assembly seats in the Maritimes region in 2007, it

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45 Even in this case the respondent did not say “Kabyè” but “people” but it what clear from the context of the statement that he meant “Kabyè”.

46 Complete results per electoral district are available only for 2013.
won only 72% of the seats there in 2013 (CENI Togo 2013; MOE UE au Togo 2007). The potential of other ethnic groups to behave as political units is even less clear. However, the analysis based primarily on the aggregated election data, approximate geographic distribution of ethnic groups, and 1981 census does not rule out a less pronounced but still very significant ethno-regional linkage. Upon a closer scrutiny, almost all Togolese parties appear to have an ethnic or ethno-regional core: RPT (Kabyè), UFC (Guin-Mina-Brasilians-Aneho), ANC (Guin-Mina), CPP (Ewe-Kpalimé), CAR (Ouatchi-Yoto), ADDI (Moba-Tone), MCD (Kotokoli-Tchaoudjo) (Agbodjan-Prince 2012; Decalo 1996; iciLome 2006). Apart from UNIR attempts to market itself as a national party, the interviews provided some evidence that the PDP pursues an explicitly multi-ethnic political project (T33).

Competence-based linkage
This linkage is weak in Togo. Even though one UNIR member told the author that he adhered to the party because of RPT/UNIR achievements to date (T36), such claims are rare. The poor governance of the country is so glaring that even the RPT/UNIR members admit it (T13). A twisted notion of emerges: the main competence of the UNIR consists in the fact that it is the only political formation that can guarantee stability of the country (understand: thanks to its ex-RPT connection to the army) (T3, T10, T32). The fragmented opposition has never governed so it cannot refer to any policy achievements either. On a more symbolic level though, the competence linkage is practiced. For example, an unannounced competition to issue the fanciest membership cards and the whole spectacle attached to it (i.e. involving computers, digital cameras, trained personnel from Lomé, etc.) can be understood in this way (T20, T21). The spacious, freshly painted offices of the UNIR create the same impression. At the most general level, one cannot rule out that less educated sections of the population may interpret clientelist gift-giving simultaneously as a sign of competence.

Ethos-based
The linkage of moral high-ground is arguably the main one that the opposition employs: human rights, no involvement in the crimes committed by the dictatorial regime, no reliance on state resources, no bribing of voters, etc. (T4, T5, T6, T29, T34). The UNIR and the UFC attempt to play this linkage by picturing the street protests that have been going on since mid-2012 as disturbances by violent mobs that attack the police, destroy property, and interfere with economic activities (T3, T10). A distinct mixture of identity-based and ethos-based linkage is also present: We have the right to govern because our socio-cultural group have been side-lined since 1967 (XXX).

Paternalistic linkage
Various community activities – educational, cultural, sport – fall in this category and the RPT certainly used to get credits for organizing them (T36). It is not clear to what extent these undertakings have been carried on by the UNIR. The interviews yielded no signals that the opposition would cultivate this kind of linkage.

6.4 Summary
XXX

7 MAPPING CROSS-COUNTRY DIVERSITY

The theoretical concepts and the comparative framework that were introduced in Chapter XXX presume and rely on similarities in the ways multi-partism is enacted in the three countries examined in this study. Before attending to them once again, this chapter compares the three countries and systematizes important differences between them. Those differences that can be assessed along one single dimension are summarized in Table XXX. The table calculates country scores for each of the three categories: (1) simple/less/fewer, (2) complex/more, and (3) middle ground. Although the scores seem to have some tendencies, they should be interpreted with caution.

47 A truly multi-ethnic party relying on Kabyè-dominated army and ex-RPT finances is a contradiction in terms.
7.1 Socio-political environment

Political violence and ethnicity
The trajectories of political violence and ethno-linguistic composition are radically different in the three countries. The nearly complete homogeneity of Burundi belies a racist conflict between two opposed social categories of human beings with genocidal consequences. This is something utterly foreign to Zambia where ethno-linguistic diversity is considerable. It does not mean that no acts of political violence have been perpetrated in Zambia in recent decades (Burnell 2005: 108-109) but the scale and its roots are not comparable to Burundi. In is not imaginable in Zambia that a political party that respects the territorial integrity of the country would be driven underground such as the FNL in Burundi.49 Togo shares a complicated ethno-linguistic map with Zambia and the strong presence of violence in politics with Burundi. In contrast to Zambia, the ethnic composition of Togo is more complicated due to the south - north orientation of the country and the differential impact of the gradual colonial encroachment in the same direction. And in contrast to Burundi, the political violence in Togo has been perpetrated exclusively by security forces; inter-ethnic violence is exceptional in Togo.50 Even though the possibility of a civil war and mass violence have been invoked in Togo (IRIN 2005; Lawrance 2007: xi; Pilon 1993: 138; Piot 2010: 47-48), it is improbable that it would ever reach Burundian proportions.

Social exclusion
Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia between 1964 and 1991, was famous for carefully balancing of the country’s ethnic groups (XXX). In Burundi, on the other hand, the Hutus were systematically excluded from politics, economy, and the education system. In Togo under Eyadéma, milder forms of social exclusion existed and have survived until the present. As a lay political observer summarized, ‘the Togolese nation has not yet formed ... every ethnic group has its culture ... the [RPT] regime promoted only one culture ... people did not feel an equilibrium of cultures’ (T7).

Political alteration
The only political turnover Togo has seen since 1967 was from father (Eyadéma Gnassingbé) to son (Faure Gnassingbé) in 2005. A UNIR member pondered that Faure Gnassingbé could hold the presidential office for four terms: He has taken two terms as a candidate of the RPT, now he will have two more terms as a candidate for the UNIR (T1). This outcome would extend the rule of the Eyadéma dynasty until 2025. In the meantime, there were two coups d’état in Togo - in December 1991 and February 2005 - though elections swiftly followed. Both of them solidified the plotters’ hold on power. Before the 1993 elections, the opposition first failed to agree on a common candidate and then withdrew from the race (Seely 2009: 132-133). In 2005, there was army interference and widespread fraud but the “ECOWAS observers, while acknowledging that there had been some irregularities, stated that these had not been such as to invalidate the result” (Murison 2008: 1205). This endorsement was sufficient to confirm Faure Gnassingbé’s presidency in spite of the fact that the European Union and the US State Department declared the contest as not being free and fair (FIDH 2005; Piot 2010: 44-48; Seely 2006). In Burundi, there have been two alterations via elections (1993 and 2005), two coups d’état (after 1993 elections and in 1996), and a bloody civil war. The coup plotters were eventually forced to give up power due to military and international pressure though they knew they could never win an open competition. It took 12 long years of war before the second post-Cold War multi-party elections were organized. In Zambia, there have been two peaceful changes in government via elections: in 1991 and 2011.

Election boycotts
Togo’s elections are the least trusted and the most boycotted. The scale of army interference and state-sponsored violence in relation to 1998 and 2005 presidential elections far exceeds the ‘tinkering’ observed with the Zambian or the Burundian election process. When probed about the most serious kind of fraud at local

49 Zambia harbours a movement that campaigns for the autonomy of secession of Barotseland.
50 Minor incidents have been reported between the Kabyè and the Kotokoli (iciLome 2013a).
level, the Togolese respondents claimed that the authorities created a parallel set of ballot boxes with false results protocols that were swapped for the real ones (T3, T5, T21). In Burundi, there seems to be little need for manipulation and rigging after ballot papers have been cast into the ballot box. At that moment, the ruling CNDD-FDD is already far ahead of any opposition party, at least in rural areas that determine the overall outcome. In spite of it (or because of it?), the opposition boycotted the second post-conflict elections in 2010. In Zambia, elections are contested as well, fraud suspected, but boycotting elections has been rare.

Private wealth in opposition politics
Given fact that ordinary party members in the three countries are poor and/or unwilling to pay regular membership dues, dynamics of the opposition scene depend, to a significant extent, on politically-minded, wealthy individuals who are economically independent of the ruling party. In Zambia, it is easy to identify such persons instantly among the presidents of opposition parties: Charles Milupi of the ADD, Elias Chipimo of the NAREP, Hakainde Hichilema and Anderson Mazoka of the UPND; there are certainly many others among the members of parliament and elsewhere. As far as Burundi is concerned, an economic paper describes the situation in the following way: “From the mid-1960s until 2005, political power and, to a large extent, economic power, were controlled by a Tutsi-dominated group from the southern province of Bururi” (Nkurunziza, Ndikumana and Nyamoya 2012: 3); despite the former Hutu rebels taking power in 2005, “most members of the traditional elite, particularly those in the private sector, are still better off than other segments of the population. The assets they were able to accumulate over several decades under monolithic regimes are shielding them from the deep poverty that afflicts the majority of Burundians” (Nkurunziza, Ndikumana and Nyamoya 2012: 5). In Togo, the situation is broadly similar. Those with private wealth have either been living abroad as Gilchrist Olympio or Kofi Yamgnane, a French-Togolese politician, or were once members of Eyadéma’s ruling clique such as Edem Kodjo of the CPP, Zariifou Ayéva of the PDR, or Agbéyomé Kodjo of the OBUTS. As the past 23 years have shown, hardly any of them can be considered as a truly opposition figure.

Political culture
Rural political cultures emerged from the interviews as identical for all three countries. Respondents’ typical statements are presented in Table XXX. More elite and more urban political cultures were noticeably different. The Zambian political culture was characterized by pragmatism and self-confidence. Some respondents were able to provide an instant briefing how to build and operate a successful political party (Z23, Z26). For them, a dynamic multi-party politics was about resources, commitment, and strategy. Togo stands at the opposite pole. Piot (2010: 28) deals extensively with a “distinctive Togolese political culture” as a whole. What interests us here is the political culture of an elite that overlaps with popular culture only partially. The Togolese ruling elite is caught in a mixture of paranoia (seeing threats everywhere) (cf. Piot 2010: 35-38) and a double illogicality: a realization that one’s hold on power cannot justified in logical terms while being in need of perpetuating an illogical discourse indefinitely because there is no alternative. That is one of the reasons why the project of UNIR, of a new beginning, offers such a relief to many. The culture of opposition is pervaded by opportunism, frustration, and bitterness combined with a dose of omnipresent paranoia. While opportunism seems to be of an older vintage (Lawrance 2007: 1-6), the opposition’s sense of frustration and bitterness are directly related to the West’s post-Cold War propaganda picturing democracy as a magic bullet to solve any country’s problems where democracy is understood to be a type of clockwork mechanism, not a struggle to create a better world. It leads to a kind of eternal immobility: a refusal to commit oneself fully until political competition is fair and democracy “real”. Investments into opposition unity are half-hearted; there is a perceptible lack of steadiness and decisiveness; instead, emphasis is put on fiery rhetoric, escalation of demands, and spectacle (Seely 2009: 102-108). The Western realpolitik of preferring stability to genuine competition is met by incredulity (Piot 2010: 46-48). The political culture of Burundi resembles more the Togolese rather than the Zambian one. Though the democratic faith is very much present in Burundi, it is limited to urban liberals and certain occupational groups such as teachers, therefore not as widespread as in Togo. In Burundi, the political fault lines derive from the past violence more than anything else. At the same time, most Burundian political parties have succeeded in reaching across the Hutu/Tutsi divide and a degree of pragmatic cooperation has become common.
Rural voters
Burundi has the highest proportion of the population living in rural areas in the world (United Nations 2012). In a country of ten million people, the only large town is the capital Burumbura with 600,000 to 700,000 inhabitants; the second and the third largest towns, Gitega and Ngozi, have about 50,000 inhabitants each (Deslaurier 2010). In spite of the small land area, the rural communities are relatively isolated because the country is hilly, there are few tarred roads, and secondary roads may not be passable during the rainy season. There is little chance that any large-scale industry would develop in Burundi in the near future that would foster rapid urbanization. In comparison, Togo’s economy has been opened to the world via the port of Lomé and Zambia’s mining industry has long-term prospects for growth (African Economic Outlook 2013). There are eight towns with over 50 thousand inhabitants in Togo and some 18 in Zambia; ten Zambian towns have over 100,000 people (Citypopulation.de 2013). At the same time, many of Zambia’s rural communities remain isolated not only because of poor transport infrastructure but also huge distances. Thus while rural/urban divide continues to be relevant in all three countries, its political significance and dynamics differ. In Burundi, the ruling CNDD-FDD can safely rely on rural support. The MDD in Zambia had a similar tendency towards the end of its rule but the rural vote was not sufficient ensure election victory in 2012 (XXX). In Togo, the rural/urban fault line runs differently: the peasants remember Eyadéma’s dictatorship very well and could overcome their parochial interests to vote against his son if governance does not improve and the opposition looks credible to them. There are also signs that the UNIR made gains among urban voters in southern regions in 2013 in comparison to RPT results in 2007 (XXX).

System of participation
Two aspects of the three countries’ legal-bureaucratic framework of political participation are important: voting system and ownership of parliamentary mandates. In Zambia’s simple plurality voting system, the mandates belong to the party. If an MP resigns or is expelled from the party, a by-election is held in that constituency. The former MP can re-contest the seat either on a ticket of another party or as an independent candidate. By-elections are common in Zambia and the expelled MPs often regain their seat via one of the two options. This setting strengthens the power of local political-economic elite to the extent that parties may court members of the elite rather than vice versa. In Burundi, the voting system is proportional and the seat belongs to the party as well. In addition, the most powerful organ of the ruling CNDD-FDD, the so called ‘Council of the Wise’ (le Conseil se Sages), can expel any member of the party without needing an approval of the party congress (IWACU). The seat then passes on the next person on the blocked party list. This framework makes MPs near puppets of the party. In Togo, the voting system is nominally proportional but the mandate belongs to the elected person (the actual proportionality of the system is low because most electoral districts comprise only two to three MP seats). Under some circumstances, such as the UFC split in 2010, the ruling party may try to enforce “false” MP resignations and the seat then passes on the next person on the blocked list (XXX). Still, the Togolese MPs are better shielded from their party than is the case in Burundi.
TABLE 14
BURUNDI, TOGO, AND ZAMBIA: THE RESPONDENTS ON RURAL POLITICAL CULTURE AND POVERTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>People [in rural areas] lack education; they do not understand opposition politics; they think that one gets involved in politics to make money (T20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>The [rural] population has no interest in political parties; their idea of a party is: if you are obedient, you will get money (T7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>The government does not want more educated peasants; the peasant has a local drink and votes the government for the next five years (T33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>The ruling party and the government keep people poor so that they can be more easily manipulated (T14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: fieldnotes

TABLE 15
BURUNDI, TOGO, AND ZAMBIA: HARSHNESS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Measure/scale</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Simple/less/fewer</td>
<td>Complex/more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Simple ethnic map</td>
<td>Complex ethnic map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political violence</td>
<td>Low-conflict polity</td>
<td>Extreme violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social exclusion</td>
<td>No exclusion</td>
<td>Extreme exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political alteration</td>
<td>Socially acceptable</td>
<td>Extremely risky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election boycotts</td>
<td>Hardly any boycotts</td>
<td>Many boycotts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of private wealth in opposition politics</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>Very significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political culture of elites</td>
<td>Business-like</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural factor</td>
<td>Relatively weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party control over MPs</td>
<td>Relatively weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country score</td>
<td>Burundi 2</td>
<td>Burundi 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Togo 0</td>
<td>Togo 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia 7</td>
<td>Zambia 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: text

7.2 Political parties

Political parties

As for political parties proper, a typology of van de Walle and Butler (1999) provides a useful tool for assessing inter-party differences. The typology emphasizes party origin and consists of three classes: ex-single parties, historic parties, and new parties. Fourteen years have passed since the publication of their article and it seems
reasonable to divide the category of new parties into two: society-oriented parties and entrepreneurial parties. The former ones have wider ambitions combing access to state resources and power with policy and governance agendas, the latter ones would be more narrowly focused, mainly on benefits that would accrue to their leadership, and more opportunistic when forming alliances. This typology is applied to the three countries examined and the results are shown in Table XXX.

**TABLE 16**
**BURUNDI, TOGO, AND ZAMBIA: TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL PARTIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ex-single party</th>
<th>Historical parties</th>
<th>New parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Society-oriented parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FNL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>RPT/UNIR</td>
<td>JUVENTO</td>
<td>ANC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ADDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CDPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>ADD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NAREP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UPND</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from van de Walle and Butler (1999)

In Burundi, party competition involves mainly society-oriented parties. All entrepreneurial parties are splinter formations induced by the dominant CNDD-FDD. They present themselves as opposition parties but they are under greater or lesser control of the CNDD-FDD. The former ruling party, the UPRONA, maintains its distinct identity and is not a simple décor of the ruling coalition.

In Togo, parties from all four classes have played an important role. The RPT/UNIR has never lost power apart from two short intermezzos between 1991 and 1995. The UFC has been considered the most radical opposition until its deal with the government in 2010. Various societal parties have put up formidable challenge to the RPT/UNIR, especially the CAR in the mid-1990s and the ANC after 2010. The entrepreneurial formations have left a deep mark on the political scene too. As already mentioned, the then UTD (now CPP) destroyed the opposition unity after the first post-Cold War legislative elections. And the OBUTS is a serious impediment to opposition unity at present.

The situation in Zambia has been more similar to Burundi than to Togo. In the 1990s, after the first political alteration, the main challenge to the MMD came from the ex-single party the UNIP. Only in the 2000s, did the balance of political competition shift squarely to new parties. The entrepreneurial formations have never been
important in Zambia because of the different system of political representation (see above), generally weak party cohesion, and the constantly shifting party – local elite alliances.

The uniqueness of each country becomes even more obvious if we consider the character of the two dominant parties in Burundi and Togo.

The CNDD-FDD representing large sections of the majority social category Hutu and the main victor of the civil war is firmly established all over rural Burundi. The hegemonic position of the party allows it to change the meaning of multi-party competition by presenting the opposition as misguided complainers. By skillfully combining policy achievements with paternalism and demagoguery, it creates a choice-less environment. The more urban setting, the lesser the pressure on the compliance and collusion of independently-minded local elites. The party can afford to lose all urban voters because the pool of rural voters is so huge.

The UNIR in Togo does not resemble any political project known to the author; and the circumstances of its formation seem to reflect the unique history of the country. The party’s origins are tied to several youth organizations that formed in 2009 to support Faure Gnassingbé’s re-election in 2010 (T10). The most important ones were the MSF (Le Mouvement de soutien au président Faure) and NJSPF (La Nouvelle Jeunesse pour le soutien au Président Faure) (Koaci.com 2011; Xinhua 2011). The claim that the UNIR was created upon suggestions of these organizations was confirmed by several informants (T1, T2, T10, T13, T19).\textsuperscript{51} Little is known about the exact circumstances of these organizations’ emergence. It is hard to imagine that they would come into being spontaneously; if nothing else, than for a lack of funding. A member of the UNIR card production team told the author that the marketing of the NJSPF was even more advanced than that of the UNIR: the organization was occasionally handing out computer memory sticks. It supposedly happened to him that a UNIR applicant from the NJSPF asked for a memory stick as a bonus upon obtaining his freshly printed UNIR membership card. The main message upon the UNIR creation - UNIR ≠ RPT – was to say that the UNIR is a non-Kabyè, national party. As much as it may sound like a cheap marketing trick that all opposition respondents ridiculed, it certainly appealed to large sections of the young generation. Right from the start, the rhetoric was carefully coordinated with geographic symbolism. The party could hardly be founded in a more southern town than Atakpamé: from the ethno-regional point of view, the environment would be too hostile. At the same time, it is a conciliatory gesture towards the old generation of the RPT cadres: it is where the RPT was founded as well and it connotes a sort of continuity. The RPT could not obviously be dissolved in Atakpamé and the choice of Blitta was again loaded with symbolism because it is neither northern nor southern town and it is a birthplace of Faure Gnassingbé.\textsuperscript{52} Whatever we may think about election fraud, the election sweep of the UNIR in 2013 in the two southernmost regions is impressive. In the Plateaux region, in terms of the percentage of MPs seats obtained, the UNIR improved on the RPT’s result of 55 % by increasing its share to 88 %; and in the Maritime region, it increased its share of MP seats from 5 % to 28 % (Cour constitutionnelle du Togo 2013; MOE UE au Togo 2007: 76; Psephos.adam-carr.net 2007). Two indicators can be used to compare the RPT and the UNIR: the ethnic diversity of the central committee and the ratio of new and ex-RPT members. As for the latter, this research suggests that there were substantial regional differences in the new/ex-RPT ratio. A UNIR member in Kara estimated that the ratio of new to ex-RPT members was 20 to 80 (or 4 to 1 in favour of the ex-RPT members), while a member of a UNIR focal point in Atakpamé, during an informal discussion, assessed the same ratio as being 80 to 20 (or 4 to 1 in favour of brand new members). Other indirect evidence also supports the view that the UNIR is largely indistinguishable from the RPT in Kara, for example, and has a feel of a new political project (T10) in other towns, such as Atakpamé or Sokodé. Several UNIR members mentioned a possible or existing rift between the older RPT generation and the new cadres (T32, T10, T19, a UNIR focal point member in Atakpamé during an informal conversation). If the rift leads to a formation of a new political party in the future, it could completely change Togo’s political landscape because it would mean a split within

\textsuperscript{51} Two persons also claimed that the formation of the UNIR had been initiated by “the youth from other parties”, i.e. other than the RPT (T36 plus a relative of T36 who was present during most of the interview).

\textsuperscript{52} From the ethno-regional point of view, Blitta is the only bigger town that is not pulled towards the south or the north. It is the exact centre of political gravity of the country.
the Kabyè elite. One informant also mentioned some tension between UNIR members and members of the NJSPF who tend to have a privileged position in the party (T13). It is not clear why the NJSPF has not dissolved when its raison d'être – the establishment of a national, presidential party – materialized. At the time of the fieldwork for this dissertation, the NJSPF was still visible and active even though the UNIR had been in existence for more than six months. It is safe to speculate that this fact has something to do with the organizations' funding and the power struggle within the newly emerging political elites. On the one hand, little has changed: the UNIR is like a herd that leaves the old [RPT] animals behind, a metaphor used by an opposition member to characterize UNIR (T33). On the other hand, such transformation of the former single party 22 years after the first 'pro-democracy' movements hit Africa, is unprecedented and begs the question who initiated the process and how. One year and a half after the dissolution of the RPT, it is still impossible to answer this question with any kind of certainty. There are three possibilities. Firstly, UNIR could be a project of the Kabyè-dominated army. According to this view, the real power-holder in Togo is not President Faure Gnassingbé, but the army. "The RPT/UNIR is a political branch of the army", is how a respondent from the UFC described the situation (T23). A similar view was expressed by a member of the ANC: "The RPT/UNIR rides on the back of the army" (T4). In this sense, Faure Gnassingbé and now the UNIR are the human face of a discreet military regime. Secondly, the UNIR can be a project of Faure Gnassingbé and his closest entourage that is made to look as if it was a spontaneous response to calls by the country's youth. The third possibility is the most interesting. The party can also be viewed as a project of a younger generation of political opportunists of diverse ethno-regional background who have managed to convince the president to launch a nation-wide party and thus breaking the north - south deadlock. They offered multi-ethnic, non-RPT legitimacy to the project and Faure Gnassingbé's continuing presidency. In exchange, the president sacrificed the old RPT generation, and he provided the necessary finances, and let some of the new generation to take parliamentary, executive, and civil service posts. None of these three scenarios rules out the possibility that a professional western consultancy firm was hired to design the transformation including the sequence of steps, organizational details, and/or the marketing.

7.3 Party organization

Overall, party organization in the three countries is quite similar, at least when compared to other sections of this chapter. Most of the differences in party organization are clearly related to the context of party politics in each country.

Membership

Zambia has the most lax rules where party membership resembles a pragmatic, temporary alliance more than anything else. No attempts are made to build digital databases of members. Burundi would lie at the opposite end. Party membership is closely tied to one's personal and group identity. Political transhumance (or party switching) has a moral dimension. One can identify it, for example, in the significance party members attach to party symbols such as the party emblem, party slogan, party pledge (all printed on the membership card), party hand sign and party anthem. The never-ending recruitment campaign of the ruling CNDD-FDD does not have a parallel in the other two countries and is facilitated by the ethnic homogeneity of the country. Togo is unique in its obsession with computer generated membership cards. Prestige for card holders and a demonstration of the party's competence seem to drive the process.

Structure

In Burundi, ruling party penetration in the population is very high all over the territory, while that of the opposition parties is very low. The presence of the opposition parties, besides a small number of strongholds, is limited to the capital. In Togo, party penetration has been uneven both in case of the RPT/UNIR and the opposition due to ethno-regional heterogeneity. Also, the lack of political alternation since 1969 has produced rigid structures that are only now being replaced. Zambia's party structure reflects a different electoral system (to that employed in Burundi and Togo) and a better established system of local government (which has been boycotted by the opposition in Burundi and is non-existent in Togo). Single mandate constituencies are basic
sub-national political units. Here the main building blocks of political parties are “wards” that correspond to electoral districts to fill one seat in a local government council. At middle and upper levels, Zambian political parties contain highly inflated and mostly dysfunctional policy-making structures.

Procedures
In Burundi, the opposition has been, partially or completely, depending on the party, driven underground. There is little or no formal party communication, party representatives meet in secrecy, there is little opposition activity in between elections. In contrast, the ruling CNDD-FDD has put in places a country-wide system of regular written reports. The CNDD-FDD purposefully blurs the distinction between the party and the state. There is an extensive state interference in internal party functioning via the ministry of interior and the judicial system which are ready to use formal deficiencies in the parties’ adherence to their statutes against them. In Togo (and Zambia as well), the party scene has been much more active in between elections. Togolese parties also stand out in their frequent and regular meetings of federation representatives. The fact that the ruling UNIR has existed without a written statute has no parallel in the other two countries. State interference in internal party functioning is limited; and the country has experienced a gradual process of state-party separation. In Zambia, the ruling parties, be it the MMD or the PF, appear to function in a broadly similar way to the opposition. Party statutes play an ambiguous role. On the one hand, they may be blatantly disregarded by the parties’ higher echelons; on the other hand, opposition intra-party environment is more competitive than in Burundi or Togo which means that adherence to formal rules at local level is at least noted if not acted upon.

Supreme organs
In Zambia, a class of professional politicians that often pursue a parallel business career (or vice versa) has emerged since 1990. This is one of the main background characteristics of the central committee members of all the main parties. In Burundi, the field is much more levelled and provincial cadres may be teachers without any additional income. Also, the two main parties, the CNDD-FDD and the FNL, are former rebel movements where the main qualification for a political career was participation in the armed struggle. In Togo, until the death of Eyadéma in 2005, it was proximity to the dictator and his family that determined everything. As far as opposition politics is concerned, there have been few incentives to become an opposition party leader in Togo and Burundi which contrasts with the relatively competitive intra-party environment in Zambia. In Burundi, long-term exile of political leaders has continued to play a significant role since the end of the Cold War. Political exile has played a less prominent role in Togo and is of only marginal importance in Zambia.

Funding
Differences in party funding are enormous across all the parties examined in this dissertation; and such differences have had huge consequences for the shape of multi-party competition. While the abuse of state resources is a constant, private wealth is important in Zambia. On one hand, it enables serious opposition politics, on the other hand it prevents ordinary citizens from pursuing political career. Even though its grip has eased somewhat in recent years, the Gnassingbé dynasty in Togo has used the state as a private asset since 1967. The wealth it has accumulated in this way surpasses anything one can imagine in Zambia or Burundi. Even if deprived of state resources, the Gnassingbé family has had enough wealth to finance country-wide political activities for years. While the Togolese opposition is short of resources, there are signs that it receives some help from its emigrant diaspora. Burundi is another extreme case. There is hardly any private wealth in politics and the opposition lacks funds for even the most basic administrative infrastructure.

7.4 Cohesion

7.4.1 Ruling party cohesion

Even though the ruling party cohesion is always dependent on clientelistic exchanges, there are some variations as well. In Zambia, ethno-linguistic identity may function as a supplementary source of cohesion but
it appears to be weak. As soon as members of the incumbent party start to feel that their positions are threatened, there is a wave of defections, especially in the months before and after the general elections. In Burundi, group identities related to genocide and civil war represent important sources of cohesion in addition to clientelism notwithstanding the enduring legacies of past conflict. In Togo, Kabylé ethnicity coupled with regional north-south consideration has supplemented clientelism as the source of cohesion. While national, cross-ethnic and cross-regional sentiments have played a prominent role in the initial rise of the UNIR in 2012 and 2013, it is doubtful that they would survive if there were deprived of the clientelistic lubrication.

7.4.2 Opposition party cohesion

Sources of opposition party cohesion are much more diverse. In Zambia, there are hardly any. The inability of the parties to hold together is made use of in multi-party competition by actively encouraging defections and co-optation of members and structures. Putting aside the question of individuals, defections of whole party structures have been documented by several observers (Hopkins 2010: 19-22; Larmer and Fraser 2007: 625; LeBas 2011: 215-217). The strategic use and abuse of defections and co-optations is part and parcel of Zambian party-building (NDI/FODEP 2003: 18). This research documented at least one case of MMD structures that were co-opted even though PF grass-root structures had already been in place (Z21, Z26). It is precisely the strategy that contributed to the PF victory over the MMD in 2011. The fostering of UNIP’s disintegration from within as an election strategy of the MMD in 1991 already has been pointed out by LeBas (2011: 216). With some exaggeration, the Zambian multi-party competition of constantly shifting alliances can be called multi-partism with only one political party. Since the first post-Cold War elections in 1991, there have been only two exceptions to this rule. The first one is the PF which survived electoral defeats in 2001, 2005, and 2008, being held together by a belief in an ultimate election victory which eventually materialized in 2011. The combination of a charismatic leader, funding from private health, and the negative motivation to end 20 years of MMD rule was sufficient to create a momentum. The second exception is the UPND which proved in 2001 that it was capable of winning. It has lost all elections ever since, but has nonetheless remained strong. It suggests that the Tonga ethno-linguistic or ethno-regional identity may provide a long-term source of cohesion in case the momentum was, perhaps temporarily, lost (cf. Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010: 63).

In Burundi, it is non-ethnic, non-regional identities that ensures the cohesion of the opposition parties. As explained Chapter XXX, Section XXX, these identities stem from a historical legacy of a rigid hierarchical social structure, social exclusion, mass violence and civil war. The contrasting identities of these core groups are inscribed in the political parties’ evolution and have created a relatively stable but sharp-edged political scene. Given the extreme nature of these fault lines, it is difficult to imagine similarly determined core groups emerging and coalescing around new political parties. All this suggests that newly formed parties and party splinters remain electorally irrelevant. Among the five or so party “doubles” of the FNL, the FRODEBU, and the UPD that were promoted by the ruling CNDD-FDD in recent years, only the FRODEBU Nyakuri wields modest popular support, i.e. 1.36 % in the 2010 communal elections (see TABLE XXX above).

On the surface, Togo fits the stereotype of “African” party politics. Party cohesion seems to have primarily ethno-regional sources. Digging beneath the surface one finds that in fact, the Togolese political predicament is complex. There are two intervening variables: geography (north-south shape of the country combined with an east-west orientation of ethnicities and environments) and the differential impact of colonization as it proceeded northward and eventually created the militarized Kabylé elite that has ruled the country since shortly after independence. These two variables produced an either/or dilemma for the Kabylé (regardless of whether it was perceived or real): stay in absolute control or risk losing everything. In spite of this highly polarized framework, it is notable that the ethno-regional loyalties interfered with opposition cohesion right from the start of the thaw in 1991. Rather than opting for the common sequence “democracy first, multi-partism after”, the opposition fragmented long before the first ever multi-party elections (XXX) (Seely 2009: 54-57).
7.4.3 Entrepreneurial party cohesion

Cohesion of the entrepreneurial parties is, by definition, of a clientelistic nature.

7.5 Linkage

Do parties make effort to maintain and create linkages with their voters in between elections? There are differences between the countries as well as the parties. In Burundi, the ruling CNDD-FDD was highly active during mid-term inter-election period when the fieldwork was conducted. The opposition was fully focussed on its own organizational survival. In Zambia, the fieldwork was conducted during the election campaign period. As for the opposition, it appears the PF was actively linking with voters between 2007 and 2011 while other parties much less so (cf. Larmer and Fraser 2007: 634-635). The ruling MMD certainly worked on maintaining its linkages. It is safe to assume that inner convictions of its representatives and activists started to weaken, especially after the 2008 presidential by-election as the PF kept the momentum and influential MMD figures were switching sides in anticipation of the PF victory in 2011. The loss of passion on the side of party activists inevitably weakens credibility of non-clientelistic linkages. In Togo, the legitimacy of the RPT was close to zero throughout until its dissolution in 2012. During the 1990s and the 2000s, it withdrew from the public space rather than intensified its efforts (cf. Piot 2010: 34-42). It remained active in its Kabyé heartlands (T36). Nation-wide mobilization returned with the launch of the UNIR in 2012. As for the opposition, the violence that accompanied the succession of Faure Gnassingbé in 2005 put an end to open political contestation – people became scared. Though the opposition took part in 2007 legislative and 2010 presidential elections, it started to mobilize only after the UFC split and the CST coalition formed in April 2012. Since June 2012, the CST members have organized a continuous stream of activities and protests. It contrast, the second opposition coalition – the CAR – has remained passive. An attempt to assess the relative significance of the various types of linkage in each country is summarized in Table XXX. While reading the table, one should bear in mind that opposition party penetration in more distant rural areas is low and only the ruling party may be present. Therefore, the people are not choosing between parties and their linkage packages; any linkage will suffice. Also, political parties instigate different types of linkages in urban versus rural areas. The ruling party and the opposition have established different mixtures of linkages. In Togo, there are important ethno-regional variations as well.

TABLE 17
BURUNDI, TOGO, AND ZAMBIA: RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF LINKAGE TYPES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage type</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participatory</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Mostly ruling party linkage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientelistic</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Ruling party linkage in Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity-based</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence-based</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>Ruling party linkage in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethos-based</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Opposition linkage in Togo and Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternalistic</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Ruling party linkage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>Urban linkage in Zambia (Michael Sata)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author
Symbols: 0 absent, + insignificant, ++ possibly significant, +++ significant

7.5.1 Participatory linkage

With one exception, there are no signs that the political parties in the three countries examined have tried to create or cultivate participatory linkages with non-members. The exception is the rather obscure relationship
between the Togolese UNIR and the youth organizations that supposedly initiated its formation and now exist in parallel to it. If this linkage is indeed present, its precise nature is unclear. As far as party members’ political participation is concerned, many similarities across Burundi, Togo and Zambia have prevailed over time. As elsewhere in the world, political parties attract people who are interested in public affairs, either on their own or because of their family background. Top-down decision making seemed to characterize most parties. Only one party, the Burundian MSD, was found to have a locally controlled process of nominating general election candidates without any interference by a central committee. Two parties, the Togolese UNIR and the Zambian NAREP appealed explicitly to the young generation with the intention to harness its political talents and, supposedly, to channel its political preferences.

### 7.5.2 Programmatic linkage

Programmatic linkage had the same general characteristics in the three countries. Above all, it was not considered very important. Several informants complained that they would like to do “issue-based” politics (as opposed to clientelistic one) but the population was not interested. Secondly, programmes were considered similar across all parties within each country. Third, putting “the country’s programme” in practice was perceived to be a greater problem than the programme itself. On the other hand, the national programme debate had a distinct tendency in each country. In Zambia, the policies and programme items mentioned by party representatives were by far the most specific. They concerned personal income tax, a windfall tax on mining companies, decentralization, constitutional questions, adherence to labour laws by foreign investors, etc. (cf. Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010: 64-68). Simultaneously, the gap between expert and lay understanding of policy issues was the widest; the difference consisted in the sophistication the programmatic knowledge of the politicians and urban dwellers rather than exceptionally crude ideas on the side of poor peasants which was the same in all three countries. In Zambia, a version of the left-right political spectrum came out the most clearly during the fieldwork and literature review. The right was implementing policies that brought benefits to multinational companies rather than communities; the left vice versa. The Zambian NAREP was also the only party studied which had a truly distinct long-term vision of the society and its development. No other similar manifesto was encountered in any other party or country. In Burundi, tangible results of the CNDD-FDD governance were easy to notice all over the country, mostly in terms of infrastructure and the construction of schools. The population appreciated them and the opposition’s discourse focused almost exclusively on criticizing government corruption and disrespect for human rights rather than providing any kind of positive programmatic alternative. In Togo, the absence of the state at all levels was palpable (cf. Piot 2010: 34-42). The “upgraded” ruling party had no explicit programme whatsoever and could not claim heritage of policy achievements of its predecessor because there were hardly any. Similar to Burundi, the Togolese opposition emphasized human rights, rule of law, and social policies that would alleviate the hardship of the poor majority. The call for equal opportunities and equitable sharing of the country’s wealth was the strongest in Togo (followed by Zambia), in response to the decades of nepotism and cronyism of the ruling dynasty. The programmatic linkage in Togo was by far the least important out of the three cases. The key issues at stake were the very basic parameters of a just and sustainable political order.

### 7.5.3 Clientelistic linkage

Following Osei’s (2012: 86-92) terminology of clientelism, vote-buying featured prominently in all three countries and shared similar characteristics. Clientelism proper (individual patron, individual client) and patronage (individual patron, collective client) varied from one country to another. In Burundi, the mass character of the ruling CNDD-FDD blurred the distinction between intra-party and extra-party linkages. As mentioned above, there has been an intentional merging of the party and the state, especially in the countryside, the state providing services under the banner of the party. The unchallenged position of the CNDD-FDD in rural areas has created a choice-less environment and long-term clientelistic and patronage relationships. The relationship between the educated elite (les intellectuels) and the CNDD-FDD is complex. The CNDD-FDD put pressure on state job holders (mostly civil servants and teachers) to join its ranks or at
least to pay regular membership dues. At the same time, the state seemed to tolerate involvement of ‘les intellectuels’ in opposition parties as long as their activities were not public and remained limited to urban areas. This phenomenon may be explained by the traditional hierarchical nature of Burundian society: members of the tiny elite of ‘les intellectuels’, be they in the CNDD-FDD or the opposition, tended to respect each other’s agendas rather than risking a dangerous confrontation. In Togo, clientelistic linkages appear to be maintained via ethno-regional networks. Over the years, the Kabyè lead ruling clique have managed to split ethno-regional elites into pro-reform and anti-reform wings, the latter colluding with the dictatorship. While clientelistic allocation of jobs and job promotions were mentioned by both Togolese and Burundian respondents, elite co-option (the so called ‘sale of consciousness’, see Section XXX fn. XXX) was perceived to be a serious problem only in Togo. Two factors seem to be at work. Firstly, after 38 years of dictatorship and 8 years of post-dictatorial drift, Togo has remained predominantly a ‘black and white’ environment. Switching to the UNIR/RPT has more serious moral connotations than an analogical act in Burundi. Secondly, in material terms, there seem to be much more to gain by changing sides than in Burundi, for example. But clientelism may take much more innocent-looking forms as well. A good case in point are the free and fancy membership cards. In Zambia, political behaviour is much more instrumental, straightforward, and business-like. People go where the money is. Most reward-based party-voter transactions have no long-term consequences such as vote-buying or upfront payments for other kinds of services (cf. Gyimah-Boadi 2007: 25; Hansen 2010). The preferential allocation of state jobs and promotions to loyal party members, the family, or cronies was not seen as a serious issue. On the other hand, the winning party may punish opposition constituencies by depriving them of funds and vice versa (patronage) (cf. Larmer and Fraser 2007: 635). This would not be possible multi-mandate electoral districts in Burundi and only partly in Togo.

7.5.4 Coercive linkage

Several mechanisms of coercive linkage were ascertained in Burundi but their overall significance is unclear. The probability that this kind of linkage plays an important role is low in Togo and negligible in Zambia. Distant rural areas and special groups such as armed forces may be vulnerable. While there may be pressures and threats, people have the choice to opt out of politics when it becomes too dangerous.

7.5.5 Governance linkage

Governance linkage differs from other types of linkage in that it is largely created and maintained implicitly via the manipulation of symbols. It enables, arguably, the most potent party-voter connections.

Identity-based linkage

Many kinds of group identities are relevant in party politics in the three countries. They are used and abused in widely varied ways. In Zambia, these identities have ethno-linguistic and/or ethno-regional basis and more often than not they are overruled by other factors. For example, in spite of the unresolved Barotseland issue, there has never been a strong Lozi-dominated political party. The ADD has not become an ethnic party either. The opposition UPND is currently the only important formation which is deeply rooted in a particular ethno-regional identity. In Togo, (one is inclined to say) “stereotypical” ethno-regional identities are critical to the country’s political landscape. They are the main cause of the continuing fragmentation of the party scene. In Burundi, a completely different set of identities is at work. As elaborated above, they derive from the caste-like social categorization Hutu/Tutsi, a hierarchical social structure, mass violence, legacy of an armed struggle, etc. They appear to provide the party scene, at least for the time-being, with a finite number of politically active core groups that fish for like-minded voters.

Competence-based linkage

It is unclear whether these practices are simply considered natural or there is no need to be bothered because there are realistic alternatives such as working in the private sector.
Manifesting competence was one of the most important communication strategies of the Zambian PF from 2001 until its election victory in 2011. It presented its leaders as more educated, more experienced, more dynamic, more “professional”. In Burundi, competence linkage is one of the main assets of the ruling CNDD-FDD: the party guarantees peace and a reasonable level of security, it has a record of tangible improvements to the country’s infrastructure and education sector, it is highly skilled in coordinating and organizing large-scale rallies and other events, etc. In Togo, competence is in short supply on all sides. It is mainly communicated via “organizational capabilities” of the political parties themselves: the way they interact with their members and supporters (how and what kind of membership cards they distribute, the offices they have, the equipment they possess, the set-up of their rallies and other public activities).

Ethos-based
Party ethos is important in all three countries. In Togo, where memories of the dictatorship are still fresh, it is solely the opposition who claim the moral high-ground and deploy when linking with their voters. In Zambia, the ethos of the MMD was destroyed by corruption scandals and misappropriation of state resources which enable the pre-2011 opposition to make strategic use of its own “clean” image. In Burundi, both the ruling party and the opposition deploy an ethos-based linkage. As in Togo, the Burundian opposition criticizes governmental corruption and a poor human rights record. But the ruling CNDD-FDD claims ethos of the victor of the civil war: it was CNDD-FDD fighters who “spilled blood” to end decades of Hutu exclusion.

Paternalistic
Paternalistic linkage is, to a larger or small extent, used by all dominant parties to placate and entertain the population, especially the less urbanized and less sophisticated in “high culture”. This particular party – voter linkage is created and maintained via the organization of seemingly non-political social events such as sports competitions, art festivals, and training programmes of all sorts. This linkage is the strongest in Burundi and the country’s president, Nkurunziza, is a master of using paternalism for his own ends. His visits to poor villages where he washes the peasants’ feet and plants trees with them has become almost legendary (East African 2011).

Populist
Populist linkage has been used only in Zambia and played a major role in the PF rise to power. They are Michael Sata on the one side, and the poor of the largest cities irrespective of ethnic background on the other side, who are linked in this way. The populist linkage has been absent in Burundi and Togo, though for different reasons. Burundi is too rural and in Togo, the largest towns are located within the Ewe ethno-linguistic domain where and identity-based politics prevails.

7.5.6 Comparison with existing literature

Osei, Resnick, Cheesman & Hinfelaar, Larmer & Frazer, Foucher, Hansen, Ngomba, Toulabor

7.6 Summary

XXX

8 THEORIZING CROSS-COUNTRY SIMILARITY

8.1 Cohesion

In the hostile operating environment, opposition parties’ are constantly exposed to a wide range of sugar and stick measures. LeBas (2011: 25) is sceptical about the capability of sub-Saharan parties in general to maintain strength and stability over longer periods of time: “they may be able to mobilize mass constituencies and even win elections, but they are likely to, eventually, fall prey to the collapse of mobilization or the fragmentation of
the party at the elite level”. It seems that sooner or later, every cross-ethnic party fragments to the point of becoming electorally irrelevant, strikes a deal with ruling party, falls back on its ethnic (ethno-regional, ethno-linguistic, and/or ethno-religious base), or keeps functioning as a clientelist formation only.

What is the added value of introducing our concept of cohesion in this equation? The argument builds on Manning’s (2005: 708) article on African party systems after the third wave of democratization in which she claims that “party systems in many African countries are built on quite a different foundation from the one that undergirds both advanced industrial democracies and the theories about party systems generated by their experience”. A more extensive citation from the article is necessary to make the point clear.

Universal pathway of modernization:
“[M]uch of today’s theorizing on regime transition, and especially on parties and civil society, draws heavily on assumptions from the literature on the political development and modernization of the 1950s and 1960s” (2005: 717). (XXX Huntington footnote)

Western socio-political cleavages and political party formation:
“[M]odernization theory rests on the assumption that parties will develop in response to similar stimuli in every country – primarily, socio-economic development. In the West, parties were the by-products of the Industrial Revolution and attendant social and political mobilization, and they reflect the social cleavages generated by this mobilization. The momentum comes from the bottom up; party organizations are devices for aggregating and transmitting societal demands” (2005: 718).

Sub-Saharan socio-political cleavages (ethnicity and religion) and political party formation:
“Both in the first period of multiparty politics in Africa immediately after independence, and in the ‘second independence’ in the 1990s, parties often grew not out of socio-economic cleavages or struggles over the nature of state authority, but out of elites’ urgent need for electoral vehicles which would allow them to compete in the newly devised rules of the political game” (2005: 715).

Let us consider the terms that are the closest to our concept of cohesion, namely institutionalization and LeBas’ writing on “strong opposition parties”. Party institutionalisation as discussed by Randall and Svåsand (2002a) and later elaborated and operationalized by Basedau and Stroh (2008) is firmly rooted in the literature on political development and modernization. The way they employ the term differs substantially what we mean by cohesion. LeBas addresses some of our concerns when she tries to define general characteristics of a “strong opposition party” in the sub-Saharan context (2011: 23-28). She is well aware of the hostile operating environment and develops a convincing model of how such a party may arise. However, she primarily deals with party systems and the conditions conducive to increasing vertical accountability; in other words, her primary focus is “democracy”. She is mainly interested in the opposition parties as long as they are strong and capable to achieve political turnover. Panebianco’s (1988: 49) definition of institutionalization (“the way the organization solidifies”) comes the closest to our preoccupation with cohesion. Panebianco’s (1988: 54) institutionalization is predicated upon the “formation of an internal incentive system” which consists in distributing selective incentives to the organization’s leaders and collective incentives of identity to the organization’s activists and supporters. According to Panebianco (1988: 54),

“[T]he consolidation of an incentive system - comprising both selective and collective incentives – is thus very much tied to institutionalization: if such a system doesn’t consolidate, institutionalization doesn’t take place, and the organization cannot guarantee its own survival”.

Obviously, Panebianco does not take into account the extremely hostile operating environment that political parties face in sub-Saharan Africa. The choice is not between having nothing or benefitting from incentives. The choice is between very many disincentives and very few incentives. In addition, the choice is long-term, potentially life-long. This is where party cohesion steps in. It has the following features:
(1) It is the "glue" or "magnetic field" that enables the party elite and activists to withstand the pressures of the hostile operating environment; it is the most fundamental asset of the party as organization that enables it to keep functioning.

(2) It is a general term that is tied neither to modernization nor to democratization. Whether political alteration in a given country is feasible or not, whether it may lead to better governance or not, multi-party politics is to stay and the opposition parties as well. Our task is to explain their behaviour as political actors.

By all accounts, it would seem that the sources of party cohesion in sub-Saharan Africa will be either ethnic (ethno-regional, ethno-regional, ethno-religious), clientelist, or derived from the model of LeBas (2011). Also, it would seem that multi-party competition cannot work without cohesion because alteration would never happen. This dissertation suggests otherwise. There seem to be more solutions to the cohesion problem.

In Zimbabwe, as described by LeBas (2011), the cohesion problem was resolved via the creation of moral and identity barriers between political parties that were achieved by intentional polarization of party landscape and continuous mobilization of party supporters though it has not led to political turnover. This mechanism presupposes a cross-ethnic social network such as the trade union movement. These networks are in short supply in sub-Saharan Africa; and therefore Zimbabwe could be a unique case.

In Zambia, the opposition parties have been weak by LeBas' (2011) criteria, mere temporary alliances of constituency elites and various blocks of voters. Though ethnic (mainly ethno-linguistic) loyalties have played a role in party formation, they can be overcome. In spite of the near absence of cohesion, there have been two political turnovers.

In Burundi, major parties (including the ruling one) draw on several strong source of cohesion: (1) history of genocide, (2) legacy of armed struggle, (3) caste-like social differentiation Hutu/Tutsi, and (4) a combination of social hierarchy and liberal democratic faith. Only one important party – UPRONA – relies exclusively on ethnic-like (caste-like) loyalty. The strong cohesion has enabled the opposition parties to survive in the face of extreme adversity.

Out of the four countries considered in this section, only Togo, to a large extent, complies with Manning’s (2005: 722) expectation regarding the role of African elites in party formation in they “capitalize effectively on existing social cleavages – particularly ethnic, regional, linguistic or religious lines – to gain competitive advantages”. The main source of cohesion is ethno-regional. But even in Togo the picture is more complicated: UNIR, the reformed party of the dictator, has been gaining ground thanks to delicate geographic balancing in addition to the ethnically-based and clientelist incentives/intra-party linkages.

The initial general hypothesis of this project, that the sub-Saharan political parties are elite clientelist creations can be safely refuted. But the party elites are not always held together by ethnicity either. The sources of party cohesion are more varied. They can rely on complex non-ethnic identities as is the case of some political parties in Burundi. Though it is too early to make any conclusions about it, the case of UNIR in Togo suggests that ethnic and clientelist cohesion may combine with a process of geographic balancing of competing political forces. In addition, Zambia shows us that cohesion is not even necessary for a meaningful multi-party competition and political turnover.

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54 The ethnic sources of cohesion equate to Panebianco’s (1988) collective incentives of identity. The clientelist sources of cohesion do not seem to be considered by Panebianco. While selective, they concern activists and supporters. In case of ruling parties, they may actually replace the collective ones. There seem to be no role for Panebianco’s (1988) provision of selective incentives for leaders because the parties hardly collect any membership dues; very often it is the leaders who finance the parties. In case of ruling parties, these “incentives” would not come from the party but from the captured state.

55 The Zimbabwean opposition MDC has been “strong” for 13 years by now. It is questionable whether the increase in vertical accountability resulted in better governance of the country.
8.2 Linkage

Scholars of African politics have noted for some time that the parties don’t form around policy agendas that follow from specific ideologies (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 251; Ottaway 1999: 311; van de Walle and Butler 1999: 23). According to Erdmann (2007: 40), "most of the parties do not have an ideology and programme that differentiate them from one another and give their members, supporters and voters a clear value system on the basis of which to judge what happens in politics". This dissertation offers a different interpretation of the same phenomenon. Anybody who has witnessed an election campaign in sub-Saharan Africa is familiar with the following picture that comes from the 1996 municipal elections in Cameroon:

"... when interviewed or when giving speeches, all politicians [from different parties] claimed to want improved health facilities, education and orderly marketplaces. They all wanted drinking water and electricity ... All professed to want to provide paved roads, telephone lines into nearby villages, the streets to be cleaned and athletic facilities built for adolescents. In short, they wanted ‘development’" (Hansen 2010: 433).

The time lag since 1996 makes no difference; the author observed several election rallies in 2010 and 2011 (especially in Burundi but also in Zambia, Togo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) and apart from the promises of more telephone lines the message was essentially the same as described by Hansen (2010). The research interviews confirm the same picture. The programme consisted of the provision of modern infrastructure in terms of water, electricity, sewage, roads, hospitals, schools, telecommunication networks, etc.

Instead of subscribing to the view that sub-Saharan party politics is devoid of ideologies, this dissertation argues the opposite: ideology is very much present but it is only one across the board, namely "development". Development in terms of "classic" modern infrastructure is perceived by the population not as one policy issue among many, but as the essence and the ultimate goal of politics, the 'purpose' of both the politicians and the state. Development in this sense easily fulfils Gerring's (1997: 979-986) criteria (namely coherence and political orientation) of ideology.

Why has political party ideology not taken on more diverse forms in contemporary (post-Cold War) sub-Saharan Africa? This is a complex question where four broad lines of reasoning may be proposed that make no claim to provide a definitive answer:

(1) The political parties are constrained a particular model of the national economy. Manning (2005: 715-716) puts this explanation in the following words: "The role of ideology in party formation and competition tends to be weak in African third-wave democracies, not least because, with the advent of structural adjustment and high aid dependency, all political contenders are constrained by the same economic model and policy parameters".

(2) Weak relationship between political parties and alternative ideologies in general. Thomson's (2010: 32-59) introductory text uses nationalism as the starting point and discusses four “shades” of it: African socialism, scientific socialism, populism, and state capitalism. These ideologies were specific to the pre- and post-independence period and the context of the Cold War. Another possibility is trying to make use of cleavage theory to explain the emergence of individual political parties and they ways they got (or have not got) intertwined with existing ideologies (Randall 2001). Historically, such bonds did occasionally develop. In his political biography of Harry Nkumbula (1916/17 - 1983), President of the African National Congress party in Zambia, Macola (2010: 6, original emphasis) argues that “ideology does matter and that the defense of material interests and the “politics of the belly” are not necessarily the most powerful forces in shaping the choices of African voters". His remark points to a dichotomy between two half-hidden ideological tendencies that exist at least in some African countries. They may be rooted in a particular ethno-regional ethos or emerge from the interaction between this ethos and a strong political personality. They may potentially lose their ethnic connotation and spread nation-wide. On the one hand, there is a more liberal, entrepreneurial outlook, on the other hand, more redistributive, "social-democratic" one. Macola (2010) describes this phenomenon in Zambia and Osei (2012: 264) notes broadly similar clusters in Ghana; the
The author came across some sign that the Kotokoli may carry the entrepreneurial ethos in Togo. Keeping these cases in mind, it seems that, for the majority of parties, ideologies, whether indigenous or imported, apart from development, play a minor role in the way they link with their voters.

(3) Low salience of alternative cross-ethnic ideologies in the population in general. "African nationalism was very much a state-defined and state-led phenomenon", Thomson (2010: 49) writes. They were not only imposed from above, the Cold War era nationalisms failed in terms of socio-economic development of the respective countries. They were replaced by a genuine, deeply internalized ideology of development.

(4) Low demand for alternatives. The population is constantly confronted with glaring inadequacy or absence of infrastructure. At the same time, via television, internet, and accounts of the diaspora, people are bombarded by images of perfectly functioning Western infrastructure.

A few additional remarks are needed to circumscribe the argument. As noted above, some party representatives were able to provide rather nuanced programmes and place their party on the left – right continuum. "We have tried to talk issues ... but it [politics] always returns to personalities", complained a respondent from the ADD in Zambia (Z14). The fieldwork showed that in Zambia and Togo there are party elites that adhere to recognizable ideologies but they fail to instil them in the voters and thus they are of little use for them in election campaigning beyond a narrow circle of core supporters.

Cheeseman and Hinfelaar’s (2010: 62) claim that the Zambian experience preceding the 2008 presidential elections was "an important corrective to the assumption that African politics is ‘devoid of ideology’” deserves a comment as well. The fieldwork conducted in 2011 support their observation that policy issues are important in Zambian party competition. It is also possible that the process of increasing polarization à la LeBas is at work. But the author thinks it is somewhat premature to call such trading of issues “ideology”. Many of the policy stances are ad hoc, opportunistic, and populist attacks. Especially their ad hoc character goes against Gerring’s minimal definition of ideology as a coherent set of ideas (Gerring 1997: 979-981).

Lastly, in Burundi and Togo, the author observed one ideology that is parallel to development, namely democracy. Although we have emphasised its religious-like features in Burundi, democracy can be understood as an ideology too. The opposition employs it both as a programme and an ethos. In the former sense, it concerns the rule of law, separation of powers, horizontal accountability, and other procedural matters. Democracy thus interpreted constitutes the most important programmatic statement of the opposition in Togo.

If we accept the dominance of development as ideology in sub-Saharan Africa (keeping in mind the above mentioned qualifications), the question arises of why it has escaped wider attention as such, why has it been invisible. In our opinion, local observers fail to see it precisely because it is so dominant and shared across political parties and social groups. If a phenomenon cannot be contrasted with different phenomenon of the same class, one fails to notice it. As far as Western scholars are concerned, ethno-centrism is to blame. For them, “ideology” simply means "Western ideology”. If there is none, ideology as such must be absent.

The fieldwork experience clearly shows that party strategists know very well why they organize their campaigns the way they do. Similarly, voters carefully select who to vote for. We face a paradox. While ideology is as important in sub-Saharan Africa party politics as elsewhere, it does not differentiate between parties because there is only one ideology and it is shared by all parties. If ideology is the same across the board, the parties have to use other means to distinguish themselves. For this reason, we need a more elaborate classification of linkage.

Table XXX below shows the extended classification. The first two columns of the table have the same content as Table XXX in the theoretical introduction outlined earlier in this dissertation in Chapter XXX. The naming of linkage types and their grouping derives from the types of appeal – "reasons for citizens to offer their support to a party or politician" (Barr 2009: 31).
TABLE 18
CLASSIFICATION OF LINKAGE: BACKGROUND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage type</th>
<th>Appeal / control</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participatory</td>
<td>We will enable your political participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>We will implement our programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We will ensure your views will be taken into account</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientelistic</td>
<td>We will reward you if you support us</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>We will coerce you if you do not comply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Identity-based</td>
<td>We will govern well because we share your identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competence-based</td>
<td>We will govern well because we are competent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethos-based</td>
<td>We will govern well because we are moral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paternalistic</td>
<td>We will govern well because we care about people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Populist</td>
<td>I will shatter the establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>We will free you from oppression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>We will attend to your views via our patrons' candidates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author, see text for Comments column

Participatory, clientelistic, coercive, revolutionary, and market linkage types correspond to Lawson’s (1980a; 2010), Kitschelt’s (2000) and Kitschelt and Kselman’s (2010) definitions (see Chapter XXX, Section XXX). The programmatic linkage combines the programmatic linkage of Kitschelt (appeal: We will implement our programme) with the policy-responsive linkage of Lawson (appeal: We will ensure your views will be taken into account) (see also Tables XXX and XXX above). Governance linkage is a completely new category which includes five sub-types of linkage. Lawson does not consider this category at all though it is not clear why. Kitschelt (2000: 845) subsumes all of these linkages in what he calls “charismatic linkage” or “affective linkage” (Kitschelt and Kselman 2010: 6). He is not interested in the category because it falls outside his purview of “democratic linkage”. In our classification, the term “governance linkage” refers to a general appeal about the quality of governance.

(1) Identity-based. This linkage, under different names, has been thoroughly studied. In the context of this dissertation, we should stress that by the term “identity” we mean any group identity, not necessarily ethnic.

(2) Competence-based. This linkage is well known under the label of “valence appeals” (Bleck and van de Walle 2011; Bleck and van de Walle 2012).

(3) Ethos-based. This linkage can be traced to Drucker’s (1979) distinction between party ideology as doctrine and party ideology as ethos: “what an earlier age might have called the spirit of the party; its traditions and habits, its feel” (Drucker’s 1991 book chapter cited by Ware 1996: 20-21). It concern broadly conceived and long-standing values that the party adheres to.

(4) Paternalistic. The author did not find any referent for this linkage in literature. It is best observed in Burundi. The setting is poverty, usually rural, dependency, demagoguery, the voter – party connection is strongly hierarchical in all senses of the word. This linkage is extensively used by President Nkurunziza. It goes directly against the citizenship principle. It thrives on the inequality of the voter/party position. Reverence may be the dominant emotion on the side of the voter. A ruling party would be more probable to rely on this linkage but, in principle, any party could use it.

(5) Populist. The author used Barr’s (2009: 38-43) conceptualization of this type of linkage. In contrast to Resnick (2012: 1358), this approach treats the question of charisma separately.

The linkage typology presented above is an analytic research tool. It is not based on folk categories. Though party strategists differentiate between different linkage types, their own classification is simple. They tend to merge some linkages into bundles. For example, an appeal by the Burundian ruling CNDD-FDD “We spilled our
blood for you” is a combination of ethos-based and identity-based linkage (we = Hutu, spilled our blood = moral claim). Similarly, the fancy membership cards of the UNIR in Togo interweave competence and clientelism. Gift-giving during election campaigns is an example of a highly multifaceted package. Depending on the context in which it is used, it may be interpreted as a reward and/or sign of competence and/or proper behaviour (ethos) and/or paternalism (cf. Hansen 2010). While it may be, at times, difficult to disentangle the package and to evaluate relative significance of its components, the exercise brings additional insights into the way the parties behave and why. The research interviews revealed only one kind of distinct appeal/linkage that does not fit easily in the above indicated scheme and we mention it here in order to record the full picture. The linkage was specific to the Togo’s UNIR and its appeal could be stated as “If we are not allowed to continue to rule, the country will descend into chaos and violence”. The appeal carried considerable weight and was related to the particular history of the country. It could be viewed as a variant of the competence linkage, but the fact that it is coined in negative terms, sets it apart; therefore, this apparently unique linkage can be called “negative”.

As for the structure of the linkage system as formulated by Poguntke (2002) (see Table XXX above), the fieldwork confirmed that his scheme is useful and can be applied in the sub-Saharan region without modifications. While the dissertation focusses on the appeal – linkage domain, basic overview of the Poguntke’s (2002) linkage channels can be provided.

1. Individualized politician – voter exchanges were observed in all three countries, mostly face-to-face or via radio broadcasts.
2. Rank-and-file party membership was involved in linkage creation and maintenance in all three countries.
3. Political parties had youth and women’s wings in all three countries.
4. Human rights organizations played important role in Togo’s CST coalition. Youth organizations were directly involved in the creation and election campaign of the Togo’s UNIR. Officially, these organizations were independent of the party. The research interviews suggested that their relationship to the party was more intimate but its precise nature could not be ascertained.

To take into account Kitschelt’s (2000), Kitschelt and Kselman’s (2010) and Resnick’s (2012) treatment of charisma and the general characteristics of political campaigning in the three countries examined, it is useful to further refine the analytic tools for the study of linkage by distinguishing between linkage and the genre in which it is enacted. This distinction takes us from the rather abstract analytical level to the daily, directly observable practice. There is infinite number of genres in which linkage can be played out. More often than not, these genres employ visual symbols, gestures, language figures, songs, theatre, cultural stereotypes, charisma, humour, etc. (cf. Hansen 2010). These performances combine indigenous and global elements, the explicit and the symbolic, ritual and spontaneity, modern technology and intuition, etc.; they form the richness of party politics.

"[I]f there is no sharp ideological divide, there are certainly longstanding differences of political style”, says Nugent (2007: 260) about Ghanaian political parties. This dissertation attempts to unpack this “political style” and identify the logic that underlies its creation and maintenance. The style is only one manifestation of underlying party – voter interactive connections or linkages. Apart from human and financial resources, the linkages are the most important asset that the parties possess and carefully cultivate. The mastery of party politics in sub-Saharan Africa consists, to a large extent, in the strategic use and skilful blending of various non-programmatic linkages and the genres in which they are expressed to achieve the maximum effect with minimum resources. The spectacle-like nature of party politics has been remarked by many scholars. For example, referring to election campaigning, Gyimah-Boadi (2007: 27) writes that "parties and candidates focus on personalities, symbols and obscurantist heritage and platforms largely because they lack policy or programmatic vision". Rather than casting them in pejorative terms, this dissertation offers analytic tool for the study these phenomena and re-interprets the seemingly light-hearted activities as part and parcel of tough political competition. Transplanting liberal multi-partism to sub-Saharan Africa brings some unexpected consequences. The emphasis on the proximity-based interaction and the impossibility to use ideology to differentiate oneself from competitors leads to a highly creative political game that has not been witnessed in
Western countries for generations.⁵⁶

8.3 Comparative framework

Let us list again the cornerstones of the comparative framework that was formulated in the theoretical introduction outlined earlier in Chapter XXX, Section XXX:

1. Incumbent/opposition disparity
2. High stakes of politics
3. Hostile operating environment
4. One ideology
5. Diversity of linkage
6. Ruling party strategies
7. Opposition strategies

As noted earlier, this framework for analysis is too wide-ranging to be treated as a hypothesis that the evidence presented in this dissertation would be able to prove or falsify. The more general building blocks of the framework have been studied by many scholars; the more specific themes - such as ideology and linkage – have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. This section aims to buttress the last two elements of the framework - ruling party and opposition strategies – and brief comments will be made about the core theme of the high stakes nature of politics in Burundi, Togo and Zambia.

8.3.1 Ruling and opposition party strategies

The greater the diversity and strength of linkage are, the better for the party. While the fieldwork was too short to assess the relative strength of linkage in a truly systematic and detailed manner, it provided enough material to assess the presence or absence of linkage types for the incumbent and the opposition in the three countries. The diversity of linkage is summarized in Table XXX.

⁵⁶ See O’Gorman (1992) for election campaign rituals, ceremonies, and performances in the 18th and 19th centuries England.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage type</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ruling</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Ruling</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientelistic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity-based</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence-based</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethos-based</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternalistic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7 (+)</td>
<td>3 (+)</td>
<td>7 (+)</td>
<td>4 (+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author
Symbols:
0 = not used because of choice or the lack of appeal
(-) = not used because of the hostile operating environment
(+)) = active
(?) = unknown

Without adding the relative strength of each linkage the results are very approximate. Nevertheless, the ratio of linkage diversity between the incumbent and the opposition corresponds to empirical reality: the chances of alteration are the highest in Zambia and the lowest in Burundi. As for Burundi, we should notice the active ethos-based linkage of the ruling party which is, in addition, very strong. In Togo, while the competence-based linkage of the ruling party is active, it is very weak. Considering the absence of the ethos-based linkage and the fact that the identity-based linkage is mainly Kabyè-related, the ruling UNIR governance linkage is quite thin. In Zambia, the match is closely fought. The question remains as to how long Michael Sata will be able to profit from his populist linkage when he is now an integral part of the “establishment”. For Burundi, there is also congruence between the low number of active linkages pursued by the opposition and the framework’s prediction that the parties whose cohesion is put to test will be forced to scale down its linkage activities. On the other hand, the largely symbolic language of non-programmatic linkages means that inventiveness can outweigh many of the opposition’s disadvantages as the PF proved in Zambia in 2011 or the PDS in Senegal in 2000 (Foucher 2007).

Due the prevalence of proximity-based campaigning, the framework predicts high pressure on the creation of party structures. Having “people on the ground” is one of the key factors underpinning election victory (XXX it may not apply under all circumstances – Foucher). The exploratory fieldwork was not designed to table the spatial dynamics of party structures depending on the election cycle, parties’ funding, sources of cohesion, and other variables. Also, a comparison with countries where political parties do not rely so much on proximity-based campaigning would be useful. Only some very basic tendencies can be summarized here.

In Zambia, the then ruling MMD seemed to have well established structures. The opposition PF went through an exponential rise in the number of segments and hierarchical levels. While the process of structures’ multiplication picked up speed in the months and weeks preceding the election date in September 2011, it had been going on at a lower rate for one or two years already, depending on the area. Interestingly, the establishment of party structures was a mixture of spontaneous activity on the ground and coordination by constituency elites. The key question, whether the currently ruling PF will be able to maintain and expand its socio-political structures may only be answered with a new research trip. Similarly, the framework predicts the
MMD structures to weaken, disintegrate, or switch sides. The process should lay bare the party's sources of cohesion which have been masked by clientelist intra-party linkages and incentives. Answering this question awaits further research as well.

In Burundi, in spite of the mid-term period, the ruling CNDD-FDD was relentlessly expanding and solidifying its structures (including physical construction of party offices) as the framework predicts. The opposition was struggling to maintain and/or renew functional leadership structures with the view of the 2015 election campaign. Its cohesion was being tested to the limits.

In Togo, the UNIR and the ANC were trying to penetrate each other's ethno-regional territory. The UNIR's renewed, hand-picked structures were trying to attract urban youth in the southern Maritime and Plateaux regions. The ANC was trying to penetrate northern urban centres and adjacent areas. Other parties' structures were either in decline or functioning in their ethno-regional strongholds only. Mass mobilization and growth of structures is set to remain high until the watershed presidential election of 2015.

The fieldwork confirmed that the opposition has great difficulties to penetrate rural areas in all three countries. The reasons are multiple, including the lack of human and financial resources and the fact that the rural operating environment is generally more hostile. In Togo, ethnicity may facilitate rural penetration in some areas and be an additional obstacle in others. In Burundi, the wide gap between urban and rural political cultures can make opposition politics incomprehensible outside the capital and provincial towns. Especially, the MMD in Zambia and the CNDD-FDD in Burundi are predominantly rural parties and the latter one at least makes long-term conscious effort to immerse itself in this social group.

8.3.2 High stakes of politics

The final comments of this section concern the high stakes of politics. In both Burundi and Togo, the research interviews provided signs that the CNDD-FDD and the UNIR elites were not even considering they would cede power to a competitor one day. No one will leave voluntarily at the end of the mandate, said a young Burundian teacher in Gitega, it is an African problem, he added. In the author's opinion, the CNDD-FDD's determination stems from the legacy of the civil war. The generation that sacrificed so many years to armed struggle, is in no mood to let the state out of its hands. In Togo, it is the crimes that the RPT/UNIR members have committed since 1963 that causes deadlock according to a member of the National Assembly (identity withheld). In this legislator's opinion, even if a general pardon is promised, the RPT/UNIR would demand an international guarantee for fears that the promise would later be broken. It is hard to imagine that such multi-lateral agreement could ever be reached.

9 CONCLUSION

Political parties in the West have been mostly studies within the vast field of "democracy", especially liberal representative democracy. This discourse relies on several important connections such as democracy – regime (if the regime is democratic, it is good), democracy – multi-party elections (there is no democracy without multi-party elections), multi-party competition – governance (in the long term, multi-party competition improves governance). According to this discourse, political parties perform certain "functions" (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 7-9). More specifically, a process is postulated whereby multi-party competition leads, sooner or later, to political parties' institutionalization; strong, institutionalized parties promote vertical accountability; vertical accountability plus political alteration via multi-party elections improves governance. This conceptual apparatus has been applied to political parties elsewhere in the world. Because of the value-laden nature of the discourse on "democracy", this exercise inevitably leads to one of two outcomes. Either the non-Western political parties are found to be deficient in comparison to their Western ideal, or one is forced to question the study of "democracy" itself.
The dissertation adopts a second influential approach to the study of political parties that views them, above all, as organizations (Panebianco 1988: xi). It views parties as collective political actors that pursue certain goals and make choices to attain these goals. In this behaviour, they are constrained, on the one hand, by their organizational nature, and on the other hand, by the macro-social context in which they operate.

In the sub-Saharan context, this dissertation has focused on two central features of political parties thus. Firstly, this study has inquired into sub-Saharan parties' organizational cohesion; in other words, on mechanisms that enable them to survive over time as organizations. A hostile operating environment is the immediate contextual variable here. Secondly, this dissertation has focused on the way sub-Saharan parties create and maintain interactive connections with their voters, in other words, linkage. In this regard, proximity-based campaigning is the immediate contextual variable.

Applying this perspective to the material from field research in Zambia, Burundi, and Togo yields the following main results:

(1) Political parties were found to have more diverse sources of cohesion than those described in previous work (ethno-regional, clientelistic, and LeBas' (2011) identity barriers). This study reveals that non-cohesive multi-party competition is also possible.

(2) Development is identified as the dominant ideology in the three countries examined and, by extension, in sub-Saharan Africa at large.

(3) This dissertation has formulated new analytic tools for the study of electoral politics. It provides a new, more complete classification of party – voter linkages by making use of a wider range of appeals/controls. To eliminate the confounding variable of charisma, a distinction is made between linkages and genres in which the linkages are enacted. Charisma thus becomes one of the genres.

(4) Finally, this research work has put forward a comparative framework that enables the generation of specific hypotheses about political parties' behaviour in individual countries, primarily in terms of their territorial penetration, linkage strategies, and co-optation of local elites.

The political parties of Zambia, Burundi and Togo emerged from this exercise not as deficient, but simply different. In comparison to their Western counterparts, they are more inclined to be elite creations, often of individual strongmen, but not necessarily. They are not products of the socio-political cleavages described in the development of political parties in Europe and other parts of the developed world. Rather, they are products of the global spread of liberal democratic ideas and practices. Their ties to specific ideologies only partially overlap with those in the West. They are all tied to one dominant ideology – development. Other ideologies are also present – democracy, entrepreneurial (liberal), and state-centred (social-democratic) values and policies – but these ideas are generally less important in sub-Saharan Africa. Unable to use ideology to differentiate themselves, sub-Saharan parties deploy a wide range of non-programmatic linkages with many spectacle-like characteristics.

From this point of view, comparisons of Western and sub-Saharan political parties are useful for examining contrasting contexts but also serve a different analytical purpose. One can only conclude that sub-Saharan political parties are weaker and less sophisticated in some regards, but stronger and more sophisticated in other respects (such as non-programmatic linkage). In yet other regards, the sub-Saharan and Western parties are incommensurable. Rather than lament this incompatibility, the comparison employed in this dissertation encourages the researcher to look for analytic tools and theoretical concepts that would explain why this incommensurability exists. This dissertation points to several factors: incumbent/opposition disparity, a hostile operating environment, proximity-based campaigning, non-programmatic linkage, etc.

The relationship between multi-party competition, political alteration, governance, and societal conflict that lie in the background of many studies of political parties is complex and this dissertation has little to say about it. In this respect, LeBas (2011: 262) warns that “[t]urnovers can refresh popular belief in democracy and
electoral competition ... but they do not necessarily generate substantive changes in governance and accountability". At the same time, she believes in what we may call “democratic convergence”. Referring to V. V. Key’s book “Southern Politics in State and Nation” from 1949 that deals with corrupt and ineffective party competition in the American South, LeBas writes (2011: 262, emphasis added):

“Political change is unlikely to occur as rapidly in Africa as it did in Virginia and Florida, but the mechanisms that drive forward change are likely to be the same. The development of competitive, institutionalized party systems is the best means of encouraging political elites to respond to the demands of their constituents”.

In his monograph on African politics, Hydén (2006: 48) is ambivalent as well. On the one hand, in a rather paternalist tone, he admits convergence by claiming that “African countries still have some way to go before the new party politics turns into a functioning party system”. On the other hand, he repeatedly emphasizes an African socio-cultural preference for stability at the expense of economic and political competition coined in western individualist and liberal terms: “The big difference between Africa and the United States is that the markers for performance in the latter are related to change and growth, whereas in Africa they are related to stability and redistribution”; and elsewhere Hydén argues that “[p]eace and stability are more important indicators of success to people in Africa than the objective economic measures used by the international community” (Hydén 2006: 46, 229).

In Zambia, the relationship between multi-party competition, political alteration, and governance remains unclear. There seems to be some link but mainly to the benefit of the circulating elites. In Burundi, the re-introduction of multi-partism in 1992 led first to the civil war and later to the hegemony of the CNDD-FDD. It could be argued that governance partly improved thanks to this hegemony rather than in spite of it. In Togo, multi-party competition has led nowhere at best, and at worst it has resulted in the disappearance of the state other than its organized violence dimension.

A comparative inquiry into the party politics of three countries should provide at least some, however broad predictions. They must be read in conjunction with the rest of the text and not separately. In Burundi, the CNDD-FDD, unless it splits, will keep ruling; it will win both 2015 and 2020 elections. This political deadlock is caused by a large population of peasants and the intimate linkages the CNDD-FDD is able to cultivate with them. In Togo, even if a coalition of opposition parties succeeds in dislodging the UNIR from power one day, politics will remain a source of frustration, bitterness, and divisions. Governance will improve very slowly, if at all. A combination of historical and geographic factors lies at the root of the country’s predicament. In Zambia, only a class conflict can significantly change the course of events. With wealth inequality (as indicated by the GINI coefficient) already very high, the constituency elites that control the political parties and well-off state employees that depend on them would have to voluntarily lower their standard of living if they wanted to promote the poor majority. Of course, it is important to recognize that in any of the three countries examined in this study, powerful social, economic, or international factors may, at any time, put the multi-party competition on a different track altogether.

The reader will hardly be surprised about the new directions of research of the sub-Saharan political parties that this dissertation suggests. Looking for yet other sources of political parties’ cohesion is one of them. Mapping the linkage strategies of individual political parties both within and across national units is hugely promising domain of future research work. Stepping in the shoes of the parties’ campaign strategists would significantly enrich our understanding. The third path is to re-orient our attention to the symbology, ritual, and performance of party politics. This last approach would teach us to better “read” what happens at the party – voter interface.

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57 For an overview of reservations about the role of competition in democratization theories see LeBas (2011: 13-16).

58 If the author was a political consultant of the Ewe leadership, he would recommend it to propose Blitta to be the new capital. Without moving the centre of political gravity further north from the coast, it is difficult to imagine that the north-south division would be overcome.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


ANNEX 1: FIELDWORK - ZAMBIA

Fieldwork period:
5 weeks between August and October 2011: 9 days in Lusaka, 16 days in Western province, 11 days in Eastern province.

Immediate context:
Election campaign and election aftermath: tripartite general elections were held on 20 September 2011.

Gender of interviewees:
26 males and 3 females (1 party member and the 2 temporary workers)

Length of interviews:
The shortest interview lasted 30 minutes, the longest 3.5 hours; the average duration was 90 minutes.

Other:
Several election rallies in Mongu (Western province) and Lusaka were observed. Local newspapers were followed (especially the Post and the Times of Zambia).

TABLE 20
ZAMBIA: LIST OF RESEARCH INTERVIEWS AND THEIR PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>PARTICIPANT(S)</th>
<th>POLITICAL PARTY</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DURATION (in minutes)</th>
<th>HOW MANY TIMES REFERENCED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Z1</td>
<td>NAREP</td>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Z2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Z3</td>
<td>ULP</td>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Z4, Z5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Z6</td>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Z7, Z8</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Z9, Z10</td>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Z11</td>
<td>UPND</td>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Z12</td>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Z13</td>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Z14</td>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>W Province</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Z15</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Z16</td>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Z17</td>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Z18</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Z19</td>
<td>UPND</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Z20</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Z21</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Z22, Z23, Z24</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Z25</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Z26</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Chipata</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Z27</td>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>E Province</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Z28, Z29</td>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29 persons</td>
<td>7 political parties</td>
<td>5 locations</td>
<td>33h 55min</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: fieldnotes
Notes: The interviews were conducted between 2 September and 2 October 2011 and are listed in chronological order. The last column shows the total count of referencing individual respondents in the dissertation. For group interviews the counts are added up. The counts give a general idea about proportion of individual contributions.
## TABLE 21
ZAMBIA: POSITIONS OF INTERVIEWEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL / TYPE</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary members</td>
<td>(2 of them from campaign teams)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constituency Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-chairperson</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Publicity and Information Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>District Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Campaign Manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth Chairperson</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Publicity and Information Secretary</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Committee Member</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (province?)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates</td>
<td>MP candidate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MP candidacy contender</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local government candidate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-members</td>
<td>Political consultant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consultancy employee Z4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Consultancy employee Z5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: fieldnotes

* The position of the only female party member is de-gendered for confidentiality reasons.

** The three candidates appear twice since their party positions are counted as well.
ANNEX 2: FIELDWORK - BURUNDI

Fieldwork period:
4 weeks in September and October 2012

Immediate context:
The middle of election cycle, several opposition leaders in self-imposed exile, opposition parties paralyzed

Locations:
Provinces: Bujumbura, Cibitoke, Gitega, Kirundo, Muramvya, Muyinga, and Ngozi.

Gender of interviewees:
Males only

Length of interviews:
The shortest interview lasted 30 minutes, the longest 2.5 hours; the average duration was 87 minutes.

TABLE 22
BURUNDI: LIST OF RESEARCH INTERVIEWS AND THEIR PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>PARTICIPANT(S)</th>
<th>POLITICAL PARTY</th>
<th>DURATION (in minutes)</th>
<th>HOW MANY TIMES REFERENCED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>B1, B2</td>
<td>Sangwe-PADER, no party</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>B4</td>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>B5</td>
<td>Sangwe-PADER</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>B6</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>B7</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>B8</td>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>B9</td>
<td>no party</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>B10, B11,B12</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD, CNDD-FDD, no party</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>B13</td>
<td>no party</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>B14</td>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>B15</td>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>B16</td>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>B17</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>B18</td>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>B19</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>B20</td>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>B21</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>B22</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>B23</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>B24</td>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>B25</td>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>B26</td>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>B27</td>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27 persons</td>
<td>7 political parties</td>
<td>34h 35min</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: fieldnotes
Notes:
The interviews are not listed in chronological order and their precise locations are not indicated for security reasons.
The last column shows the total count of referencing individual respondents in the article. For group interviews the counts are added up. The counts give a general idea about proportion of individual contributions.
**TABLE 23**

**BURUNDI: POSITIONS OF THE INTERVIEWEES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary members</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillside</td>
<td>Hillside president</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-president of a sub-hillside committee</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commune</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executive secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commissary for information</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Head of the ex-combatant wing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Head of the youth wing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executive secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spokesman</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member of the central committee</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-members</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO coordinator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Village priest</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>28*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: fieldnotes

* One interviewee was a communal executive secretary and simultaneously a member of the central committee.
ANNEX 3: FIELDWORK - TOGO

Fieldwork period:
7 weeks in October and November 2012

Immediate context:
According to the country's constitution, legislative elections were supposed to be held by 14 October 2012 but were postponed into 2013; strong mobilization of the opposition in the capital.

Locations:
Atakpamé, Dapaong, Kpalimé, Kara, Lomé, Sokodé, and a small town in the Savanes region

Gender of interviewees:
32 males and 4 females

Length of interviews:
The shortest interview lasted 20 minutes, the longest 3.25 hours; the average duration was 74 minutes.

TABLE 24
TOGO: LIST OF RESEARCH INTERVIEWS AND THEIR PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>PARTICIPANT(S)</th>
<th>POLITICAL PARTY</th>
<th>DURATION (in minutes)</th>
<th>HOW MANY TIMES REFERENCED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>T1, T2</td>
<td>UNIR</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>T3</td>
<td>UFC</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>T4</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>T5, T6</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>T7</td>
<td>no party</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>T8</td>
<td>OBUTS</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>T9, T10, T11</td>
<td>UNIR</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>T12, T13</td>
<td>UNIR</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>T14-18</td>
<td>UFC, ANC, Sursaut Togo ...</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>T19</td>
<td>UNIR</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>T20</td>
<td>CDPA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>T21, T22</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>T23, T24</td>
<td>UFC</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>T25</td>
<td>CDPA</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>T26</td>
<td>UNIR</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>T27</td>
<td>UNIR</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>T28</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>T29, T30</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>T31</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>T32</td>
<td>UNIR</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>T34</td>
<td>MCD</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>T35</td>
<td>ADDI</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>T36</td>
<td>UNIR</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36 persons</td>
<td>10 political parties</td>
<td>29h 40min</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: fieldnotes
Notes: The interviews are not listed in chronological order and their precise locations are not indicated for security reasons. The last column shows the total count of referencing individual respondents in the article. For group interviews the counts are added up. The counts give a general idea about proportion of individual contributions.
### TABLE 25
TOGO: POSITIONS OF THE INTERVIEWEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary members</td>
<td></td>
<td>9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-section</td>
<td>Communication secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focal point</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President of youth wing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-president of youth wing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President of women’s wing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Member of parliament</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary responsible for party structure</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liaison officer in charge of labour unions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant of party president</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-member</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: fieldnotes

* Three from among the ordinary members were simultaneously federal representatives of a civil society organization affiliated to their party and held the following positions there: president, communication secretary, member of federal committee.